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I passed by a graffiti in the center of Budapest during the Serb-Croatian war, which
claimed that “Milosevic is a pig”. Under this text, there was a sagacious response also
in English stating that “Human beings are the problem”. Almost a decade later, the
graffiti is still there. Nobody repainted the wall; probably in order to leave the graffiti as
a memento for the senseless bloodshed in the Balkans.
Human beings are the problem in the sense that despite the painful consequences,
they choose to make sacrifices for their group and participate in an action that results in
intergroup conflict. There is no need to raise extensive arguments as to why these
harmful conflicts should receive special attention in the social sciences. It is also
needless to say that not all intergroup relations end up in conflict. Just the opposite, we
find that groups in most cases can live peacefully together (Fearon and Laitin, 1996;
Gould, 1999). Therefore, the most challenging question for scientific research is to
determine the conditions under which peaceful relations prevail. Developments in this
direction could offer methods of conflict resolution and hopefully, might lead to policy
advice and implementation.
There is no doubt that policy makers are in a strong need of suggestions for handling
intergroup relations of several kinds. Recent examples of civil war, ethnic hostility,
fights between soccer fans or between urban gangs bitterly show that conflicts often
remain unresolved or are only solved with tremendous effort. International warfare of
alliances of nations is an analogy on a larger scale and confrontation between pupil
groups often causes a similar headache on a smaller scale. And this is by far not the end
of the list of poisonous intergroup relations.
For proper advice to politicians we need a better understanding and a deepened
explanation of violent confrontations. Sometimes we need to argue from the opposite
point of view and have to concentrate on the emergence of peaceful coexistence, like
the rise of a live-and-let-live system in the trenches in World War I. Sometimes in
similar circumstances we do not have to worry about individual participation, but rather
about the lack of participants, like in the case of voting in two-party democracies. All of
these and many more examples relate to the very same problem of 

	 that are based on individual contributions.
To determine the conditions for the emergence of intergroup conflict and peace we
have to ascertain under which circumstances group members are willing to make
contributions to harmful intergroup competitions. Furthermore, in order to do this, we
have to explore the 	 
 that drive individuals towards sacrifices
against another group. This sort of logic is grounded on the principles of

	 (Coleman, 1990) and it is in strong contrast with previous
explanations of intergroup conflict that were built on macro mechanisms and are still
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very much in fashion. The logic of explanation in this study is also in contrast with
theoretical and empirical research that examines individual causes, but fails to reveal
the mechanisms behind these effects.
In general, little has been said before now about the social mechanisms that lead to
intergroup conflict. As a major contribution, this study aims to highlight causal chains
that stem from the  of human action (Granovetter, 1985). Individual
decisions in the intergroup context are interdependent, embedded in the social structure,
and embedded in a historical context. They are , because contribution to
harmful intergroup competition has an effect on intergroup relations and consequently
on the well-being of others. Moreover, it has also a direct effect on actions that others
undertake. Such influences are especially strong among friends, neighbors, colleagues,
and family members, which means that the network of individual relationships
constrains individual actions. This explains why 
	 has an impact
on intergroup relations. On the other hand, lethal clashes in the past and prospects of
future relations have firm effects on present attitudes and actions in the intergroup
context. This is the reason why 	 	 plays a crucial role in
intergroup competitions.
The question of how interdependence and embeddedness influence decisions in the
intergroup context and consequently the outcome of intergroup relations is central in
this study. This question frames the theoretical model building in the research, as well
as the methodology we apply to detect fundamental processes. Among effects of
structural embeddedness, particular attention is devoted to the effect of  and
to the underlying 
	
 mechanisms. With regard to temporal embeddedness,
we are mainly interested in tracing typical 
 of intergroup relations and
individual 	 
 that are responsible for the changes. We use
 and laboratory  as research tools that are quite unconventional
in this field. We do this with the aim of better understanding, explanation, and
prediction of intergroup conflict and peace.
In this chapter we summarize the objectives of this study and give an introduction
to the analysis of intergroup conflict and peace. Section 1.2 introduces the general
research problem. In Section 1.3 we provide an overview of related theories of
intergroup conflict and attempt to highlight some fundamental problems of existing
approaches. In Section 1.4 we discuss why we line up behind the 		
of intergroup relations. A major scientific relevance of this study lies within the
incorporation of effects of structural embeddedness into the team games model. The
background of this model development is discussed in Section 1.5 and the
cornerstones of the model extension are introduced in Section 1.6. A discussion about
the effects of temporal embeddedness follows in Section 1.7. The main research
questions of this study are formulated in Section 1.8. The primary motivations for
using simulations and experiments as methodological tools are presented in Section








In our attempt to determine underlying mechanisms that influence the likelihood of
intergroup conflicts, we first have to clarify what kind of conflicts we study. There are
many forms and reasons of intergroup conflict, too many and too different to provide a
general theory for all of them. Being less ambitious, we restrict our interest to conflicts
between two groups that are  consequences of conscious and voluntary
actions of group members. Unintended conflicts are suboptimal outcomes compared to
other outcomes, like peaceful coexistence. Examples are violent clashes between ethnic
groups in residential neighborhoods or in villages and harmful competitions between
pupil groups. We would like to explain such outcomes without assuming that group
members actually seek harmful outcomes. As we have a limited scope of interest, we
will use the term 	

 only in the following restricted meaning.
# !"!! $	 

 is an aggregated consequence of individual
contributions to an action of the group that hurts the interests of the other group.
The definition presumes that we consider intergroup conflict as an 
consequence of  contributions. The definition applies to situations in which
two distinct groups are involved. We emphasize that we do not consider groups as
unitary actors, but as collections of individual decision makers who have the right to
decide about their contributions. Furthermore, the definition also specifies the
relationship that exists between the two groups. If an action of one group hurts the
collective interests of the other group, there is a 	
 between the
two groups. Negative interdependency occurs in 	 
 situations, in
which territory, power, economic and social incentives, or other scarce resources are at
stake. For instance, opposite sides in civil war may fight for power or street gangs may
contend to obtain social identity. These situations are symmetrical in the sense that a
competitive action of one group hurts the other group and a competitive action of the
other side also hurts the first group. If both sides act competitively, it results in a
mutually harmful outcome that is worse for all than the lack of competitive action. For
example, an endless war or bloody street battles is worse than living in peace for both
parties.
Situations, in which intentional actions of individuals result in suboptimal outcomes
for everyone, are described as 
	 . Consider the following more formal
definition given by van Lange et al. (1992: 4):
# !"!" %
	 can be defined as situations in which each decision
maker is best off acting in his own self-interest, regardless of what the other
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	!
persons do. Each self-interested decision, however, creates a negative outcome or
cost for the other people who are involved. When a large number of people make the
self-interested choice, the costs or negative outcomes accumulate, creating a situation
in which everybody would have done better had they decided not to act in their own
private interest.1
Under certain conditions intergroup conflict is a social dilemma, but a special one in
which people’s 




 of the group. The collective action, however, creates a negative
outcome or cost for members of another group and a gain for members of the own
group. If a large number of members in both groups contribute to the group actions,
then everybody is worse off than they would be in the absence of contributions. Hence,
unlike in single group social dilemmas, 
				
 from the
collective point of view. For instance, in civil war, the choice of shooting with many
comrades is a contribution to a collective action that hurts the interests of the enemy.
When there are enough warriors in both groups, balanced fighting results in bloodshed.
The question now is how can contribution be the self-interested choice. This is a
challenging question as in single group collective action 	 
	 is the
unconditional best strategy. The structure of interdependency within the group is not
different in intergroup related collective action. The difference is the competition
between the groups. In order to explore the role of intergroup competition and examine
under what conditions it can provide a structural solution for the collective action
problem within the group (cf. Bornstein, Erev, and Rosen, 1990; Erev, Bornstein, and
Galili, 1993), we need to integrate modeling interdependencies within the group and
between the groups. These interdependencies cannot be separated, therefore should not
be handled separately. It is quite surprising that this association has been hardly made




The fundamental question is why do people join collective actions that are harmful
in the intergroup context, if they have to make sacrifices. This is the question we need
to answer in order to find an explanation for the emergence of lethal conflicts between
groups.
Specification of all factors that possibly influence individual decisions and
consequently the likelihood of intergroup conflict goes far beyond our possibilities. We
concentrate on the 
 between the groups for certain scarce resources and on
the 
 and 	 of individual actions. First, individuals are
encouraged to participate in conflict by rewards of intergroup competition and
                                                          
1
 There are also less restrictive definitions of social dilemmas that do not require that following self-




comparison, such as territory, pride, or social identity. Second, they gain merits from
social connections and relationships with others in their group. Third, they are
mobilized by revenge, experience, and other factors based on the past, and expectations,
fear, and other factors based on the future.
The analysis of 
	 in intergroup conflict is an original aspect
of this study. When individuals decide to participate in conflict, they are influenced by
the presence, opinion, and behavior of their friends, neighbors, colleagues, and their
family. They also receive relevant information through these connections. Actors and
the interpersonal connections among them are referred to as the 
	 '
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 9). Surprisingly, research on intergroup conflict until now
has disregarded social network effects almost completely (exceptions are Flap, 1988;
Nelson, 1989; Gould, 1999; Bhavnani and Backer, 2000). By focusing on the relevance
of networks of social relationships we can gain a better understanding of conflicts in
different structural environments. Examples are how different residential structures
affect the likelihood of ethnic conflict, how seating policies influence the likelihood of
conflict between supporters in a stadium, as well as which settlement policies can help
conflict resolution. Since there are many possible structural configurations and several
network properties that can be important in intergroup relations, we should specify
which structural characteristics are the focus of our exploration.
Inspired by empirical puzzles and debates, our research problem about social
network effects is primarily centered around the effect of  on intergroup
conflict. The level of segregation is conceptualized as the extent to which group
members have ties among each other compared to all connections in the social network.
Consequently, the question why and under what conditions segregation increases the
likelihood of intergroup conflict is equivalent to asking why and under what conditions
dense within group relations and scarce intergroup relations support the emergence of
intergroup conflict.
There are already indications in classical sociology that segregation results in a
higher level of intergroup-tension, which makes conflicts more likely (Simmel,
1955[1908]; Sumner, 1974[1906]; Coser, 1968[1956]). In the academic debate over
school desegregation, for instance, Blalock (1986) has emphasized the effect of racial
segregation on interracial tension. The implementation of school desegregation policy
in the seventies in the United States brought improvements to interracial relations
(Blalock, 1986; Granovetter, 1986). There is also empirical evidence of the effect of
residential segregation on ethnic conflicts (cf. Harris, 1979; Diez Medrano, 1994;
Hasson, 1996; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996).
On the other hand, some residential studies debate that segregation in cities would
result in the emergence of ethnic conflicts (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Lieberson,
1963). An outburst of ethnic violence at residential division lines with a mixed
population and self-sustaining migration movements towards segregation evoked
government policies supporting residential  (Belfast, Jerusalem, Usti nad
Labem, Mostar, or Kosovska Mitrovica are recent examples). Building walls and
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destroying or closing bridges together with a deployment of armed forces, although
radical tools to achieve interethnic peace, they nevertheless provided a solution. This
solution often seems only temporary as tension between the opposing ethnic groups is
far from being extinguished. In other cases, separation is successful, because intergroup
conflict ends with a disappearance of its object (cf. Simmel, 1955[1908]). If negative
interdependencies are unavoidable and intergroup competition situations occur over and
over again, separation policy can even support lethal conflicts.
It is likely that there is no general answer for whether or not desegregation is an
effective policy to decrease violence between groups. In this study we address the
question 	 	 	 	 
	 	 
	 	 '	 
	

. Since segregation is the aggregation of ego-network attributes and
intergroup conflict is an aggregation of intentional individual decisions, the proper way
to find explanatory mechanisms is to look at the relationship between ego-networks and
individual decisions. Therefore, we have to find an explanation to 			

	 
	 	 	 	 	 




							 In this explanation, we have to reveal the
micro mechanisms that cause the effects of structural relations. This also helps to
specify how the segregation effect depends on the nature and content of interpersonal
relationships.
What complicates our analysis is that groups rarely face only one single competition
situation. As they live alongside one another, competition situations occur repeatedly.
There might be changes in the nature of interdependency, but often similar situations
are recurrent. On one hand, previous outcomes certainly play an important role in
subsequent competitions, as they influence forthcoming decisions. On the other hand,
foresight of future intergroup and social relations also poses limitations on current
actions. Hence, our investigation cannot be complete without considering the effects of
	.
General observation in the literature about dynamic intergroup relations is that there
are two likely scenarios. One, which fortunately occurs more often, is long lasting peace
and the other is a lethal spiral of violence (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). We are interested
whether and under what conditions these paths occur and what are the underlying
mechanisms causing them. In order to help conflict resolution, we will attempt to show
the conditions that best promote the evolution of peaceful scenarios and reduce the
emergence of durable conflict. We are interested in 	 	 	 	 









. For answers, we
have to consult again mechanisms at the micro level. We have to find an explanation to
	 	 	 	 	 	 
)	 	 	 	 

	 	 













In the previous section, we specified our general research problem. In this section,
we briefly discuss a selection of previous research on intergroup conflict. We will also
consider studies that use the concept of intergroup conflict in a broader sense or in a
different way than we do, since their findings might be instructive for this study. This
overview is deliberately biased towards theories that are directed at intergroup
competition, social networks, and historical effects as factors that are related to
intergroup conflict and peace.
We structure this selection along the division line between macro and micro
approaches, although the border between them is probably not as unambiguous as we
propose. Furthermore, there is an overlap with the categorization offered by Lindenberg
(1997). According to Lindenberg, interdependencies that make group relations




First, we discuss some classical theories in macrosociology that concentrate on
functional interdependence in intergroup relations. Second, we turn to highly influential
thoughts in the social psychology of intergroup relations that emphasize cognitive
interdependencies. Third, we target microsociological and economic approaches that
cope with functional and structural interdependencies.
Classical theories mainly focused on 
	  and on 


 in intergroup relations. The main concern of the seminal work of
Simmel (1955[1908]; 1955[1922]) was the functional role of intergroup conflict on
cohesion and solidarity within the group. Besides internal solidarity, another product
Simmel emphasized was the integration of the group (Simmel, 1955[1908]: 91):  “…the
group as a whole may enter into an antagonistic relation with a power outside of it, and
it is because of this that the tightening of the relations among its members and the
intensification of its unity, in consciousness and in action, occur.” Simmel also
discussed the content of interpersonal relationships that drives towards participation in
conflict. He argued that individuals have a limited choice in conflict situations, as the
force to comply to a uniform action is very strong (Simmel, 1955[1908]: 92-93):  “A
state of conflict … pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such a
uniform impulse that they either must completely get along with, or completely repel,
one another.”
Drawing on the work of Simmel, 
	

	 was oriented towards the
functions of intergroup conflict (Coser, 1968[1956]; 1967). As Coser (1968[1956])
claimed, a primary function of conflict is that it establishes and maintains group
identities and boundaries. Furthermore it is a basic source of internal solidarity. Besides
the functions, the sources of conflict are also of central interest in realistic conflict
theory. The starting point of realistic conflict is intergroup competition (Williams, 1947;
Blumer, 1958; Coser 1968[1956]; Sherif, 1966a). Groups compete with each other for
certain scarce resources and the scarcity of these resources makes intergroup conflict
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“realistic”. Groups try to obtain these resources, because it is in their economic (or any
other type of) interest. For instance, religions are in ideological conflict with each other
when they claim to be the one and only true religion (Allport, 1954). In general,
hostility towards the competitive group is just the means for obtaining the scarce
resources for the in-group. Hence, groups involved in realistic conflict are in a certain
sense rational. Still, this approach has nothing to do with rational individual choice (cf.
Coenders, 2001: 14), as it considers the groups as the units of analysis and not the
individual members of the groups.
Realistic conflict theory was extended in the individualistic direction by Blalock
(1967). Blalock handled actual intergroup competition for scarce resources at the macro
level separately from individual actions. In his model, individuals are mobilized if they

	 intergroup competition or an out-group threat. This perception does not
necessarily have to coincide with an actual competition (e.g., LeVine and Campbell,
1972: 41).
The analysis of Richardson (1948a; 1948b) did not consider the group as the unit of
analysis, but was based on statistical proportions of individuals with different moods in
the rival groups. His study examined the effect of time on the number of persons in
different ( in two opposing nations. Richardson explained changes in these
numbers by an underlying mechanism that is analogous to epidemics. Friendly and
hostile attitudes spread irreversibly as a disease or fashion and result in transitions from
one mood to another. When appropriate transition rules and starting parameters are
assumed, the typical phases of symmetrical war can be deduced. For certain values of
the parameters a balanced state of armament levels is derived. The other two typical
scenarios are escalation of a runaway arms race and complete disarmament
(Richardson, 1951; 1960). However, just like the classical macrosociological theories,
these derivations fail to reveal the micro foundations of intergroup conflict and peace.
$ and 
	 
 are the focus of theories about
intergroup conflict and attitudes in 
	
. On the other hand, these theories
tend to neglect the importance of functional interdependencies between the groups that
is at least recognized by macrosociological approaches.
The positive association between positive attitudes toward in-group members and
negative attitudes toward out-group members is emphasized by the theoretical concept
of 
 (Sumner 1974[1906]; LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Brewer, 1981).
Sumner (1974[1906]) claimed that this association is universal and every group has a
syndrome of ethnocentrism. In this respect, there is sufficient supporting evidence in the
empirical literature, for instance, the studies of urban gangs (Suttles, 1967; Jankowski,
1991: 88).
Sherif in his “	 	 

” focused on the emergence of negative out-group
attitudes and intergroup hostility (Sherif, 1966b; Sherif and Sherif, 1969). In line with
realistic conflict theory, he emphasized that competitions between groups have a




attitudes, and on the emergence of hostile behavior (Sherif, 1966a; 1966b). In his field
experiments in a young boys summer camp, he showed how sport competitions and
segregation led to a greater distance between the groups, to prejudice, and even to
occasional hostilities (Sherif, 1966b). Sherif also attempted to find possible resolutions
of conflict. Contact between members of the groups that does not involve
interdependence among them did not improve intergroup relations; occasional meetings
just provided a place for hostile behavior and clashes. On the other hand, the
establishment of superordinate, common goals fairly improved the situation. As groups
faced a series of cooperative interdependencies, hostilities were disappearing (Sherif,
1966b; Brewer, 1996a).
For the emergence of in-group favoritism and out-group hostility it is not required
that groups are organized or have an established set of norms. In the pursuit of minimal
conditions that are sufficient to facilitate intergroup conflict, Tajfel and his colleagues
conducted a series of 	 	  (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971;
Billig and Tajfel, 1973). In these experiments, there was no social interaction between
the subjects, furthermore the groups were created on a cognitive basis and therefore
they are referred to as “minimal”.  * based on the estimation of the number
of dots in a drawing or on the preferences for the paintings of Klee and Kandinsky was
already sufficient for the emergence of in-group favoritism. Besides this highly
influential result, a pragmatic value of minimal group experiments was that they were
able to distinguish and control for different effects, unlike field experiments, where it is
also difficult and partly unethical to create “real” social groups.
The minimal group experiments stimulated the formation of 
	 	 
(Tajfel, 1981; 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). The basic premise of social identity
theory is that individuals strive to achieve or maintain a satisfactory image about them
and an important aspect of self-definition is group identification. Social identity is
primarily relational and comparative in nature as it is based on intergroup comparison.
The polarization of the noble in-group image and the evil out-group picture provides
positive social identity. The need for a positive psychological group distinctiveness can
be achieved through social comparison. Intergroup competition provides this
comparison, which explains the emergence of in-group favoritism. Individuals invest
emotional energy to develop social identity and this might be the basis of their
behavioral decision to participate in actions of the in-group. In these cases social
identity is not taken into account purposefully, however the strive for social identity can
indirectly explain why group members are mobilized (cf. Macy, 1997).
The follow-up of social identity theory has taken different routes. On one side, (

* theory emphasized intergroup behavior in terms of underlying cognitive
representations. Radical views expressed that individuals are “transformed into groups”
via the process of self-categorization (Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 21), meaning that this
cognitive mechanism is sufficient for thinking in group terms. On the other side, critical
remarks maintain that social identity is obtained conditionally, only if the group is seen
as an acting social unit (Horwitz and Rabbie, 1982). This approach gives more attention
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to the instrumental character of intergroup relations in which one group competes with
another group to achieve valued goals (Rabbie, 1982). Some critics in political science
argue that the establishment of group identity might have no negative effect at all on the
other group. An example is the distinction between the concept of “healthy” patriotism
and harmful chauvinism at Kosterman and Feshbach (1989).
These approaches in social psychology emphasized the role of cognitive
interdependencies in intergroup relations. On the other hand, they disregarded macro
relations between the groups and functional and structural interdependencies.
The individualistic perspective of social psychology and the emphasis on functional






 theories. For this study, these research directions are
most essential, as we intend to explore the micro foundations of intergroup conflict and
we have only a side interest in analyzing cognitive interdependencies.
Segregation and its evolution were the focus of some pioneer models in 


 sociology. Models of Schelling (1971; 1978) and Esser (1986) have
demonstrated how residential segregation can evolve as an unintended result of
intentional individual action. These models, however, concentrated on neighborhood
preferences as a source of segregation and they did not specify what was wrong with
segregation and how it was related to intergroup relations.
Economic incentives are emphasized in intergroup relations by 
	 

 (Gellner, 1983; Olzak, 1986; 1992). Ethnic groups are considered as effective
coalitions that are formed to extract material benefits from others or to defend
possessions. This is also the source of ethnic competition and violence. The stronger the
ethnic competition, the more severe the attitudes towards the competitor group are
(Olzak, 1986). A core hypothesis is that ethnic collective action is intensified by
desegregation of the labor market, as employment possibilities are scarce and they are
also the targets of ethnic competition (Olzak, 1992: 3). Ethnic groups (and also other
groups), however, have fixed group boundaries and membership is not a question of
choice. As entry and exit is blocked, ethnic networks enjoy several advantages, like
trust, cohesion, and easier establishment of collective action (Wintrobe, 1995).
A substantial element of intergroup relations that was neglected by all models
discussed so far is 
	 
. As a formal study of strategic
interdependence, noncooperative 	 is ideally suited for sociological concerns
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Schelling, 1960). A
contradiction between individual and collective interests is modeled by social dilemma
games, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod,
1984; Poundstone, 1992). Considering the wide range of societal applications, it is no
surprise that for the study of individual behavior in these situations a new research field
has evolved (e.g., Dawes, 1980; Liebrand, 1983; van Lange et al., 1992; Kollock,
1998). %
	 	 




model for the interdependence of actions and not due to its key assumption of
rationality (Macy, 1991b: 810).
The strategic interdependence of individual decisions in intergroup relations is
emphasized by recent models of Fearon and Laitin (1996), Gould (1999), and Bhavnani
and Backer (2000). These models also recognize that ways of resolving intergroup
conflict are difficult to find, if explanations are only provided for conflict and not for
intergroup (interethnic) peace. Furthermore, individuals have contradicting interests
considering intergroup and within-group relations. Conflict between the groups often




Bhavnani and Backer, 2000). Successful mobilization within the group is difficult to
achieve; violent competitions are therefore less frequent than peaceful coexistence.
We follow this research path in this study. In order to explain the emergence of
intergroup conflict and peace, we develop an explanation for individual participation in
conflict. For this purpose, we base our theoretical model on the 	 approach
that considers strategic interdependence of individual actions both in the intergroup
context and within the group. The subsequent section provides an introduction to this
approach. In this way, this research diverts from explanations of group conflict that
disregarded the purposefulness of individual action and also from studies that failed to
recognize the conflict between individual and group interests.
	/ (&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The theories introduced in the previous section are all lacking one or more aspects
of what we believe an adequate theory on intergroup conflict should have. First of all,
groups cannot be handled as unitary entities as they consist of consciously acting
individuals who primarily care about their own gains and losses. The most
challenging problem for research is when intergroup conflict is an aggregated
outcome of voluntary and intentional individual actions. The theoretical foundations
we choose for our analysis should take this into consideration.
The explanation should be supported by a theoretical model that gives meaningful
predictions of the conditions under which conflict and peace are likely to occur. The
appropriate model should represent the duality of within-group and intergroup
interdependencies. Furthermore, the explanation of intergroup conflict should start
from a simple and abstract theoretical model (Lindenberg, 1992). In this section, we
argue what should be the key elements of a simple model of intergroup competitions
and we introduce the theoretical framework that would be the departure point of the
theoretical investigation in this study.
Considering within group interdependency as a 

	
	 is one key
element in the model of intergroup relations. Either looking at civil war, violence
between football supporters, or fights between urban gangs, participation in conflict
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involves high costs and risk for group members. Individuals have to sacrifice time and
sometimes money to take part. They can have serious injuries and might even risk
their lives. If they do not participate and leave others “doing the job”, they can still
enjoy the benefits. Benefits of intergroup competition (for instance, public happiness,
pride, or social identity) can be considered as group 
	, because there is no
rivalry in consumption and no group member can be excluded from the consumption.
This is the reason why individuals are able to free ride on the effort of others and the
within group interdependency can be considered as a collective action problem.
Individual contributions are costly, therefore group beneficial collective action is
difficult to achieve.
What makes intergroup conflict different from other collective action problems is the

	 	 	 . As it was suggested first by realistic conflict
theory (see previous section), the origin of intergroup conflict is that the groups
compete for obtaining certain scarce resources. Examples of such resources are
territory or economic control. However, intergroup competition can also be heated by
immaterial benefits, like pride, avoidance of shame, or social identity. Benefits to
football hooligans are certainly only immaterial and consists of, for instance, the pride
of being the most feared ultras. As an immaterial benefit that exists only in intergroup
relations, the striving for social identity can explain group-beneficial behavior in
minimal groups (Tajfel, 1970). It can also provide a reason for why groups are more
competitive and aggressive than individuals (cf. Kramer and Brewer, 1984; 1986; Tajfel
and Turner, 1986), which is referred as the 
	 
	 (Schopler and Insko,
1992; Insko et al., 1993; 1994). Experiments also confirmed that when they are playing
alone and when they are members of groups, individuals behave differently (Bornstein,
Erev, and Rosen, 1990; Schopler and Insko, 1992; Insko et al., 1994; Bornstein and
Ben-Yossef, 1994). Subjects were more inclined to make sacrifices for their group to
win from another group than they were for themselves in two-person situations.
Which group is able to realize the benefits of intergroup competition depends on an
	
 of strength and efficiency of mobilization of group members.
Practically, one of the major determinants is the number of people mobilized.
Meanwhile the winning group obtains the benefits, the other group can suffer from
negative consequences (for instance, loss of resources, shame, humiliation). For
instance, successful recruitment of volunteers into paramilitary units creates possible
gains for the in-group, but certainly hurts the interests of the out-group. Both sides are
punished in the case of mobilization of a similar strength. Endless civil war, unsettled
disputes, mutually harmful clashes are such examples where no benefits are realized.
These outcomes are worse for everyone compared to no mobilization and peace.
This character of intergroup interdependence resembles the two-person +,
# (e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1984;
Poundstone, 1992). If groups were unitary entities and they could choose between
mobilization and no mobilization, mobilization would be their 	.	This




mobilization. Following the dominant strategy by both sides would result in a
suboptimal outcome.
However, groups do not fight with each other in every situation. They are often
unable to establish collective action because of ramifying interests within the group.
This way, within group interdependencies can help to solve conflicts between the
groups. Hence, there are two different perspectives of the situation. Conflicts between
groups can be resolved by interdependencies within the groups. On the other hand,
intergroup competition can be considered as a possible structural solution to social
dilemmas within the group (Bornstein, Erev, and Rosen, 1990; Erev, Bornstein, and
Galili, 1993). To summarize, the model of intergroup competition should capture this
duality of within-group and intergroup interdependencies and should represent the
mixed motives of individual decisions.
Until now, however, 	 	 	 











'	 	 . A framework that would allow for a combined
modeling is offered by the 	 	 
 (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983;
Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987). In team games, competitive group relations are
represented by a game. There are two levels of the game. At the intergroup level,
groups as aggregates face an interdependent situation. Group action is determined as a
consequence of individual actions within the group. Individuals decide either to
contribute to the group action (make a sacrifice for their group) or not.2 Individual
decisions are strategically interdependent, which is represented as -person games at the
within-group level.
In the $	+,	# (IPD) game (Bornstein, 1992; Insko et al.,
1994; Bornstein, Winter, and Goren, 1996; Goren and Bornstein, 2000) individuals are
always better off when they do not participate in the group action. Public rewards for
group members increase with the difference between the number of participants in the
own group and in the other group. Besides, if the numbers of participants are equal,
higher rewards are distributed, in case more people are mobilized. In this game, no
participation is a dominant strategy equilibrium that is suboptimal in comparison to the
outcome in which everyone participates.
Similarly, in the $	 +
	 - (IPG) game (Rapoport and Bornstein,
1987; Bornstein, 1992) intergroup competition is based on the number of contributors.
Public good benefits are distributed in the group with more contributors. In case the
numbers of contributors are equal, scarce public good rewards are divided between the
groups. In the IPG game, individuals do not have a dominant strategy, since there are
situations in which a single decision changes the result of the competition. Still, in most
cases, not contributing is a more beneficial option.
The IPG game nicely represents the dichotomy of interdependencies within the
groups (provision of a public good) and between the groups (intergroup competition).
                                                          
2
 In several intergroup competitions individual decisions are not binary, but continuous (for instance,
how accurately warriors shoot in civil war).
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On the other hand, the IPD game can illustrate the social trap character of harmful
intergroup competitions. If both groups are able to mobilize their members effectively,
the result of the competition is harmful for both sides. A modification of the IPG game
with this character would result in a model that describes more closely lethal intergroup
conflicts.
In this section, we introduced the team games approach as a model of intergroup
relations. We discussed the key elements of this model and its advantages compared to
other approaches. Based on these arguments we choose the team games model of
intergroup relations as a departure point for theory development in this study.







. As the primary objective of this study is to explain
why individuals participate in harmful intergroup collective actions, we need to
overcome this deficiency of the team games model. Furthermore, 	 

	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
. Behavior is
embedded structurally, as everyone’s behavior is to a large extent constrained by
neighbors, friends, and the family, regardless of group affiliations. Not only the team
games approach, but also other prominent theories of intergroup conflict neglected the
role of interpersonal relations (including all that was discussed in Section 1.3). As we
are interested in the explanation of intergroup conflict and peace, we need a model
extension that can deal with behavioral constraints and influences of social networks.
For this reason, in this study 		 
	
		 	 
					. Considering structural embeddedness in the
analysis of intergroup conflict is a new development and a major contribution of this
research. Before going into details about how we implement this, in the next section we
will provide a brief overview of previous research that emphasized effects of structural
embeddedness.
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In order to reveal how structural embeddedness constrains individual behavior, in
this section we discuss some theoretical suggestions and results of previous research.
These recommendations might support the explanation of how interpersonal ties
influence individual participation in intergroup related collective action.
With regard to interpersonal contact and interaction between members of the
	 , the 

	  of Allport (1954) suggested that these are
crucial to preserve good intergroup relations. In the presence of extensive interpersonal
ties across group borders, the emergence of negative attitudes towards the out-group
would be less likely. The contact hypothesis indirectly implies an increasing effect of
 on the likelihood of intergroup conflicts. Supportive findings in empirical




homogenous ethnic enclaves (Anderson, 1983; Denitch, 1994; Massey, Hodson, and
Sekulic, 1999). Although contact across group borders seems to be the key to the
reduction of intergroup conflict, it works only conditional on the quality, frequency, and
extensiveness of the contact and on the context in which it takes place (Brewer and
Miller, 1984; 1996: 132; Brewer, 1996a; 1996b; 1999).
Interpersonal ties between members of the 	 also influence the outcome of
intergroup competition. As intergroup conflict involves collective action problems
within the groups (see previous section), this study might build on the recommendations
of research about social network effects in 

	
 situations. The importance
of the structure of interpersonal contacts for mobilization in collective action is
emphasized by both theoretical (e.g. Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl, 1988; Macy, 1991;
Opp, 1991; Bonacich and Schneider, 1992; Gould, 1993a; Heckathorn, 1993; Flache
and Macy, 1996; Chwe, 1999) and empirical studies (e.g. McAdam, 1986; Fernandez
and McAdam, 1988; Chong, 1991; Finkel and Opp, 1991; Gould, 1991; 1995; McAdam
and Paulsen, 1993; Opp and Gern, 1993; Sandell and Stern, 1998). It is widely believed
that dense in-group relations help the establishment of collective action (Marwell,
Oliver, and Prahl, 1988; Coleman, 1990: 318-320; Marwell and Oliver, 1993: 102;
Gould, 1993a; Opp and Gern, 1993).
As social networks are known to greatly affect behavior in collective action











. The main drawback of empirical studies is that they are purely descriptive and
they do not test micro processes of social network effects and in particular, of
segregation effects. On the other hand, empirical results show that segregation can be
associated with higher likelihood of intergroup conflict (Blau and Schwartz, 1984;
Whyte, 1986; Diez Medrano, 1994; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996).
Explanations of intergroup conflict should not be satisfied with discovering merely
associations between social network properties and intergroup conflict. For a deeper
understanding, 	
 of social network effects should be revealed. As
these mechanisms work at the interpersonal level, the role of social contacts and their
influence on participation decisions in intergroup competition should be specified.
Network ties between individuals work as constraints to individual decisions. These
constraints are represented as interpersonal interdependencies in 
	 

 (e.g., Ellison, 1993; Berninghaus and Schwalbe, 1996; Mailath, Samuelson, and
Shaked, 1997; Chwe, 1999; Morris, 2000). Local interaction games are played between
connected individuals and might have different payoff structures, for instance,
competitive structures between enemies or coordination games between fellows. This
approach is highly relevant for the purpose of this study, as local interaction games also
deal with individual decisions that are embedded in a network of dyadic
interdependencies.
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There are several other models and theories that might provide suggestions for how
to conceptualize underlying mechanisms and constraints posed by network relations.
Prominent examples are the theory of social impact (Latané, 1981; Nowak, Szamrej,
and Latané, 1990), models of social influence (e.g., Carley, 1991; Friedkin and Johnsen,
1999), and the model of dissemination of culture (Axelrod, 1997b). A concept that
embraces a wide range of micro mechanisms and specifies the content of dyadic
interdependencies is 
	
 (Heckathorn, 1990; 1993; Macy, 1993a).
#	!.!	%
	
	is defined as a constraint on individual decision posed by
the influence as well as the presence, opinion, expectations, and behavior of relevant
other individuals.
In this section, we discussed that individual actions are embedded in the social
structure. Social control and other mechanisms explain why structural embeddedness
has an influence on individual actions. Hence, the model of intergroup relations should
consider effects of social networks and the underlying mechanisms. However, these







	 	 	 			 	 	 . The next section
will specify the key elements of this model development.
	1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As we discussed in Section 1.4, structural embeddedness is missing from existing
explanations of intergroup conflict. This is a major deficiency since individual behavior
is embedded in the social structure also in the intergroup context (see Section 1.5). In
this study, a more comprehensive theoretical model of competitive intergroup relations





We will concentrate on three different social control mechanisms. Social control in
these forms constrains individual action by creating positive and negative incentives.
First, the close social environment is a source of distribution of 
	 
,
including social norms (Sandell and Stern, 1998). Durkheim (1984[1893]) and Parsons
(1937), well before the rise of social dilemma research, have claimed that social norms
help to solve the conflict between individual goals and common interest in favor of
collective goals. The concept of selective incentives originates from Olson (1965), who
showed the conditions under which the provision of selective incentives solves social
dilemmas in a world of rational actors. Selective incentives from group fellows help the
establishment of collective action as they reward participation and punish free riders
within the group (Olson, 1965). The provision of these incentives is completely




decisions. Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider them as additional incentives
rather than produced normatives that raise a second order free rider problem
(Heckathorn, 1989).
Second, behavior is constrained by social control as individuals strive for 

 (Lindenberg, 1986). Behavioral confirmation is received for an action that
is identical to behavior of related individuals. Finkel and Opp (1991) have found that
participation in collective political action can be largely explained by willingness to
conform to the expectations of important others. Furthermore, empirical evidence
shows that people do not participate in collective actions in isolation, but together with
friends and neighbors (see McAdam 1986; Gould 1991; Opp and Gern 1993).
Individuals decide to participate, if they are assured of the participation of their friends
(Chong 1991; Oberschall 1973; 1994). Chong (1991) and Oberschall (1994) described
this as an assurance process. In the assurance process, behavioral confirmation has a
two-fold effect. Confirmation by participating fellows provides an incentive for
contribution and confirmation by free riders works against contribution.
Third, in intergroup relations, ties that connect members of the opposite groups pose
a different constraint to individual behavior. Friends from competing groups have
contradictory interests in the intergroup context. Since their friendship is valuable for
them, they reward the other’s action that is against the own group’s interest (e.g.,
Kuran, 1995, 9-10). For instance, supporters surrounded by fans of the other club are
esteemed for  behavior and for remaining silent, if their team scores.
As a result of dyadic social control, individuals can be mobilized to participate in
collective action that has harmful consequences in the intergroup context. This raises
further interesting questions about how the relative strength of social control
mechanisms influences structural effects on intergroup conflict. We will explicate these
research questions in Section 1.8. The new theoretical model that incorporates these
forms of social control in the team games model of intergroup relations will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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Besides the structural embeddedness of behavior we should not forget the role of
	  in intergroup relations (Granovetter, 1985). In this section,
we will discuss the societal relevance of this factor. Moreover, we provide a brief
overview of micro mechanisms specified by previous research that explain how
temporal embeddedness influences intergroup relations. This study will rely on these
mechanisms at the formulation of hypotheses for repeated intergroup encounters.
There is no doubt about the 
	 
 of temporal embeddedness for
empirical applications. Interdependencies arise repeatedly, giving a chance for the
offended party to revenge. Examples are hostile relations between families in Corsica,
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Montenegro, Albania, or medieval Iceland, where insults are endlessly retaliated and
the accepted norm of vengeance creates a spiral of clashes (Frank, 1988; Hardin,
1995). Similar dynamics of revenge can be traced between urban gangs, football
supporters, nations, or ethnic groups. The Hutus and Tutsis have a long history of
ethnic slaughter, in which killings are reciprocated by killings (Bhavnani and Backer,
2000). Fortunately, in many contexts, third party interventions or institutional
solutions can break the spiral of violence. But the intention for revenge cannot be
subdued easily. Hatred can elicit conflicts later in time, perhaps even a generation
later, as in the case of Bosnia (Kaplan, 1993). Once conflict is established, it is
difficult to bring it to an end. As Hardin notes (1995: 121) the really interesting
question is not how the groups became enemies, but how their conflict is maintained.
Counterexamples of competitive, but peaceful group relations are plentiful (cf. Fearon
and Laitin, 1996; Gould, 1999). This leads us towards the inquiry of the determinants
of the emergence of lethal and of peaceful scenarios.
In this inquiry, it is inevitable to discover  temporal embeddedness influences
intergroup competition. A fundamental question of whether  	 	 	 
governs individual decisions is a sharp division line in the theoretical literature and it is
strongly related to debates over individual rationality.
 Models that assume perfect rationality exclude the influence of the past. Individuals
have a clearly forward-looking perspective, they choose for alternatives that offer the
best future consequences. Such models are widespread in research on social dilemmas
(e.g., Olson, 1965; 1982; Taylor, 1987; Sandler, 1992; Bicchieri, 1993; Buskens, 1999;
Flache, 2002). Despite their theoretical value, these models have serious deficiencies in
describing individual behavior in empirical and in experimental social dilemma
situations (e.g., Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Caporael et al., 1989; Camerer, 1997). The
problem is not merely that people have no knowledge or have misbeliefs about
preferences and knowledge of others (Kreps et al., 1982). They also often fail to choose
the alternative that would be optimal based on their beliefs and expectations (Rapoport,
Bornstein, and Erev, 1989; Orbell and Dawes, 1991; Smelser, 1992). However, the fact
that expectations often do not match with choices does not mean that expectations do
not influence behavior at all. At the other extreme, a wide variety of models that assume
backward-looking actors make this mistake, including several models of learning,
imitation, reciprocity, and regret.
Comparison of extreme models of forward-looking and backward-looking behavior
provided important insights for social dilemma research (Flache, 1996; Chen and Tang,
1996; Ho and Weigelt, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1998; Flache and Hegselmann, 1999b).
However, in less extreme versions, forward-looking action and backward-looking
behavior are not obviously in contradiction. In case of incomplete information forward-
looking action can use experience from the past as indication of intended behavior. On




sense that behavior is updated based on the past in order to gain future success
(Vanberg, 2002).
There are some models that combine elements of forward-looking and backward-
looking perspectives (Zeggelink, 1993; Stokman and Zeggelink, 1996; Buskens and
Weesie, 2000), and there is also illustration for how strategic decision making may
include rational learning from experience (Friedman, 1986: 126-136). The concepts of
bounded and procedural rationality just deny the assumption of perfect rationality, but
not the relevance of future (Simon, 1976; 1981). These concepts also dispute the logic
of backward-looking models with long-term memory and a wide horizon. Instead, they
assume that individual behavior is guided by a set of simple heuristics or rules of thumb
(Orbell and Dawes, 1991) that might contain the influence of the past as well as the
shadow of the future. The question is what might these simple heuristics be?
In a ('	 
, assuming bounded rationality, there are several
strategies that are based on expectations about subsequent outcomes and might be
relevant in intergroup encounters. Shortsighted strategies vary in their assumptions
regarding individual rationality, calculating capabilities, and access to information.
Below we just mention some examples that will be used in the theoretical analysis of
Chapter 2. Individuals might recognize their 	, if they have any. If they
have sufficient information and calculating capabilities, they might give their 
 to dominant strategies of others. Even more extensive information is assumed, if
there is 
	' between friends or neighbors about the dominant reply of
relevant others. Furthermore, in the lack of dominant reactions, individuals might
decide on the basis of their 
 about the outcome of intergroup relations and
about the decisions of related persons.
A simple forward-looking decision heuristic that is also based on expectations
about the subsequent outcome is the 

 principle. In case an individual
expects that his or her decision would be a decisive one in the subsequent situation,
which means that his or her decision would change the outcome of the intergroup
competition, he or she is guided to participate in the collective action of the group.
The median voter theorem of Downs (1957) was probably the first one to recognize
the importance of objective criticalness. Later, research on step-level public goods
showed that 
 criticalness is an important predictor of contribution (Rapoport,
1987; Kerr, 1989; Erev and Rapoport, 1990; Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Chen, Au,
and Komorita, 1996; Au, Chen, and Komorita, 1998).
In a 
'('	 
, strategies are conditional on previous events
and decisions, that is, they are built on  experience. However, decision rules that
build on the full record of past experience are not likely to be followed in practice. For
instance, people rarely make as extensive calculations as it is assumed by fictitious
play (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993). It is plausible to assume that
individuals act according to simple heuristics that use experiences about the outcome
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and about the behavior of a limited set of players from the recent past only. These
heuristics can be interpreted as programs that trigger 
	 to earlier
events (Vanberg, 2002).
In this study, we will test the presence of some simple backward-looking heuristics
in repeated intergroup encounters. One simple heuristic that received broad attention
and empirical support in previous social dilemma research is 
	 .
Reinforcement learning describes that the chance of remaining at the previous
individual decision increases after that particular action resulted in a satisfactory
outcome. Otherwise this likelihood decreases. This mechanism has been found adequate
in describing animal and human behavior in simple experimental situations. Its
theoretical origin goes back to Thorndike’s (1898) ‘law of effect’ and to Skinner’s
(1938) behaviorism. Bayesian updating and stochastic learning (Bush and Mostseller,
1955) are mathematical formulations of this simple rule. In slightly different versions,
reinforcement learning has been useful to model and understand human behavior in
social dilemmas (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Macy 1989; 1990; 1991b; 1993a; 1993b;
1995; Messick and Liebrand, 1995; Roth and Erev, 1995; Flache, 1996; Buskens and
Snijders, 1997; Erev and Roth, 1998; 1999).
Another simple heuristic that has received enormous attention in the literature on
social dilemmas is 

	 (Axelrod, 1984; 1987; 1997a; Komorita, Hilty, and
Parks, 1991; Komorita, Parks, and Hulbert, 1992; Kollock, 1993; Wu and Axelrod,
1995; Bicchieri, 1997; de Vos and Zeggelink, 1997; Wagner, 1998; Komorita and
Parks, 1999; Watanabe and Yamagishi, 1999). There are theoretical arguments for
reciprocity being a rational individual strategy (Friedman, 1971; Axelrod, 1984; 1997a).
Reciprocity is also an important mechanism in intergroup relations (Fearon and Laitin,
1996; Goren and Bornstein, 1999). All empirical and anecdotal evidence of vengeance
supports the consideration of this heuristic. Peaceful attitudes of the rival group are
tolerated, but harmful collective action is retaliated in the subsequent encounter, if
reciprocal strategies are applied.
Besides the aggregate action of the other group, the behavior of neighbors can also
be retaliated (Whatley et al., 1999). Such 
	

 is often named by journalists
as the “main ingredient” of violent ethnic conflict (Hardin, 1995: 148). Local
reciprocity is a direct way of imitation as it is a reaction to actual behavior in the past.
The intergroup context provokes vengeance in interpersonal relations between members
of the opponent groups, but there are also indications that intergroup relations support
in-group reciprocity (Brewer, 1981).
In this section, we provided a brief introduction and overview of the forward-looking
and the backward-looking behavioral mechanisms we will investigate in this study as a
basis of dynamic intergroup relations. Our research questions about these micro
mechanisms of temporal embeddedness and their macro consequences will be





In the previous sections, we discussed the general research problem and the
theoretical foundations of this study. In this section, we formulate our main research
questions that can be classified along three dimensions. First, we are interested in the
effects of 
 and 	 and their 
 on intergroup
conflict. Second, we are interested in 
	
 on intergroup conflict and in the
	
	
. Third, research questions are open for a 
 or
for an  investigation. There are only effects of structural embeddedness
in single intergroup encounters. In repeated intergroup relations, effects of structural
and temporal embeddedness and also their interactions are present. Table 1.8.1
provides a simplified overview of this classification.
Table 1.8.1 Overview of research interests
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
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-&micro effects on
individual decisions 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In order to gain a transparent overview, interaction effects of structural and
temporal embeddedness are omitted from Table 1.8.1. This overview also expresses
our objectives to have a close correspondence between the content of research
questions that are formulated for theoretical and for experimental investigation.
Keywords in the cells indicate our specific research interests. Main research questions
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These research questions will be addressed in a theoretical investigation in Chapter
2. We test some of the derived model predictions under experimental conditions.
Experimental analysis will address these questions in single intergroup competitions
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These questions aim to highlight why and under what conditions individuals
participate in collective action that hurts the interest of another group and might result
in mutually harmful consequences. In particular, we will predict that different forms of
social control influence individual decisions conditional on the local network
neighborhood and consequently are responsible for the segregation effect on intergroup
conflict. We will test these predictions in single-shot encounters in Chapter 3 and in
repeated intergroup relations in Chapter 5. In the theoretical analysis of Chapter 2, we
will also investigate whether the effects and macro consequences of social control
mechanisms are dependent on assumptions about 	  and access to
information or not.
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These questions will be investigated in repeated intergroup competitions. We will
elaborate more on the exact nature of behavioral heuristics and their relation to
aggregated scenarios in Chapter 4. Derived hypotheses will be tested in experiments in
Chapter 5. Furthermore, we will also test interaction effects of structural and temporal
embeddedness. At the macro level, we will investigate whether typical scenarios differ
with structural conditions. At the individual level, we will analyze if we find different
behavioral heuristics in different structural environments and we will test if experiences
from the local neighborhood can trigger conditional responses.
To answer our research questions, we will apply simulations and experiments as
research methodology. In the next section, we will give arguments why do we choose
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Due to the complexity of real settings, behavioral rules and social network effects
are often untraceable and our predictions about them cannot be tested. We would need
to analyze very simple (for instance, ancestral or tribal) environments in order to
investigate individual level mechanisms that are responsible for social network effects
and dynamic intergroup processes.
A powerful alternative to prehistoric or anthropological testing is computer
simulation and conducting laboratory experiments. In , computational
capacities allow to investigate the effect of parameter values and explanatory
variables in any deliberately chosen environment. Using a computer the properties of
a higher level system can be derived from simple laws governing the lower level units
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Simulations are also experiments in the sense that
different combinations of parameter values can be tried out to investigate the
theoretical research questions. Simulations have the aim to explore general answers,
but only in a simplified environment that is not a true representation of reality
(Gilbert, 1995). They are favored to analytical methods when the formal derivation of
system properties is difficult from the model assumptions.
A criticized feature of simulations is that they require simplified assumptions and
cannot cope with the complexity of real situations. A sound reply to this criticism is
expressed by Axelrod (1997a: 5): “… if the goal is to deepen our understanding of
some fundamental process, … then simplicity of the assumptions is important and
realistic representation of all the details of a particular setting is not.” The lack of
complexity is a virtue of simulations, not a vice. Based on simple assumptions they
are perfect tools of theoretical investigations and abstract model building. As Macy
(2002) summarizes, “Making these models fit actuality would add complexity that
undermines their usefulness as theoretical tools.”
In our case, we intend to use simulations for exploration of underlying mechanisms
that cause the macro phenomenon of intergroup conflict. In this respect, our study is
one of the first attempts to use simulation methodology to understand intergroup
conflicts.3 Furthermore, we will use the simulations to derive hypotheses for our
experiments.
The experimental design is constructed in order to test these hypotheses.
Laboratory 	 have the advantage that by manipulating conditions and
controlling for disturbing variables it is possible to detect the presence of predicted
mechanisms. For this reason and because the values of other parameters can be fixed,
experiments are ideally suited to test hypotheses about mechanisms of the simulation
model. In laboratory conditions, interdependencies can be created, in which individual
                                                          
3
 Existing simulation studies deal with different kinds of intergroup relations than we do (cf. Suleiman
and Fischer, 1996; 2000; Fischer and Suleiman, 1997; Rapoport and Amaldoss, 1999; Jager, Popping,
and van de Sande, 2001).
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payoffs are measurable. Non-strategic uncertainty can be kept to a minimum and
control of information can be easily achieved (Crawford, 1997: 216). Non-monetary
incentives can be separated by experimental manipulations (Roth, 1995).
Furthermore, laboratory experiments do not face serious ethical concerns that field
experiments of intergroup conflict do.
Experiments also have their drawbacks. It is difficult to generalize their results,
because subjects are most often students, therefore the pool of participants does not
represent the entire population. This would be a serious concern, if there had been a
major difference in the effects of structural and temporal embeddedness for students
and for the general population. Since the number of experimental sessions and
participants is vastly limited, only effects of few variables can be tested and only a
small set of parameter values can be used. However, this is only a disadvantage
compared to simulations. In field experiments or in case studies there is no way to
vary parameter values at all.
Furthermore, there is a rather large gap between the simulations and the
experiments with regard to their behavioral assumptions. This follows from the
difference in the objectives of these research methods. Simulations are devoted for
understanding the theoretical relationship between structural embeddedness and
intergroup conflict. This relationship is explored in general when auxiliary
assumptions on individual rationality and on access to information are introduced and
varied. Interactions between these assumptions and effects of structural embeddedness
are certainly interesting, but questions about individual behavior are not as central as
in experiments. In the experiments the actual behavior of subjects is studied and
hypotheses about decision heuristics that appear in repeated encounters are tested.
Moreover, there are also differences in how the results are analyzed. In the
simulations, simple rules are assumed about individual behavior and macro
phenomena are derived through the application of these rules. In the experiments,





, we provided an introduction to the analysis of intergroup conflict and
peace. We presented an overview of the societal relevance and theoretical background
of this problem. We discussed the necessary theoretical developments and the major
contributions of the present study. We formulated our research questions and we
provided arguments for the chosen simulation and experimental methodology.
The structure of subsequent chapters follows the classification of research interests
as they were provided in Table 1.8.1.  	"	and 5	are devoted to the analysis of
effects of structural embeddedness in single intergroup encounters. The emphasis is on




segregation and on the underlying mechanisms of this macro phenomenon. In Chapter
2, the Intergroup Public Good (IPG) game model of competitive intergroup relations is
extended by dyadic forms of social control that can be responsible for social network
effects. Next to the theoretical contributions, this chapter aims to answer theoretical
research questions by using simulation methodology. In Chapter 3, a new experimental
design is introduced to test the segregation effect and the underlying social control
mechanisms in a series of single-shot IPG games.
In  	6	and ., we analyze repeated intergroup encounters. Besides the effects
of structural embeddedness, this allows for the investigation of how and as a result of
which mechanisms intergroup relations change over time. In Chapter 4, we specify
elementary behavioral rules that might be relevant for individual decisions in the
repeated IPG game and we derive hypotheses about micro and macro effects of
temporal embeddedness. Model predictions about effects of structural and temporal
embeddedness, and about their interactions are tested in Chapter 5.
In  	 7,	 research problems and results of this study are summarized and
conclusions are drawn. Furthermore, limitations of the study are discussed and
suggestions are given for future research. It is argued that policy implications should be
handled with reservations as there is no general remedy for real intergroup conflicts and
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In this chapter we present a theoretical model that provides predictions about the
structural conditions under which harmful intergroup conflict is likely to occur and
when peaceful coexistence might be expected. We focus on a factor that has been
surprisingly neglected in previous research: the effect of structural embeddedness (cf.
Granovetter, 1985). Previous models have not taken into account that individual
network ties within 	 between the groups transmit social and cognitive rewards that
influence participation in intergroup related collective action (see Section 1.5). In
particular, while it is widely believed that dense in-group relations help the
establishment of collective action (Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl, 1988; Marwell and
Oliver, 1993; Gould, 1993a; 1993b), in the intergroup context, we do not know much
about why and under what conditions dense in-group and scarce out-group relations
(segregation, clustering) support harmful collective action. We will investigate this
question in this chapter, considering competition situations between two distinct
groups. As a first step, we focus on single-shot situations. Since history effects are
quite crucial in empirical examples, Chapter 4 will be devoted for the development of
a dynamic model that considers repeated intergroup relations.
In Section 1.4 we discussed that if individual contributions are costly, group
beneficial collective action is difficult to achieve. This partly explains why lethal
conflicts are more the exceptions than the rule (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Gould,
1999). On the other hand, experimental findings have revealed that a presence of an
out-group, especially in the case of competitive intergroup relations might help to
establish collective action within the groups. This duality of intergroup and within
group interdependencies and their interrelation is represented in the 

 (IPG) game (Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987; Bornstein, 1992).
The original IPG model disregards the 	
  of individual
actions. As it was discussed in Section 1.5, everyone’s behavior is to a large extent
constrained and influenced by neighbors, friends, and the family, regardless of their
group membership. In this chapter, we would like to demonstrate the underlying
mechanisms of 	
 
 behind these network constraints. In the close social
environment 
  are distributed (Sandell and Stern, 1998). Selective
incentives from fellow group members help the establishment of collective action, but
friends from the other group provide 	  that suppress contribution.
 		
 	 that accompanies almost every kind of human interaction
(Lindenberg, 1986) is also transmitted by network ties. In large-scale collective action
people are not likely to conform to everyone’s behavior or to be fair to everyone.
Behavioral confirmation is distributed in the social network environment, which
appraises expectations about the behavior of friends and neighbors.
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These social control mechanisms can be represented as overlapping dyadic
interdependencies. Each dyadic relation is subject to playing local coordination games
(cf. Ellison, 1993; Morris, 2000), but in a form that is inseparable from participation
choice in collective action. Surrounded by extremist fellow group members, people are
highly constrained to participate. On the other hand, peaceful friends or many friends
from the rival group can provide enough confirmation pressure to avoid contribution
to the harmful collective action. Such mobilization process is also referred to as “block
recruitment” (Oberschall, 1973) and can provide the micro foundation for collective
actions such as demonstrations, urban gang fights or civil war.
In this chapter, we incorporate these different mechanisms in the model of intergroup
conflict. Intergroup competition, structural embeddedness, and strong social control in
dyadic connections might mobilize group members to participate in intergroup related
collective action. A theoretical investigation in this chapter supported by computer
simulations aims to show under what structural conditions and due to which forms of
social control mobilization occurs.
As a consequence of these factors, a social trap of a different kind might arise.
Should both groups become involved in a collective action, then this could be mutually
harmful. From the community perspective, this is an outcome that is best avoided.
Among structural conditions, it is particularly interesting to study under which
circumstances 	 leads to intergroup clashes. In this chapter, we will
investigate which forms of social control are responsible for the strengthening of the
segregation effect. We will demonstrate how the relative size of selective incentives and
behavioral confirmation (normative pressure versus confirmation pressure) influences
the effect of segregation on the likelihood of conflict and hence the chance that
residential policy can help conflict resolution.
Furthermore, for exact model predictions, we have to specify assumptions about
individual consciousness and access to information. Assumptions in the relevant
literature contain perfect rationality (e.g., Chwe, 1999) as well as considerations of
motivations that are beyond egoistic incentives (cf. Caporael et al., 1989). There are
various models that assume bounded rationality or limited access to information in
different forms (e.g., Ellison, 1993; Morris, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Gould,
1993a; Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987; Macy, 1991b). Since there is no generally
accepted view on what level of rationality can be assigned to individual action and on
what kind of information people use for their decisions, we will consider four models
with different levels of consciousness and access to information. We do not claim that
any of these models reflect the appropriate view on the logic of individual action. We
also think that there is no such a view: the level of rational consciousness in individual
action varies, depending on the framing and importance of situations (Lindenberg and




The effect of network structure on intergroup conflict will be compared under the
different specifications. Different behavioral models can also be considered as
robustness tests to check whether normative pressure in general strengthens the
segregation effect on intergroup conflict more than confirmation pressure. Examples of
typical structures will demonstrate how the success of local mobilization can be
dependent on the behavioral assumptions on individual “rationality”. We will
investigate whether under certain structural conditions “rational” individuals are more
willing to contribute to collective action or are they the ones who always abstain from
participation.
In the following section, we introduce the Intergroup Public Goods (IPG) game as
a model of competitive intergroup relations. As a major theoretical contribution of this
chapter, we incorporate dyadic effects of social control in the model in Section 2.3.
This new, structurally embedded model provides an explanation as to why segregation
often supports the emergence of intergroup conflict. In Section 2.4 we show that
participation in conflict can even be a dominant individual strategy that leads to a
suboptimal outcome of harmful clashes. In order to derive exact predictions, we
introduce four different behavioral models in Section 2.5. These models differ in their
assumptions about how much rationality is assigned to individual actions.
The conditions under which segregation leads to intergroup conflict are
investigated in the four behavioral models by using computer simulation. Section 2.6
describes the simulation design. Section 2.7 clarifies the interpretation of segregation
and its measurement in the simulations. Simulation results are presented in Section
2.8. Examples of other structural effects are discussed in Section 2.9. Finally, we
summarize the simulation results and conclude this chapter in Section 2.10.
	*	 $&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There are two exclusive groups ! and   of size $ and % ($≥2 and %≥2), with
contradictory collective interests. Inside both groups, members face the dilemma of
providing a step-level public good (cf. Bornstein, 1992). A step-level public good is
only provided, if a certain level of contribution has been reached. This level is
determined by the number of contributors in the other group.
We assume that group members are anonymous and can gain (lose) the same
rewards from the intergroup context with identical action. For instance, we suppose
that everyone is equally proud after a victory and equally ashamed after a defeat.2 If the
number of contributors in group ! exceeds the number of contributors in group  ,
then each member in ! receives a reward  (a piece of a "-cake, temptation
                                                          
2
 More precisely, since we do not make any interindividual comparison, it is enough to assume that
everyone values his or her share relatively the same way in comparison to other rewards and costs of
him or her.
34 	
reward) and members of   receive a reward of  (	, the sucker’s payoff). If the
number of contributors is equal, then everyone receives a reward (
	, reward for a
draw). The relation between these rewards is ##. For instance, let us consider a
team sport in which members of the two teams decide whether they help their team
with low or high effort. High effort can be regarded as contribution to the provision of
the public good that is a win in the competition.
We assume that a free riding action (low effort in the previous example) results in
an extra positive reward of ($, >>). As an example, consider that the
group of Republican voters are all happy if a Republican president is elected, but
those who refrain from voting gain more, they could otherwise occupy themselves
instead of going to the polls (opportunity cost of voting). Table 2.2.1 represents the
payoffs from the IPG game for player ∈!
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,: '$L= the number of contributors in group ! (excluding player); '%= the number of contributors
in group  .
As Table 2.2.1 shows the IPG game is not a perfect social dilemma. In a game of
continuous provision of public goods not to contribute is a dominant strategy, but this is
not the case for a step-level public good (cf. Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1978; Hardin,
1982). In the IPG game shown in Table 2.2.1, when >+, in state (II) is better off
by contributing and when >+, in state (III) contribution is a better choice. Given
the lack of a dominant strategy Rapoport and Bornstein (1987) assumes that
individuals order expected values to the actions and maximize this expected value.
Critical probabilities (cf. Caporael et al., 1989) concerning states (II) and (III) show
the likelihood that the single individual action of  has an influence on the overall
outcome. Denote the subjective probabilities for of the four states with ,, ,,, ,,,
and ,9, respectively (,+,,+,,,+,9*1). It can be shown, that contribution is a
better choice for player  if
,,+,,,-(.#        (2.2.1)
If group sizes are large, then critical probabilities are small and the structure of the
game is close to being a pure in-group social dilemma (cf. Bornstein and Rapoport,
		
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1988, 127). Consequently, peace is very likely to be the outcome of intergroup
opposition (cf. Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Gould, 1999).
However, the social trap character of a stalemate is not incorporated in the original
IPG model. Therefore, that model can be applied to different intergroup competition
situations in which a tied outcome does not have a harmful character. An example is
an election in two-party democracies. A tie can be embarrassing and can lead to
lengthy and costly recounting and law suites, but it is not worse than if nobody voted.
Similarly, in team sports a scoreless draw at a boring match is definitely not better
than a draw with many goals, where all players gave their best. Competitions between
ethnic groups, urban gangs, or pupil groups have a different character. A draw means
a mutually harmful clash that is worse than the lack of collective action (peace). To
explain the emergence of such outcomes, we implement modifications that are
borrowed from the IPD game (see Section 1.4).
Another change is a generalization of the original model. In the Rapoport and
Bornstein (1987) model, for all draws the size of public payoffs are equivalent,
irrespective of how many individuals contribute. Since in the situations we would like
to model, mutual mobilization significantly differs from mutual lack of mobilization,
we should specify how the payoffs depend on the number of contributors, if
contributors in the two groups are equal in number. If a couple of Serb civilians shoot
at Bosnian civilians, this would not yet be a civil war situation, but would be treated
as an attempt of murder. Ethnic clash starts, if the number of contributors is large
enough. For this reason, besides the endogenous threshold (the number of contributors
in the other group), we introduce an exogenous minimal contributing set (MCS) in the
game (cf. van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes, 1983). This means that less than a
specified number of contributors no collective action will be established in the group
and consequently provision of the victory and clash public goods is not possible.
Since groups can differ in their internal structure of norms, one group can exhibit a
more patient attitude in intergroup relations. Therefore we allow minimal contributing
sets to be different in the groups and we denote them by '$(0≤'$≤$) in group !and
by '%(0≤'%≤%) in group  .
If the number of contributors is equal and both groups are above the minimal
contributing set, then everyone receives a negative reward  (
	, punishment
payoff). We suppose that the clash of collective actions is worse than the outcome of
	. Peace is the collective outcome in which no collective action is established in
the groups. For the sake of simplicity the reward for peace  is a reference value and
assumed to be zero. Hence, the relation between the different payoffs is #*/##.
If groups were unitary entities and they could choose between either collective action
or no action, collective action would be their dominant strategy. Both sides following
the dominant strategy would lead to a suboptimal outcome. On the basis of Definition
1.2.1.1, we will call all outcomes in this game  
, where collective
action is established at least in one of the groups.
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We retain the assumption that a free riding action results in an extra individual
reward of  ($, >>0). Table 2.2.2 gives a complete typology of possible
outcomes of the IPG game and represents the payoffs for player ∈!.
The IPG game in this form is intended to model group competition situations in
which collective action of equal strength leads to mutually harmful outcomes (clash
punishment). Examples are civil war, conflicts between pupil groups, fights between
football supporters or urban gangs. In the case of only a few initiators, nothing happens
and the status quo is preserved. If, however, the number of contributors exceeds a
certain threshold, a collective action is established and this can mean victory for the
group. A group wins if more contributed to the collective action than in the other group.
Defeat is the worst case scenario: just imagine the frustration experienced by gang
members having lost a street battle.
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,: '$L= the number of contributors in group ! (excluding player); '%= the number of contributors
in group  .
We need assumptions about how individuals reach their decisions so as to predict
which outcome will be realized. Similar to the original IPG game, there is no dominant
strategy in the modified game. In states III, IV, V, and VI (cf. Table 2.2.2)
contribution is a better choice. In these states a single individual decision is 	

for the outcome. Using the argument of Rapoport and Bornstein (1987) again, given
the lack of a dominant strategy we could assume that individuals order expected
values for actions and maximize this expected value.
Denote the subjective probabilities for of the seven states in correspondence with
states (I)-(VII) in Table 2.2.2 by ]’s (∑] I..VII ]*1). For the sake of simplicity, let us
assume that rewards are numerical and individual utility is a linear function of
rewards. The expected value (23) of contribution for player  is:
                                                          
3
 State (V) is the exceptional case and only relevant if '$4#'%4. In this state there are an equal number
of contributors in both groups. Collective action is established only in group  , but the contribution of
player ∈! means that the outcome is victory of group !. State (I) is not relevant, where less than two
contributors can establish group collective action and state (IV) is not relevant, where the minimal




whereas the expected value of not contributing is
23(1) = +(,,+,,,+9)+9,+9,,.
Contribution is a better choice if 23() > 23(1), thus
,,,(()+,9+9(()+9,(() > ,
where ,9is zero, if '$*/,9is zero, if '%≥'$, and 9,is zero, if '$*$.
In this model, critical probabilities concerning states III, IV, V and VI indicate the
likelihood that the decision of  has an influence on the overall outcome. If group sizes
are large and the minimal contributing sets are relatively high, then the likelihood is
extremely small and the structure of the game is close to being a perfect social dilemma.
Similar to the original IPG game, peace is still the expected outcome of intergroup
opposition (cf. Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Gould, 1999).
A specific example of the game is represented graphically in Figure 2.2.1. In this
example group sizes and the minimal contributing sets are equal. Bullets indicate Nash
equilibria. In general (if minimal contributing sets are larger than one), pure strategy
Nash equilibria are the situations in which there are {0; 0}, {'$; 0}, or {0; '%}
contributors. Overall defection is an equilibrium, because a single contribution cannot
break the peace, but involves the loss of endowment . Another Nash equilibrium is
when the number of contributors in one group equals to the MCS and in the other group
there are no contributors. In this case, no contributor would be better off by free riding,
because #. For defectors, it would not make sense to change their decisions, because
they cannot improve on the outcome alone. In addition to these equilibria, clash with
overall participation is also a Nash equilibrium, if group sizes are equal and +5.
This equilibrium is never Pareto-optimal.
 / '4                    
,!-'$.





















Although concerned about the simplifications made, we will nevertheless use this
simple model throughout this study as the solid ground of modeling intergroup conflict.
We will leave issues such the size of payoff parameters, additional incentives, non-
linear utilities, risk preferences, social orientations, third party or institutional
interventions for later discussion. These are all factors that can introduce complications
to the model. Discussion of these will be however strictly limited, as they are not in the
main interest of this research.
	*,   !+-  $+! # 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As individuals are able to free ride on the effort of others, beneficial collective
action is difficult to achieve within the groups. However, individuals can be mobilized
for participation, if effective social control, norms, or selective incentives exist in the
group (Olson, 1965; Coleman, 1990; Heckathorn, 1990). In this section we will
incorporate three different forms of social control that are transmitted by network ties in




. As a consequence of dyadic social control, under certain
network structures harmful collective action is likely to emerge.
If their neighbors or friends are from the other group, individuals are rewarded for
not participating in the collective action. We assume that everyone receives a #0
	 reward in the case of no contribution for each tie that connects this person to
members of the opposite group. Hence the traitor payoff is a selective incentive
rewarding defection and distributed locally conditional on the number of ties with the
other group. The traitor reward provides an additional incentive for people who, living
close to members of the opposite group to restrain from participation in collective
action. For instance, supporters surrounded by fans of the other club are rewarded for
remaining silent in a stadium.
Ties connecting members of the same group transmit different social incentives.
People receive 		
	 (#/) from each relation by acting similarly
to their fellow friends. This reward is a mutual positive externality, which drives
towards uniform action. Irrespective of behavioral confirmation, contribution is
rewarded by fellow neighbors or friends. They appreciate group-beneficial action by
social 
  We assume that all contributors receive a selective
incentive #/from each fellow neighbor. The provision of these incentives does not
require separate decisions as they always accompany choices made in the intergroup
game. This assumption is plausible for certain social rewards such as respect or status
that can be by-products of intergroup relations. The relationship between fellow
neighbors or friends can be represented as a local coordination game (see Table
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2.3.1).4 Unlike public goods (“bads”) ,  and , bestowing the three types of social
incentives is not conditional on the outcome of the intergroup competition.
Table 2.3.1 Local coordination game between fellow neighbors
	
contribute do not contribute
contribute +7+ 70	

do not contribute 0,  7
The structurally embedded IPG game is the 8	(Table 2.2.2
and Figure 2.2.1) $   (, , and )   $' .
Individuals must choose a single action (contribution or no contribution) and cannot
tailor their behavior to each neighbor.5 A formal expression of individual payoffs in
the structurally embedded IPG game can be found in the Appendix 2.A.1.
	*.
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In the structurally embedded IPG game, contribution can even be the dominant
strategy. For this, selective incentives have to exceed rewards for defection in the
“worst case” scenario, i.e. when no fellows neighbors are contributing and a single
contribution does not change the outcome. That is, contribution is a dominant strategy
of player ∈A, if
 ( ), −<+ (2.4.1)
where  L denotes the number of fellow neighbors of  and Lstands for the number of
neighbors from group  . Although the decision of  is not likely to be critical,
contribution can be highly beneficial due to social incentives. For instance, many
individuals join tribal wars although the gains from these conflicts are only symbolic
and single contributions make no difference. One reason is that warriors can attain
high status in the group and can easily become “heroes”. We can argue in a similar
way in order to explain redundant contribution choice (Caporael et al., 1989). People
seek social rewards when they sacrifice their contribution to the production of a public
good that has already been established.
                                                          
4
 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that selective inventives and confirmation payoffs are held
constant through all pairwise games. Although it is sufficient to assume that all individuals relate social
rewards to other rewards and costs in the same way.
5
 It is also the assumption of the literature on local interaction games (see Morris, 2000: 57).
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At the other extreme, no contribution is the dominant strategy of , if defection
provides higher rewards than contributing even if all fellow neighbors are contributing
and a single additional contribution would change the outcome of the game. That is,
defection is a dominant strategy of player ∈A, if 6
( ) . −++>+ (2.4.2)
Nash equilibria in the structurally embedded game can be very different from the
original IPG game, depending on the exact network structure. Social networks
decisively shape conditions under which social incentives can generate solutions for
the in-group collective action problem. In a highly segregated network with dense in-
group and scarce out-group relations overall participation is likely to be an
equilibrium. Full contribution can be a dominant strategy equilibrium and a
suboptimal outcome in which every individual payoff is smaller than in overall peace.
The unusual social dilemma that traps groups in harmful contribution emerges, if
 >−−> (2.4.3)
holds for every individual.
	*01 !& ## ! $!
In order to derive exact model predictions, we need auxiliary assumptions on
individual behavior. In this section we introduce four behavioral models and describe
the effect of segregation on intergroup conflict under the different assumptions. The
discussion of these four models has an illustrative purpose and does not mean a
commitment to related behavioral disciplines. In all four models, however, we assume a
certain level of rationality. We also bring strategic thinking back into consideration,
which would not be present if we had assumed that people order expected values for
actions and maximize this value (cf. Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987). On the other hand,
the models also deviate from classical game theory by avoiding the assumptions of
complete information and perfect rationality.
                                                          
6
 If '%≥'$, then the less strict conditions
( )  −++>+
and
( )  −++>+
are sufficient to hold for defection (no contribution) to be a dominant strategy.
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By considering four decision models, we can analyze the effects of individual
consciousness and access to information on the likelihood of contributing and the
interaction effect of behavioral assumptions and segregation on intergroup conflict. In
Model 1, we only assume that individuals choose their dominant strategy, if they have
any. This is a simple strategic model, in which individuals take those actions that are
beneficial under all circumstances. In Model 2, in addition we assume that individuals
are also able to recognize the dominant replies to the dominant strategies of their
neighbors. This is still a simple strategic model that introduces local information into
the analysis. In Model 3, we assume that such obvious actions are common knowledge
between neighbors and optimal replies are chosen accordingly. In Model 4, an expected
value element is added to all these assumptions. This model still assumes bounded
rationality, since we control for a tendency of overestimation of criticalness (cf.
perceived efficacy at Kerr, 1989). These four models are easily comparable as their
assumptions are added step by step. The most rigid assumptions on individual behavior
are used in Model 4 and the least rigid ones in Model 1. All the assumptions will be
discussed in detail in this section. We intend to show that rigid assumptions strengthen




In the first model, only a limited rationality of players is assumed. We presume that
actors choose their dominant strategy, if they have one. Everyone lacking a dominant
strategy contributes with a fixed probability. These behavioral assumptions allow for a
derivation of hypotheses from equations (2.4.1)and(2.4.2).As far as the main payoff
parameters are concerned, a smaller difference between victory and defeat and a smaller
reward for free riding will increase the likelihood of intergroup clash. With regard to
structural effects, extensive fellow connections (larger L’s) support contribution,
therefore collective action will be more likely in a clustered population.
Already this simple model generates empirically plausible implications. However,
there are empirical examples that contradict our predictions and show that isolation
can sometimes be an effective way to avoid intergroup clash. Isolation in these cases
could mean a termination of the interdependent situation (e.g., building a wall in
Belfast, destruction of a bridge in Mostar, or blocking a bridge in Kosovska
Mitrovica). These are external or artificial solutions of intergroup conflict that might
require the deployment of armed forces for monitoring. When there are no external










The model has interesting implications for group size effects. In a physical clash or
battle, larger groups can obtain success easily. If the minimal contributing sets are
equal in the groups, the larger group has a higher chance to win from the intergroup
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opposition. The lower the minimal contributing set, the more likely it is that collective
action emerges. In this case, only a little noise is needed to destroy the peaceful
equilibrium. Empirical examples of noise are mistakes, misinterpretations,
drunkenness, or sudden passions (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). It is more remarkable that
even if minimal contributing sets are given proportionally to group size, the larger
group still has the advantage. It follows from the fact that if group ! is larger than
group  , then the expected proportion of fellow ties in group ! is higher than the
relative size of group !. Hence, the chance of being in a neighborhood, in which
normative pressure restricts the individual to contributing action, is exponentially
higher by increasing group proportion. For instance, there is evidence of nonlinearly
increasing voting participation (and votes) with higher levels of residential
segregation (Butler and Stokes, 1974). In other cases this prediction may contradict
real life experience. Larger groups tend to be more sparse and less organized (Olson,
1965). Furthermore, if there is a large inequality in the strength of the groups, the
minority may try to avoid intergroup opposition by choosing assimilation. As a





In the second model we formulate more rigid assumptions about individual behavior
by introducing access to local information. Every actor follows his or her dominant
strategy, if there is one. Furthermore, since people know their neighbors to some extent,
they can also attain information about their possible actions. Let us assume that people
can recognize when their neighbors have a dominant strategy and can give an
unconditional best (dominant) reply, if there is one.7 Denote the number of fellow
neighbors who have a dominant strategy of contribution by LF and the number of fellow
neighbors who have a dominant strategy of defection by LG. From Table 2.2.2 and
equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.2)it can be derived that contribution is the unconditional best
(dominant) reply of ∈!, if
( ) ( )( ) −−++<+ (2.5.2.1)
holds and defection (no contribution) is the dominant reply, if
( )( ) ( )  −+−++−>+ (2.5.2.2)
                                                          
7
 We call a strategy unconditional best (dominant) reply, if it is a pure best reply against all pure
strategy profiles that contain the dominant strategies of neighbors. It involves the assumption that every
actor is capable of assessing information about the number of ties and about the relative value of social
rewards  and  for all fellow neighbors.
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is satisfied.8 Everyone without a dominant strategy or dominant reply is assumed to
contribute with a fixed probability.
Model 2 generates further insights into structural effects. Compared to Model 1,
the existence of relatively closed “ghettos” increases the likelihood of conflict. The
periphery of these network segments acts in line or together with the initiators as they
have dominant reactions. The higher the relative size of social incentives (+), the
more likely it is that the periphery will also be encouraged to contribute. A large
relative difference between selective incentives and behavioral confirmation (()
helps key contributors to arise (see Model 1), but their additive value (+) is
important for the mobilization of the periphery (Model 2). On the other hand, if
confirmation rewards are relatively important, peaceful behavior might diffuse to
radical defectors. Hence in Model 2, centralized networks are efficient in spreading
both behavioral patterns (cf. Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl, 1988; Gould, 1993a).
Figure 2.5.2.1 Imaginary map of a small village with mixed population
Consider for instance the following example. An imaginary map of a small village
is represented in Figure 2.5.2.1. Five members of group ! (white houses) and seven
members of group   (black houses) inhabit the village. In this example members of
group ! live at the periphery of the village. Assume that groups are involved in a
competition situation that can be described by the structurally embedded IPG game.
Let us suppose that everyone is in close connection only with neighbors to the East,
West, South, and North. Group  has the advantage of size but also has a structural
advantage, since its members are located mainly in the center of the village.
Consequently, collective action is more likely in this group. One player has a
dominant strategy of contribution in group  , if +;5;. Three other members living
in black houses have a dominant reply of contribution in this case, if +5. If a
stronger condition of ++5 is satisfied, then five members of group   have
                                                          
8
 If '%≥'$, then the less strict conditions
 ( )( ) ( )  −+−++−>+
and
( )( ) ( )  −+−++−>+
are sufficient to hold for defection to be a dominant strategy.
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contribution as a dominant strategy. If the condition of +5+ is also met, then the
remaining two members of group   may contribute to the collective action, since it is
their dominant reply.     	  	""   ! 	 	
	 	"  	 	 
"  . In this village only high
opportunity costs of contribution (high rewards for free riding) and low importance of





If we assume extensive contacts in the neighborhood, we can also suppose that
individuals are not only capable of recognizing dominant strategies of their neighbors,
but also dominant replies, best replies to dominant replies, and so forth. In Model 3
we assume that people cannot only anticipate obvious actions of their neighbors, but
also the neighbors’ perceptions about their own behavior and the neighbors’
perceptions about their own perceptions. That is, having a dominant strategy or reply
of any order is common knowledge between neighbors. Under this decision rule, it is
also assumed that everyone who has a dominant strategy or reply of any order acts in
accordance with this strategy. In the absence of such a strategy, individuals are
assumed to contribute with a fixed probability. Model 3 goes far beyond the previous
models in the sense that it also takes indirect network influence into consideration. In
this model, hesitating people can be influenced by neighbors who have in turn been
convinced by their neighbors. At high levels of clustering, contribution spreads easier
and at low levels defection does. Consequently, in this model we expect a stronger
effect of segregation on the likelihood of conflict. The stronger relationship originates
in the more exhaustive recruitment of peripheral areas next to the initiators of
collective action. Completely isolated individuals are not assured by the action of
fellow group members and are not rewarded for traitor action, therefore they remain






Decision models 1-3 allowed individuals to make strategic calculations, but
involved a pure probabilistic element in the case of the absence of a dominant strategy
or a dominant reply. However, under certain circumstances it is reasonable to presume
a calculative choice for these individuals. In Model 4, we assume that everyone who
has a dominant strategy or reply of any order acts in accordance with this strategy,
just as in Model 3. Those who do not have such a strategy will base their decision on
an expected value calculation that involves estimating the number of contributing
fellow neighbors and a subjective forecast of probabilities of possible outcomes
(similar to Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987).
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To make the model more realistic, we incorporate a certain tendency in the model
that is found in experiments and is in accordance with bounded rationality. Social
psychologists often claim that people usually overestimate the criticalness of their
own decision (e.g., Kerr, 1989). Even if their beliefs about critical probabilities are
correct, they contribute to the collective action more likely than what would follow
from expected value calculations based on these probabilities (Rapoport, Bornstein,
and Erev, 1989). This striking gap is also present in experimental conditions, where
confirmation incentives can be excluded (cf. Caporael et al., 1989). Such a positive
error can originate in people’s preferences for not being responsible for the group
decision and can be labeled as responsibility aversion. We incorporated this tendency
in Model 4. The exact specification of the expected value rule that is adjusted for
responsibility aversion can be found in Appendix 2.A.2.
In Model 4, collective action might be established in a segregated setup, even
where rewards of intergroup opposition are not salient. In less segregated settings, not
only direct neighborhoods, but also fellows of a larger network distance can be
enforced to contribute because they might forecast contribution in the close
neighborhood of initiators. On the other hand, highly mixed networks are still likely to
avoid conflict.
We are also able to derive predictions about the effect of a certain type of cognitive
interdependency between the players. When at least in one group there is a
widespread belief that the local area is a leader in the establishment of group
collective action (for instance, in many districts of the city, Serbs believe that only
“good” Serbs live in that district), collective action will be more likely realized. The
more people who expect a high level of contribution (conflict), the more likely it is
that conflict will happen. On the other hand, expectations of peace will help the




In the previous section we introduced four models of individual behavior and we
discussed general model predictions under different assumptions. We noticed that
segregation increases the likelihood of intergroup conflict in all models, especially in
the presence of strong selective incentives. Besides the derivation of transparent
analytical results, we use simulations to derive precise predictions and provide
comparative statics for all possible networks in specific settings. In the simulations,
network ties represent relations between neighbors and other relations are omitted.9
People are seldom able to escape interacting with neighbors and being influenced by
them. As a consequence, different neighborhoods have different influences on
                                                          
9
 Simulation programs were written in Delphi 3.
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individual behavior. The empirical relevance lies in the fact that unlike other ties,
neighboring connections are symmetrical (undirected) and easily mapped. Residential
structures are visible and therefore our results can be interpreted easily. Furthermore it
is known, that residential segregation often goes together with other forms of
segregation (e.g., Whyte, 1986). The simplicity of neighborhood maps makes it
possible to apply a 


	 			 (von Neumann, 1966) alike design. Cellular
automata have become useful in understanding the relation between structural
embeddedness and individual choice in an interdependent situation (e.g. Messick and
Liebrand, 1995; Hegselmann, 1996).
In the simulations, a grid of a rectangular grid modeled residential locations. Every
location in the grid (each cell) could have three different states: occupied by a
member of group !, by a member of group  , or empty. No restrictions were applied
about the location of the empty cells. For instance, corner areas of the rectangle could
be empty. In this way the model could also resemble cross-shape or amorphous
settlements. However, simulation could provide only a simplification of residential
configurations observed in reality. Simplification was also made with respect to an
upper bound on neighborhood size. The usual assumptions of cellular automata based
research were embraced and at most four (South, West, North, East) or eight (also
SW, NW, NE, SE) adjacent cells were considered to represent neighbors (von
Neumann or Moore neighbors). As in reality, at the edges of the grid, neighborhood
was smaller in size. Empty adjacent cells at central locations could represent, for
instance, uninhabited buildings, squares, or parks.
	*31!&!#!$$ 
Since the central interest of this chapter is the relationship between structural
configurations and the likelihood of conflict, it is important to describe the network
structure with appropriate measures under the model settings. Therefore we briefly
summarize the measurements used in computer simulation.
In the limited scope of simulations, ties connect two adjacent cells. We measured
" by the proportion of ties that connect two nonempty cells. This measure of
density approaches a simple quadratic function of the proportion of nonempty cells as
grid size increases to infinity, regardless of the definition of neighborhood. The proof of
this is outlined in Appendix 2.A.3 (Lemma 2.A.3.1).
The concept of segregation is central in this research. In general, we mean by the
level of segregation in a network the following:
1 >) The 

	 in a network is defined as the proportion of
relations between two members of the same group relative to all ties in the
network. If this proportion is higher, then segregation is also higher.
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Segregation levels are comparable given a certain level of density in the network.
The definition corresponds with how the concept of 
is used in the empirical
literature (Lieberson and Carter, 1982). The level of clustering measures the extent to
which members of one group have connections only among each other (cf. Willms
and Paterson, 1995; Lieberson, 1980). On the other hand, segregation is also related to
the level of 8 that indicates to what extent members of one group are exposed
to members of the other group (Lieberson, 1980). If exposure is higher, then
segregation is lower in the network. In empirical research, segregation indexes are
computed from grouped data (e.g., group proportions in census tracts). As Grannis
(1998) stresses, in this way the indexes provide a biased measure of neighborhood
compositions. Individual behavior is influenced mainly by contacts embedded in
smaller units of residential structure, hence tertiary residential-type streets or merely the
closest neighbors comprise the lionshare of the explanatory focus.
In the simulations, we need to specify exactly how we measure segregation. As our
simulations contain individual-level data, we can rely on micro-level indexes that are
close in interpretation to the empirical isolation and exposure measures. The proportion
of fellow ties (from all non-empty relations) will be used as an index of 	
(clustering). This measure is closely related to the individual L values. As in the
empirical isolation index, high values indicate high levels of clustering. As grid size
increases to infinity, the expected proportion of fellow ties approaches the sum of
squares of the group proportions. The proof of this statement can be found in Appendix
2.A.3 (Lemma 2.A.3.2).
If a grid is more clustered than another under the von Neumann neighborhood
definition, this does not necessarily mean that this grid is also more clustered under
the Moore neighborhood definition. A striking example is a chessboard-like
settlement, in which black and white fields represent members of the two groups
respectively. In such a residential structure the segregation index is zero, if
neighborhood is defined by von Neumann neighbors, but it is close to the average
level, if neighborhood is defined by Moore neighbors (see Figure 2.7.1).

-	8. 4 8 4 8 4 8

	8 1 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.25
88 0 0 1 0.5 0.5 0.75
Figure 2.7.1 Simple patterns of different levels of clustering
,: Indexes are calculated for infinite grid sizes with these patterns
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The proportion of opposite ties that connect members of the competing groups could
be used as an index of 8. This measure is closely related to the individual L
values. High values of exposure indicate high levels of mixing. It is important to note
that extreme mixing is not equivalent to a random residential structure. The proportion
of fellow and opposite ties (segregation and exposure) always sums to one. The
constructed segregation and exposure indexes fulfill the proposed criteria and are
appropriate for the simulation analysis based on complete information. In our next




The aim of this section is to provide precise predictions about the effect of
segregation on the expected likelihood of conflict under different behavioral models.
In the simulations, structurally embedded IPG games were played between two
groups of equal size. We considered a 10×10 grid, in which 90% of the cells were
inhabited. Thus, there were 45 members in both groups. Under each decision model, a
homogenous population was assumed in the sense that every player used the selected
decision rule. The probability element of each decision rule was fixed to 25% of
contribution.
Figure 2.8.1.1 The effect of proportional threshold (MCS) on the expected
likelihood of collective action
,: Individual contribution chance is 25%.
Although we fix the parameter values of group size and minimal contributing sets
in all simulations, we can briefly demonstrate the effect of these parameters on the








































world in which every individual contributes with a 25% chance. Figure 2.8.1.1 shows
the effect of varying the minimal contributing set on the expected likelihood of
collective action of the group. The minimal contributing set is given in proportion to
the group size and different lines indicate different group sizes. If the minimal
contributing set is higher than the expected value (25%), then small groups can
establish collective action easier than large groups. The analytical calculation of the
likelihood of conflict becomes highly complicated if individual decisions are not
randomly taken. This is an additional reason why we need to use computer simulation.
Before discussing the effects of segregation and individual decision rules, let us
also illustrate how the definition of neighborhood influences the expected likelihood
of conflict. If the same levels of clustering are considered, the expected likelihood of
conflict is usually higher in the von Neumann neighborhood. Figure 2.8.1.2 shows
two comparisons in decision Model 1. As a grid with Moore neighborhood represents





can be found in the structural conditions of having a dominant strategy. In the
confirmation pressure condition only defection can be a dominant strategy.
Furthermore, it can be a dominant strategy only under the Moore neighborhood
definition, which means a higher likelihood of peace in this case. If local selective
incentives are important, then contribution is more likely to be a dominant strategy in
dense networks (cf. equations 2.4.1 and 2.4.2).
Figure 2.8.1.2 The effect of segregation on the expected likelihood of conflict, if
neighborhoods are defined differently
,:In confirmation pressure condition: *7*); in normative pressure condition: *)7*.  Other
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Figure 2.8.2.1. The Expected Likelihood of Conflict by Clustering, if the Minimal Contributing Set is 12 Members
 : Curves A, B: salient; curves C, D: non-salient rewards of intergroup opposition. Curves A, C: confirmation pressure condition; 





















































































































































































































Figure 2.8.2.2. The Expected Likelihood of Conflict by Clustering, if the Minimal Contributing Set is 23 Members
  Curves A, B: salient; curves C, D: non-salient rewards of intergroup opposition. Curves A, C: confirmation pressure condition; 















































































































































































































Curves in Figure 2.8.1.2 and in subsequent figures connect discrete cases of
clustering levels. It is possible that when the average number of fellow neighbors is
higher, the number of people who have enough fellow neighbors to have contribution
as a dominant strategy is smaller. This causes quite a big fluctuation, especially for
high and low ranges of clustering. To avoid graphic confusion, averages of expected
likelihood of conflict are shown by 0.01 interval sizes in the medium range of
clustering and by 0.025 interval sizes for extreme cases. However, it could be
interesting to investigate what structural configurations are behind these fluctuations
and what are the structural conditions that result in a high likelihood of conflict in a
mixed setting or the opposite, resulting in a low likelihood of conflict in a segregated
setting. We will return to this point in Section 2.9.
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Figures 2.8.2.1 and 2.8.2.2 illustrate how different individual decision rules
(Models 1-4) influence the effect of segregation on the expected likelihood of conflict.
The figures demonstrate this effect for two minimal contributing sets. In these
examples, we considered Moore neighborhoods. In both figures, behavioral models
are represented separately. On each figure, curves display the expected likelihood of
conflict for four combinations of parameter values: whether rewards from the
intergroup opposition are 	
 (*9, *(9) or (	
 (*;, *(;), and whether
behavioral confirmation is more important than selective incentives (	
 condition; *, *)) or not (	  condition; *), *).
Values of other parameters were fixed in all cases (*, *(), *).
 Figures 2.8.2.1 and 2.8.2.2 show that segregation has a crucial effect on the
expected likelihood of conflict in the normative pressure condition.10 Salient payoff
parameters are always associated with a higher expected likelihood of conflict. This
effect is never as crucial as the difference between the confirmation pressure and
normative pressure conditions. This is not surprising, since social incentives originate
from network relations; meanwhile payoff parameters of the IPG game are independent
from social structure. If contribution can be a dominant strategy (#), then the
relationship between segregation and the expected likelihood of conflict is best
described by a steep S-shape curve. In the normative pressure condition, clustering has
a crucial effect on conflict in a certain critical range. This range 	 moves
to the right (compare Figures 2.8.2.1 and 2.8.2.2) if the minimal contributing set for
                                                          
10
 In the confirmation pressure condition, contribution cannot be a dominant strategy (cf. equation
2.4.1). In these cases the expected likelihood of conflict is smaller. If *) and *, then contribution is
a dominant strategy for individual , if L*/ and L≥ ;; or if L*) and L ≥ 9. If rewards from the
intergroup opposition are salient (*9, *(9), then not to contribute is a dominant strategy for
individual ∈!, if L*/ and L≥;; or if L*) and L≥=; or if L* and L*A. For non-salient payoffs, not to




collective action is higher, which means that the overall likelihood of conflict is always
smaller. Under certain conditions, there is no critical range. There are examples in
which conflict is certain even in a grid of minimum clustering. There are also cases in
which peace is expected with certainty even in a grid of maximum clustering (cf.
confirmation pressure in Figure 2.8.2.2).
Within Figures 2.8.2.1 and 2.8.2.2, comparisons can be made between the effects
of segregation under different decision models. The segregation effect somewhat
increases and the critical range of clustering decreases, as we go towards models with
more rigid behavioral assumptions. In the low ranges of clustering, the expected
likelihood of conflict is lower, if a rigid decision rule is applied. In these cases, peace
can be achieved easier, if the community consists of “rational” individuals with
extensive information attainment. This success of calculative action can be explained
by “negative” block recruitment. In the high ranges of clustering, the opposite process
(positive block recruitment) can be traced. In the normative pressure condition, more
and more people will have a dominant strategy (and a dominant reaction) of
contributing in a segregated network. These two processes of block recruitment result
in steeper curves on the figures.
However, curves only become 

" steeper. The processes discussed above are
only present in some networks. In most of possible network structures very few
individuals have a dominant reply of any order. This implies that assumptions on
individual consciousness and local information are  	
 to determine
segregation effects on conflict. However, we will see in the next section that in some
specific structures more rigid assumptions on rationality definitely change predictions.
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In this section we try to illustrate with examples when rational consciousness and
access to additional information makes a significant difference for our model
predictions. We also try to provide an explanation for the fluctuations in Figures 2.8.2.1
and 2.8.2.2. These curves are constructed by connecting discrete data points. One data
point shows the expected likelihood of conflict under a given level of clustering. There
is a high variation of how many network configurations belong to the same level of
clustering. Furthermore, the expected likelihood of conflict might be very different for
two networks with the same level of clustering. Obviously, segregation is not the only
network characteristic that influences the likelihood of conflict between groups. As a
short illustration, we mention here the relevance of bridges, minority hostages, and
subgroups.
Bridges are believed to be of central importance in social network analysis
(Granovetter, 1973). Chain reactions in collective action also require bridges that link
socially distant actors (Macy, 1991a). A bridge is defined as a connection between
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otherwise separated units or subgroups of the network. In the intergroup context,
bridges are connecting otherwise separated portions of the 	 group. Our analysis
shows that bridges do not always help to diffuse contribution or defection and
sometimes do not play any role in intergroup conflict. Whether bridges play brokerage
or not, depends on the importance of social rewards, on the width of the bridges, and
also on the environment of bridging ties. The size of social rewards determines what
compositions of the individual neighborhood would allow dominant strategies or
replies. Let us consider the normative pressure condition of Figures 2.8.2.1 and 2.8.2.2
with the same parameter values. The first three network segments in Figure 2.9.1 are
examples of low clustering levels. In these segments, a single bridge, a double bridge,
and a double bridge with bridgeheads are represented for the black group in a residential
setting in which network ties are assumed to exist between Moore neighbors.
Figure 2.9.1 Examples of a single bridge, a double bridge, and bridgeheads (above)
and examples of suppression of collective action by minority hostages (below)
,6A white X denotes a dominant strategy of contribution, a white “/” stands for a dominant reply of a
first order and a white “\” indicates a dominant reply of a higher order.
The examples demonstrate that under the given parameter conditions a single bridge
“does not make a summer” (cf. McAdam, 1986; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). If
mediators are not alone, at least they will be active contributors to collective action.
However, they can only influence the connected subgroups, if sufficient people receive
their message. That is, bridges are capable of transmitting contribution incentives, if
they are “wide” enough and bridgeheads are built to receive and forward these
incentives. From Figure 2.9.1 we can also get an idea how a flow of contribution can be
established between loosely structured subgroups that are connected by wide bridges
and bridge-heads, if the local common knowledge rule (Model 3) is applied.
Another central issue in social network analysis is the role of structural holes (Burt,
1992). In the intergroup context, we redefine structural holes as empty or minority
connections in a local environment that is dominated by one group. Empty cells in a
homogeneous neighborhood harm neither contribution, nor defection, unless there are
not many of them. In a dense structure, abandoning some fellow ties and creating
structural holes has a low marginal influence on contribution, since dominant strategy
		
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and reply is more dependent on the homogeneity than on the size of the neighborhood.
However, if structural holes are filled with minority “hostages”, then they form a
serious threat for contribution. If they have central location, they can nip collective
action in the bud. As an example let us take a look at the normative pressure condition,
with the same parameter values as in previous figures. In this case, minority hostages
have a good chance of suppressing collective action if they are not completely alone
(see Figure 2.9.1, network on the bottom right). The network on the bottom left of
Figure 2.9.1 indicates the situation where the direct influence of a single individual is
maximal (all neighbors have a dominant reply of contribution). The feature in the
middle of the second row shows that contribution is suppressed if a structural hole is










Figure 2.9.2 Expected likelihood of conflict in networks with equal level of clustering
,:The expected likelihood of conflict is indicated for salient intergroup rewards in the normative
pressure condition with a minimal contributing set of 13 members (Moore neighborhood). In each
decision model, the probabilistic element is 25%.
Left side: a network with small cohesive subgroups, right side: a network with a large, loosely
connected subgroup. A white X denotes a dominant strategy of contribution, a white “/” stands for a
dominant reply of a first order and a white “\” indicates a dominant reply of a higher order.
For the discussion of anomalies, we would like to emphasize another important
point: the role of subgroup structures. What helps intergroup collective action more:
many small, cohesive, but isolated subgroups or few large, loosely connected
subgroups? The answer depends on the behavioral assumption we apply. If people can
recognize only their dominant strategies or have very limited local information (Model
2), then isolated, but dense subgroups are more efficient in the establishment of
collective action. However, if people are capable of assessing high quality information
regarding their neighbors (Model 3), then large, loosely connected subgroups are more
effective in mobilizing group members. Individuals at the periphery of the large group
can be convinced to participate in collective action. However, key contributors are
always necessary to initiate mobilization. Two networks with equal level of clustering
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are represented in Figure 2.9.2 as an example.  In the network on the left, there are two
small cohesive subgroups of black cells. In the right network, there is a loosely
connected large subgroup. The expected likelihood of conflict is larger in the left
structure under Model 1, but it is smaller under the assumptions of Models 2 and 3.
	*'5!&!! 
The aim of this chapter was to construct a theoretical model of intergroup conflict
that is based on the interdependency of individual decisions and integrates sociological
insight into the analysis. The latter was achieved by focusing on social incentives that,
besides the rewards from the intergroup context, influence individual decisions. Social
incentives are transmitted through social ties; consequently the network structure has a
strong impact on the emergence of group conflicts.
Previous research found that intergroup competition, the local assurance process, and
the application of selective incentives are possible structural solutions to social









 . Further investigation in the chapter concerned structural
conditions that can help to avoid lethal conflicts. Particular attention was paid to the
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   . This result will help us to
derive hypotheses for the experiments that are discussed in the subsequent chapters.
Furthermore, our findings might also have implications for real conflict management,
e.g. for residential policy.
Besides aggregated consequences, our main research questions concerned
underlying mechanisms on the interpersonal level (cf. Section 1.8). We were interested
in the effects of social control on individual decisions and we intended to explore how
different forms of social control are responsible for the segregation effect and what is
the impact of their relative size. In general, 
	
	7  	    	 	 	  
	. We were also interested if our results were valid under different
behavioral specifications. We demonstrated that the intensified effect of segregation
under strong normative pressure was present in all of our behavioral models. We
showed that by assuming higher consciousness of individual decisions and better access
to local information, the segregation effect becomes stronger. On the other hand, 
 	  		
" 	 	  
"  	 $'
	.
Possible applications of the model include ethnic conflict in neighborhoods, villages,
or cities under different residential structures; conflict between football supporters in a
		
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stadium or between pupils in a classroom under different seating patterns; and
participation in voting in two-party democracies. Empirical evidence from different
areas provides support for many of our model predictions. For instance, residential
segregation and separate education was found highly responsible for repeated conflict in
Northern Ireland (Whyte, 1986). In studies of voting behavior, the classical work of
Tingsten (1963 [1937]) has shown that socialist party choice is disproportionally more
likely in working class districts. Further evidence of a nonlinearly increasing effect of
segregation on voting was found by Butler and Stokes (1974) and Ragin (1986).
The model might have many important societal implications that will be discussed in
Section 6.2. On the other hand, there is a valid concern about the limited applicability of
the model to empirical situations. The ecological validity would be enhanced
significantly if some of the parameter values were based on empirical data. However,
the measurement of payoff parameters (especially social selective incentives and
behavioral confirmation) is highly problematic. Numeration of public good rewards
(e.g., social identity and nationalist pride) is also often impossible. Furthermore, the
model is based on far too simple assumptions to be sufficiently competent to describe
the complexity of reality. We should also mention some of the limitations. The focus on
single-shot games results in the neglect of time. In the model, simultaneous actions of
individuals are assumed, although in many empirical situations there are long-term
delays and people can obtain information about the decision of others. The introduced
dominant reply and common knowledge decision rules could however be interpreted as
decisions with a certain time lag. Using this interpretation our model allows new insight
also regarding the threshold models of collective action (Granovetter, 1978; Oliver,
Marwell, and Teixeira, 1985; Macy, 1991a; Gould, 1993a; Chwe, 1999). More
strikingly, we did not attempt to include the history of intergroup relations, which is the
root of many empirical conflict situations. The neglect of history will be relaxed in






Individual payoffs in the modified IPG game can be expressed as follows.
Formally, the set of possible strategies (ωL) for player ∈!are {0,1}, where 1 stands
for the contributing action. Let us denote the number of contributors in group ! and  
respectively by '$ and '% and the minimal contributing sets (MCS) by '$ and '%.
Given the strategy combination vectors ω$ and ω% (dimensions of $×) and %×)), the
payoff for  is determined by:
( ) ( ) ,, 1k1kBA BA +++−= ιιωω 7LL ) ω
where ιkA+1 is a ($+))×) vector of zeros with 1 in the '$+)(th place. The expression
ιkA+17ιkB+1  points to the {'$+)C '%+)} element of matrix . The ($+))×(%+))
dimension  matrix contains the payoffs from the intergroup context for individual
∈!. If there are '$ contributors in group ! and '% contributors in group  7 then the
{'$; '%} element of the  matrix shows the reward for individual ∈!.In general,
the matrix can be partitioned into four submatrices. The '$×'%  dimension  1
submatrix  contains  zeros  as  elements,  the '$×(%('%+)) dimension 2 submatrix
contains ’s as elements, and the ($('$+))×'% dimension 3 submatrix contains ’s
as elements. In the ($('$+))×(%('%+)) dimension 4 submatrix, there are ’s, if the
row number equals the column number in matrix . Furthermore, there are ’s if the
row number exceeds the column number and there are ’s if the column number is
higher. For example, if there are five members in group !,seven in group  , and the
































Payoffs with an asterisk indicate rewards from a Nash equilibrium outcome. There
are three Nash equilibria: one in which nobody contributes, one in which there are
three contributors in group ! and none in group  , and one in which there are no
contributors in group ! and there are four in group  . To facilitate the interpretation
of the  matrix, this latter equilibrium belongs to the fifth element in the first row of
the matrix. The corresponding payoff denotes that group ! is defeated.
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In the structurally embedded IPG game, these payoffs are extended by rewards
from interpersonal relations (local coordination games). The strategy set of player ∈!
is again {0,1}, where 1 stands for the contributing action. Let us denote the number of
’s neighbors from group ! by L and the number of neighbors from group   by L. The
individual payoff for ∈!, given the strategy combination (L×)) vector ωf for the fellow
neighbors, is determined by:
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ },,, ffff1k1kfBA BA ωωωωιιωωω 777 −−++++−+= ++ LLLLLLLL )) ωωωω







In Model 4, we assume that everyone who has a dominant strategy or reply of any
order acts in accordance with this strategy. Those who do not have such a strategy,
will base their decision on an expected value calculation that involves an estimation of
the number of contributing fellow neighbors and a subjective evaluation of
probabilities of possible outcomes.
The estimation can be based on the following calculation. Denote the subjective








 1  and the estimated number of
fellow neighbors for  who will contribute by
LF
ˆ . For the sake of simplicity, let us
assume that rewards are numerical and individual utility is a linear function of
rewards. We obtain that contribution is a better choice, if




We have to make further assumptions regarding how individuals determine critical
probabilities. The calculation could be based on an approximation from the binomial
distribution. People however, are unlikely to make calculations in this sophisticated
way (cf. experimental results of Rapoport and Bornstein 1989), especially if it is
problematic to translate rewards into utilities. On the other hand, in making decisions
individuals certainly consider what the probable outcomes of the intergroup
opposition will be and how their neighbors will behave. Therefore, results are aimed
only at highlighting the tendencies of how the “vision of rational man” can change the
predicted likelihood of intergroup conflict and the predicted relationship between
segregation and conflict.
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To make the model more realistic, we incorporated a certain tendency that
individuals often overestimate the criticalness of their own decision (Kerr, 1989;
Rapoport, Bornstein, and Erev, 1989). Precisely, we assume that if individuals do not
have a dominant strategy or a dominant reply of any order, (local common knowledge
is assumed about obvious reactions of neighbors), they will then use an expected
value calculation based on inequality (2.A.2.1). Critical probabilities ,,,, ,9, 9, and
9, (cf. Table 2.2.2) are obtained from a binomial calculation that sums the
probabilities of all possible events for the given outcome:
















































































































































































where $4and%4denote the D	
" that a representative individual
contributes to the group collective action in group !and  , respectively. We assume
that people think both groups are homogenous in a sense that they order the same
subjective probability to each actor’s action in the given group (cf. Rapoport and
Bornstein, 1987). In the simulations, we assumed both $4 and %4 to be 0.25.
Responsibility aversion is incorporated in the decision rule as when the procedure
described does not result in contribution people are still allowed to contribute with a
fixed probability. In the simulations, this probability was set to 0.25.
!;		
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In this part of the Appendix we derive some statistical properties of the network
measures used in the simulation. In all simulations, a grid of a rectangle form was
considered with Brows and columns.
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!;) The total number of dyadic connections @ is equal to B(B(,if
von Neumann neighbors are considered.
. Every cell in the middle (sum (B-2)(-2)) has four adjacent cells, every cell at
the edges (sum 2B+2-8) has three adjacent cells, and the four cells in the corners have
two adjacent cells. Summing this, every dyad is counted twice, thus
which completes the proof the proposition.
 !; The total number of dyadic connections @ is equal to =B(;B(
;+,if Moore neighbors are considered.
. Every cell in the middle (sum (B-2)(-2)) has eight adjacent cells, every cell
at the edges (sum 2B+2-8) has five adjacent cells, and the four cells in the corners
have three adjacent cells. Summing this, every dyad is counted twice, thus
which proves the proposition.
LEMMA 2.A.3.1. Denote the grid size by  (*B) and the population density (the
proportion of inhabited cells) by π*$%/. We assume no restrictions on how the grid
is filled, that is every location can be filled with a probability of π. The " of
network relations is measured by the proportion of nonempty dyads (ties) and it is
denoted by δ. Irrespective of the definition of neighborhood (von Neumann or Moore
neighbors), the expected density of network relations 2(δ) is obtained by
The larger the grid size () is, the closer the expected value is to π, i.e.
A network relation connects two adjacent cells in the grid. We do not make
specific assumptions about the definition of “adjacent” cells; thus our results are valid
for any neighborhood definitions. Consider a randomly selected dyad. This dyad is
empty when one of the cells it connects is empty. The probability of one cell being
empty is )(π. The same holds for the adjacent cell. However, the two events are not
































independent given the fixed population density of the grid (the two locations are filled
$ replacement). Therefore, for the calculation of the probability of this dyad being
empty the joint probability of the two events have to be subtracted, which is
The probability of this dyad being nonempty is one minus the probability of this
dyad being empty, thus irrespective of the definition of neighborhood,
Since the dyad was selected randomly, by applying the expectation of the binomial
distribution we get 2(δ)=(δ) and the proof is given.
LEMMA 2.A.3.2. Denote the proportional group sizes by α (α*$E$%) and β
(β*)(α). We assume no restrictions on how nonempty cells are filled, that is every
nonempty location can be filled with members of group ! with a probability of α. The
proportion of fellow ties φ (from all non-empty relations) will be used as an index of
	 (
). Irrespective of the definition of neighborhood, the expected
proportion of fellow ties 2(φ) from all non-empty relations is obtained by
By enlarging the grid, the expected value gets closer to α+β, that is
The proportion of opposite ties γ (from all non-empty relations) will be used as an
index of 8. The index of segregation (clustering) and the index of exposure
sums to one. Irrespective of the definition of neighborhood (von Neumann or Moore
neighbors), the expected proportion of opposite ties 2(γ) from all non-empty relations is
obtained by
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For the proof of LEMMA 2.A.3.2, consider the following proposition.
 !;;Without the loss of generality, let us consider group !, with a
relative proportion of α. The expected proportion of ties (from all non-empty relations)
connecting two members of group ! (denoted by ρ) is
 The placement of α$% individuals to $% locations and
the determination of the proportion of ties connecting members of group ! is equivalent
to the placement of π nonempty fields to  locations and the determination of the
proportion of network relations. Thus using LEMMA 2.A.3.1 and substituting α to π,
the proof is given.

	Fellow ties connect two individuals from the same group. The
probability of a randomly selected nonempty tie being a fellow tie is
Since the tie was selected randomly, by applying the expectation of the binomial
distribution we get2(φ)=(φ), which completes the proof.
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Single-shot social dilemma experiments often find unexpectedly high cooperation
rates. Even in strictly impersonal settings, in which no communication is allowed and
subjects are completely strangers, many people tend to act against their own interests
and make sacrifices for the collectivity. In a competition situation with another group, it
is even more likely that subjects put their direct monetary incentives aside in favor of
contributing to the public good provision (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994). In
intergroup competition experiments (e.g., Bornstein, Erev, and Rosen, 1990), subjects
were not allowed to redistribute payoffs, to invent binding commitments, or to apply
coercion. High level of cooperation was nevertheless achieved.
Why do people tend to act in favor of their groups if it is not in their interest to do
so? This question is particularly challenging to answer when widespread cooperation
within competing groups has lethal consequences for members of both groups. A
harmful outcome provides just another incentive against contribution, but people still
not refrain from making sacrifices of this kind for their group. Such action is difficult
to explain assuming perfect individual rationality. In this chapter, we do not discuss
limitations of rationality, but we raise doubts about whether the monetary payoff
structure of experimental games fully describes the incentives of players in the
laboratory. We claim that there are also other substantial utility concerns. We will
concentrate on the role of incentives that stem from 		. We try
to demonstrate that elementary structures might be present in the laboratory and can
make a significant difference to contribution decisions, even when subjects do not
know each other and are not allowed to communicate.
In this way, this is the very first attempt to incorporate structural embeddedness in
the experimental analysis of intergroup competition. As a model of intergroup
relations, we will use the structurally embedded Intergroup Public Goods (IPG) game
that was discussed in Chapter 2. We developed this model in order to explain how
structural embeddedness influences the likelihood of intergroup conflict. The
theoretical results we derived for this question will guide us as hypotheses in the
experiments. Among effects of structural embeddedness this study is particularly
interested in the effect of  on intergroup conflict. In the theoretical
analysis of Chapter 2 we found that in general the effect of segregation on the
likelihood of intergroup conflict can be characterized by an S-shape function. This
implies that segregation is likely to promote intergroup conflict, but in certain ranges
of segregation, an additional change does not result in an increase in the likelihood of
conflict. These results directly lead to one of the main research questions we would
like to answer in the experiments. This regards whether the likelihood of intergroup




As an underlying mechanism, in Chapter 2 we analyzed the impact of 
 on individual decisions. In previous experiments, there has been little focus on
structural embeddedness and social control. There are explanations of seemingly
irrational cooperation that concentrate on group identity, on fairness, or on other
related concepts (social commitment, conformity), but we do not exactly know how
these processes work in practice. There are some indications of the presence of social
control in earlier social dilemma experiments (van de Kragt, Dawes, and Orbell, 1988;
Rapoport, Bornstein, and Erev, 1989), but without clear conceptualization of these
effects.
As in Chapter 2, in the experiments we focus on three fundamental forms of social
control. The first is    that expresses the subject’s desire to
conform to the expected behavior of other individuals. The second is the distribution
of    such as prestige or respect. The third form is present in
network relations between members of the opposite groups and is referred to as a
 It is a social selective incentive that punishes contribution and rewards
defection. For the derivation of hypotheses about these social control mechanisms,
results from Chapter 2 give directives. These results show that the larger the size of
selective incentives compared to behavioral confirmation, the stronger the effect of
segregation on intergroup conflict. In the experiments, we explore in which forms
social control influences individual behavior and whether the segregation effect on
intergroup conflict is indeed stronger under normative pressure than under
confirmation pressure.
For the conceptualization of social control in the laboratory, we have to consider that
social control might become ! (Scott, 1971; Coleman, 1990: 293). The
internalization of 	 creates a cognitive reward for cooperation. This
motive, that can be summarized as “I do the right thing for the group”, is relevant even
if individual decisions are completely confidential (Opp, 1989). Similar explanations
were provided for surprisingly high contribution rates in social dilemmas and for high
participation rates in collective action situations from various theoretical perspectives.
Such motivations have already been recognized by Smith (1976[1759]) and were as a
“universal fellow feeling”. The interpersonal character of these intrinsic motivations
were acknowledged by Sen (1977), who called them “social commitment”, and by
Elster (1990), who specified these behavioral incentives as a “sense of duty”. They
argued that social commitment and respectively the sense of duty is obviously stronger
in the direction of somehow related individuals (cf. Caporael et al., 1989). Others
attributed the selective character of internalized contribution norms to internalized
values of altruistic or non-selfish behavior (Kenrick, Baumann, and Cialdini, 1979;
Cialdini et al., 1987).
Some concepts that have appeared in the literature as possible solutions for social
dilemmas show similarity with  . "
 can be an efficient




present in single-shot situations in a cognitive form. For instance, individuals might
believe that others are good contributors and they might believe that others have similar
beliefs. Furthermore, they might also think that there is a mutual consensus about
considerations of reciprocal fairness (cf. Camerer, 1997). Besides reciprocity, another
mechanism that shows similarity with behavioral confirmation is . Even if
others are not able to monitor individual choice, people tend and like to behave as
others or imitate behavioral samples (Asch, 1956; Dawkins, 1976; Pingle, 1995). In
classical sociology, Weber (1978[1913]: Chapter I.4, 29) specified “custom” similar to
internalized behavioral confirmation: “As distinguished from both ‘convention’ and
‘law’, ‘custom’ refers to rules devoid of any external sanction. The actor conforms with
them of his own free will…” In a certain sense, fashion works in a similar way, as
individuals gain enjoyment by confirming the behavior of relevant others (e.g.,
Richardson, 1948a; 1948b).
#  are also likely to be internalized as a fear of local conflict and
benefit for local harmony. Betraying someone else elicits an unpleasant feeling of
guilt; therefore people try to avoid this (e.g., Poundstone, 1992: 223).
We believe that these forms of social control influence individual contribution
decisions in intergroup related collective action. As an aggregated consequence of
dyadic social control, the network structure of individual relations influences the
likelihood of intergroup conflict. Dense in-group relations and scarce out-group
relations are correlated with extensive distribution of social selective incentives
between fellows and limited realization of traitor rewards. Hence, segregation
supports the emergence of harmful intergroup clashes. The key elements of the
explanatory mechanism are the fundamental forms of social control. In this chapter,
we will examine what types of direct and internalized social control influence the
decision of subjects to contribute or not to group collective action in controlled
experimental conditions. In short, we are interested in what forms of social control
back the segregation effect on intergroup conflict.
To test the presence of different forms of social control and the segregation effect
on intergroup conflict, we introduced a $
. Seating patterns were
varied and visibility conditions were manipulated in order to detect forms of social
control that are activated conditional on the neighborhood composition. We
implemented a full segregation, a complete mixture, and a medium segregation
condition. Additionally, in the control condition, subjects made decisions in isolation.
As an aggregated consequence of local social control we derived a prediction that
intergroup conflict will be more likely in segregated seating configurations. This
prediction was tested in the experiments.
Subjects were unknown to each other. They were not able to communicate in any
form and there was no way to learn of the decisions of others. Consequently, there
were no real network relations between the subjects. For testing the presence of
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internalized social control, we introduced   between neighboring
subjects. Minimal contact meant that subjects were able to see each other and they
were able to identify the group membership of each other. We were interested in
whether this minimal contact is sufficient to activate internalized forms of social
control in the experiment.
Experimental evidence shows that face-to-face contact facilitates cooperation in
conflict situations (Drolet and Morris, 2000). Previously, this finding was explained
by the social psychological process of rapport that is conceptualized as a “state of
mutual positivity and interest that arises through the convergence of nonverbal
expressive behavior in an interaction” (Drolet and Morris, 2000: 27; Tickle-Degnen
and Rosenthal, 1990). There is no doubt that when subjects are able to communicate
with nonverbal signs or are able to send emotional signals, they influence the behavior
of each other in the social dilemma task. However, we would like to emphasize that
minimal contact has an additional effect that is due to the activation of internalized
social control. To show this, extensive nonverbal communication was disallowed in
the experiment and decision times were restricted to avoid initiations of signaling.
Our experiments provide a test whether we can partly explain a higher level of
contribution in the IPG game by internalization of social control (behavioral
confirmation, selective incentives, and traitor rewards) under strictly impersonal
experimental conditions with only a minimal contact between subjects. In later parts
of the experiments, behavioral confirmation and selective incentives were introduced
as monetary side-payments. In this way we tried to model real situations, in which
related individuals experience direct social control. As we deal with unrelated subjects
in the experiments in artificial circumstances, it was only possible by transforming the
utility of these social incentives into monetary rewards. Obviously, we predict these
effects to be stronger. With their introduction, however, our main intention was to
provide a meaningful comparison between the size of monetary and internalized
social incentives.
A deeper question concerns why do people experience social control and why do
they experience social incentives in relation to strangers. Evolutionary psychology
offers an answer in the ancestral environment (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). At a
certain time of human evolution, survival success and adaptation to the environment
was increased by the emergence of human sociality. There is a growing literature that
helps to explain the evolution of early human sociability by using computer
simulation or game theoretic tools (e.g., Axelrod, 1986; Allison, 1992; Young, 1993;
Binmore, 1998; Bowles and Gintis, 1998; Bateson, 2000). Mainstream sociology,
however, concentrates not on natural selection, but on culture and norms that are
learnt as “rules of the game” during the socialization process. It is not our goal to be
involved in this debate on nature and nurture (for a synthesis, see Gintis, 2001). We
are not interested in the origins of social incentives; we just aim to test whether they




From previous experiments we know that many other factors influence cooperation
rates in social dilemmas (e.g., Ledyard, 1995). These factors might be relevant also in
intergroup related collective action. With the introduction of personal characteristics
as control variables into the analysis, we will be able to test the significance of
“traditional” research variables as gender, study direction, experience with similar
experiments, risk preferences, and social orientations. We show whether prosocial
individuals are more concerned about harmful outcomes and thus abstain from
contribution or whether they have higher contribution propensities and are even the
initiators of harmful intergroup conflict.
We have to emphasize that decision algorithms that we discussed in Section 2.4
(dominant strategy, dominant reply, local common knowledge, and expected value
rules) are difficult to be traced in the experiments. Looking only at the monetary
rewards, subjects have no dominant strategies in the payoff structure of the
experiment. We are not able to test the hypothesis that some subjects might evaluate
social control so much that contribution becomes unconditionally their best choice.
Furthermore, subjects have no information about the utility function of neighboring
others as it is assumed partly in the dominant reply, the local common knowledge, and
in the expected value rules. Similar problems hold for subjective expected utility rules
(cf. Esser, 1986) and other belief-based models (Camerer and Ho, 1999).
In this section we provided an introduction to the experimental analysis of
intergroup competitions. We discussed motivations to investigate structural effects
that until now have been neglected in the experimental literature. In Section 3.2 we
formulate our hypotheses for the experiments. In Section 3.3 we introduce the new
experimental design. The model we use to test our hypotheses is specified in Section
3.4.1. A discussion about which control variables are included in the analysis can be
found in Section 3.4.2. Section 3.5 describes the method with the discussion of some
major characteristics of the subjects, the experimental procedure, and some technical
difficulties. Results in Section 3.6 contain descriptive statistics and the discussion of
questionnaire data, followed by the multilevel analysis of contribution propensities.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.7.
	"&'()%'$'(*$(''
The experiments were designed to answer research questions about the effect of
structural embeddedness on intergroup conflict. At the aggregated level we aim to
answer whether harmful intergroup outcomes more likely in sessions in which members
of the two groups are seated in a segregated pattern. With regard to the underlying
micro mechanisms, our main research question concerns whether social control affects
individual decisions in a direct and in an internalized form. These questions will be
answered by analyzing individual decisions in a series of single-shot IPG games.
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The general conclusion of previous IPG experiments is that individuals often make
sacrifices for their group. In our experiments we will test whether higher contribution
rates can be partly explained by effects of social control. Furthermore, we are interested
whether eye contact between the subjects is sufficient to trigger internalized forms of
social control in impersonal experimental conditions. We will test the presence of three
types of social control mechanisms: selective incentives (), behavioral confirmation
(), and traitor rewards (). When internalized, these forms of social control create non-
monetary incentives for the subjects, which can be expressed as part of their utility
functions. Since both monetary and these non-monetary incentives enter the game, the
“real” payoff matrix is not equivalent to the “monetary” payoff matrix. The “real” game
could have multiple equilibria (cf. Gächter and Fehr, 1999). Contribution, for instance,
could be a dominant strategy (cf. inequality 2.4.1). Formally, in the experimental game
contribution is a dominant strategy of individual if assuming a linear utility function




holds, where L stands for the reward for free riding,  L denotes the number of fellow and
L the number of opposite neighbors of . The relative weight of the utility of monetary
rewards and of the utilities attached to different forms of non-monetary incentives can
change from person to person.1 We do not assume a specific form of utility function
that can be applied to everyone. However, we are interested only in mean tendencies
and in trying to estimate the average relative size of different forms of social incentives.
Our main interest is in the analysis of social control that is experienced in dyadic
contact. We predict that social control enters subjects’ considerations in an
internalized form when eye contact is established and in a direct form when monetary
side-payments are included. With regard to different forms of social control, we can
explicate the following hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived directly from the
discussion in Chapter 2.
Selective incentives always reward contribution or punish defection (Olson, 1965).




More connections to group
fellows means the distribution of selective incentives from multiple sources.%
		
	
On the other hand, the effect of behavioral confirmation is not only dependent on
the composition of the network neighborhood, but also on expected decisions of
neighbors. We presume that subjects do not make qualitative differences between
fellow neighbors. We can therefore derive the following hypothesis:
                                                          
1
 For this reason, we use the subscript for non-monetary incentives in inequality (3.2.1). Later on, this
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The presence of neighbors from the opposite team triggers an internalized form of
social control we called traitor rewards. Because of research limitations and for the
sake of simplicity, we did not introduce these incentives in a monetary form in the
experiments.
# : ' 








Network connections were conceptualized as adjacency in the seating configuration
in the experiment. As we believe that neighbors are the direct source of social control,
different neighborhood compositions would lead to different contribution propensities.
At the aggregated level, higher contribution propensities mean higher likelihood of
intergroup conflict. As a consequence, different outcomes can be predicted for different
neighborhood structures. Theoretical analysis in Chapter 2 has shown that from the
nature of the specified social control mechanisms it follows that segregation is likely to
promote intergroup conflict. On the basis of this result, we formulate the following





Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 2 also specified the impact of the relative size of
social control mechanisms on intergroup conflict. Results demonstrated that the
segregation effect on intergroup conflict is stronger where selective incentives are
relatively important when compared to behavioral confirmation. In order to test this
theoretical prediction, a   
	 condition and a  
	
condition was implemented in the experiments. In the normative pressure condition,
selective incentives were introduced as monetary side-payments. In the confirmation
pressure condition, monetary behavioral confirmation rewards were included. On the









In this section, we summarized our main research questions and hypotheses for the
experiments. In the next section, we introduce a new experimental design that is
invented to test these hypotheses.
	"	'+
In this section, the structure of the extended IPG game used in the experiments will
be outlined. There were two groups: the red group and the green group consisting of
five members each. Every player decided individually whether to keep a bonus of 11
points completely (in the experiments, 1 point was equivalent to 1 NLG = 0.42 USD) or
to give all of it to help their group in the competition. Depending on the number of
contributors in the groups, public good and “bad” rewards were distributed equally
among all group members. The sizes of these rewards in the experiments are shown in
Table 3.3.1.
Everyone in the groups received these rewards, regardless of the decision to keep or
give away the bonus of 11 points. Table 3.3.1 does not include the bonus reward that is
added to the payoff of those subjects who decided to keep it. Moreover, to ensure
positive payoffs, every subject was entitled to 15 points additional payment at the end
of the experiment.
Table 3.3.1 The IPG game (with clash punishment) used in the experiments
			
payoffs
1 point = 1 NLG 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 15 15 150
0 0 0 -15 -15 -15
0 0 0 15 15 151
0 0 0 -15 -15 -15
0 0 0 15 15 152
0 0 0 -15 -15 -15
-15 -15 -15 -11 15 153
15 15 15 -11 -15 -15
-15 -15 -15 -15 -11 154
15 15 15 15 -11 -15
-15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -11
	
		
 5 15 15 15 15 15 -11
*+The payoffs are public good rewards distributed to everyone in the red (bottom left corner of each
cell) and in the green (top right corner) group.
Due to Definition 1.2.1.1, in intergroup conflict the collective interest of a group is
hurt by the collective action of the other group. In the experiment, if there were at least




Table 3.3.1). These are the combinations (victory of one side or clash) we call
	
  in the experiment.
There are three pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game. One is when nobody
contributes. In this situation, no player can be better off by giving the bonus away since
the outcome cannot be changed by a single contribution. The other equilibria are when
there are three contributors in one group and none in the other team. In this situation,
contributors do not have an incentive to switch because the reward for victory
outweighs the value of the bonus. Free riders are happy in the winning group and alone
they cannot change the situation in the losing group. Since communication is not
allowed between the players, there are strong arguments against the occurrence of the
latter equilibria. First, nobody would be really interested in making the sacrifice when
he or she could also free ride on the effort of other team members. Second, making such
a sacrifice does not mean success immediately; there should be at least two other
fellows who are willing to make this decision. This makes contribution a very risky
alternative and makes the latter equilibria vulnerable (cf. Selten, 1975). On the other
hand, overall abstaining from contribution is a stable equilibrium. Although keeping the
bonus is not a dominant strategy in the game, it nevertheless provides, almost under
every condition, a better individual payoff.2
In order to obtain more data in the experiments, the game was played many times in
each session, but subjects received payments in a randomly selected single round only.
No information was provided during the experiment about what has happened in earlier
rounds. This method was applied in earlier team game experiments by Bornstein and
Ben-Yossef (1994).
To have a low variation in neighborhood composition and to facilitate the testing of
the segregation hypothesis, only simple neighborhood structures were applied in the
experiments. Every experiment started with a control condition, in which subjects had
to make their decisions in isolation and without the knowledge of their group
membership. After the control condition, color labels were introduced and subjects were
seated due to three structural patterns that are shown on Figure 3.3.1. These structural
conditions varied in between the experiments. In all structures, subjects had at most two
neighbors. The structural position of the groups was completely symmetrical in each
case.
Seating patterns were varied between experimental sessions. Visibility conditions
were varied and direct social incentives were introduced within every experiment. The
latter was done in order to map neighborhood effects and to provide a meaningful
comparison for the relative size of the effect of internalized social incentives. The
importance of internalized social incentives varies across individuals. We are only
                                                          
2
 The exceptions are the following situations. A member of the red group is better off with contribution,




able to demonstrate the relative importance of internalized social control on average
and the extent of variation between subjects.
Figure 3.3.1 Structural conditions in the experiment: control condition, low, medium,
and high clustering
*+ Light and dark colors indicate seats of the members of the red and green group. In the control
condition, no color labels were introduced.
Social control of the network neighborhood is predicted to be strongest in the
presence of direct monetary rewards. Between experimental sessions, two conditions
were applied. Next to the payoffs that were present in the beginning of the
experiments (see Table 3.3.1), in the  
	 condition direct
behavioral confirmation incentives (=5 NLG), in the   
	 condition
direct selective incentives (=5 NLG) were introduced at a certain point in the
experiment. Later, in both conditions the other type of incentives was also introduced.
Subjects received 5 NLG behavioral confirmation reward if one of their fellow
neighbors chose the same action as they did and received 10 NLG if two of their
fellow neighbors acted on the same way. Selective incentives were distributed
regardless of the decision of neighbors. Contributing subjects received 5 NLG for
each fellow neighbor they had. In the low clustering condition there was no change
due to the absence of fellow neighbors. This way we had a 2×3 block-design of
experimental conditions (see Table 3.3.2).
Table 3.3.2 The number of sessions by experimental conditions
$,%'+ $- % (+(

	()  , ,
 




Every experiment consisted of four parts (see Table 3.3.3). All experimental sessions
started with an anonymous control condition (Part I) in which subjects were isolated
from each other. They did not see each other and did not know which group they belong
to. This part allows us to estimate the baseline contribution rates without eye contact
between the subjects.
Table 3.3.3 Overview of experimental parts
 anonymous control condition
 eye contact is established
 one form (/) of social control is introduced in a monetary form
 the other form (/) of social control is introduced in a monetary form
	".($,$+$/%$$''
,-.+!
In this section, we describe the model we use to test our hypotheses in the IPG game
experiments. In the explanatory model of individual contribution propensities we
incorporate different forms of social control that are believed to be the underlying
mechanisms of the segregation effect on intergroup conflict at the macro level. Besides
social control being the focus of our interest, we briefly discuss the influence of
personal characteristics that are handled as control variables.
For the analysis of experimental data we will use multilevel logistic regression (Bryk
and Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995). In our two-level model, single decisions are
the lower level observations and characteristics of the subjects, who took these
decisions, are the group level observations. The two-level model allows us to correct for
the methodological problem that observations within the subjects are not independent.
For the binary dependent variable, we will use the logit transformation. Formally, let the
function /UL denote the propensity of actor  to cooperate in the th single-shotgame.
The propensity of cooperation is specified by the logit link function (Goldstein 1995:
Chapter 7), which is the natural logarithm of the quotient of the probability of
contribution /UL() and the probability of defection /UL(0).
( )










where α is the baseline contribution propensity. From previous experiments we know
that α depends primarily on the payoff parameters, on the criticalness of the decision
(which is a function of group size and the threshold of collective action) and on
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experimental conditions of confidentiality and anonymity (whether subjects know each
other, whether they are in the same room, etc.). Notation εL stands for a subject level
error term and ξUL is intra-individual variation. The latter term represents the residual
variance that is not estimated in models that include the random intercept α. We
assume that the subject level error has a zero expected value and has a normal
distribution, that is
εL~N(0,σ),
where the variance σis going to be estimated. This baseline model does not contain
any explanatory variables and allows us to model behavior in the anonymous control
condition (Part I).
The interindividual variation of contribution propensities depends on personal
characteristics, like gender, study direction, experience in similar experiments, attitudes
towards risk, or social orientations. We will include personal characteristics in the
analysis as control variables. They enrich research with interesting insight and
comparisons can be made with previous findings. They might also interact with
internalization of social control. These effects will be discussed in the next section.
Intra-individual variation results from experimental manipulations and also because
subjects might reconsider their expectations about the behavior of others. These main
factors are relevant after the introduction of minimal contact in Part II. Additional
reasons for such variation that can already be present in the control condition are
stochastic individual decisions, consideration of mixed strategies, or simply
inconsistency. In our simplest model, we assume that intra-individual variation is not
correlated with the round number  and has a zero expected value. However, we have to
modify this assumption and add a trend element if we find indications of learning the
structure of the game through the experiment.
With the introduction of minimal contact (Part II), we predict that internalized
social incentives affect individual decisions. The propensity of cooperation will also
be dependent on internalized selective incentives, behavioral confirmation, and traitor
rewards, as expressed by equation (3.4.1.2):
( ) ( ) .ˆˆ000 ULLLGULFULL,,UL / ξεα +++= −+ +−−+  (3.4.1.2)
To recall, notation  L stands for the number of fellow neighbors of  and Lfor the
number of neighbors from the opposite group. Parameter  denotes internalized
selective incentives (prestige, respect, etc.) and  stands for internalized behavioral
confirmation rewards. We need to estimate these parameters from the experimental
results. The expression after  within the brackets denotes the difference between the
expected number of contributing and defecting fellow neighbors in decision round . If




used a direct way to estimate the expectations of subjects about the number of
contributing and non-contributing neighbors. Subjects were asked to forecast the
decision of their left and right neighbors before every decision round.
The number of neighbors from the opposite group affects contribution rates through
traitor rewards. These are positive () and negative () selective incentives rewarding
defection and punishing contribution.3 For the sake of simplicity, we denote their sum
by . In the simplest model, we only estimate the average individual importance of
internalized social control, therefore the subscript  is omitted for estimates , and .
However, in part of the analysis, we will consider that there is a random variance in the
size of these effects. Specifically, we will assume that the effects of internalized social
control for the subjects are normally distributed around their means. This is consistent
with the statement that individuals do not assign the same relative utility for social
control, but the utilities are scattered normally around a certain mean evaluation. In this
part of the analysis, we will estimate the variances of the influences of different forms
of internalized social control, as well as their covariances.
Finally, when explicit monetary payoffs of social control ( and ) are introduced
(Parts III and IV), we have to extend equation (3.4.1.2) with additional terms. The
simple model in its general form can be written as






M dummies denote experimental parts: 
,, indicates whether or not minimal
contact is present, 
V denotes whether or not direct selective incentives are introduced,
and 
E shows the presence of direct confirmation rewards. We have to emphasize that 
and  in equation (3.4.1.3) are parameters we need to estimate and therefore we
distinguish them from the monetary values  and . The utility of these monetary
rewards might differ between subjects, therefore, in part of the multilevel analysis we
will assume a normal distribution of the estimates over the subjects.
,1 
Instead of including individual effects as dummies, it is more meaningful to
analyze what kind of personal characteristics have an influence on contribution
propensities. We do not derive hypotheses about the effects of these variables, but we
include them as controls because they might have a strong impact on behavior in the
experiments.
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 In Chapter 2, we considered positive traitor incentives only. The consideration of both positive and
negative traitor rewards does not add complications to the model.
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We know from previous social dilemma experiments that gender is an important
predictor of cooperation. However, findings are contradictory about whether women
or men are more cooperative (e.g., Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985; Mason, Phillips,
and Redington, 1991; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993; Brown-Kruse and Hummels,
1993; Nowell and Tinkler, 1994; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Ortmann and Tichy,
1999). Most subjects participating in experiments are students at different faculties of
the university. Direction of study might cause individual differences in willingness of
contribution. Previous research found that economists have lower contribution rates
(Marwell and Ames, 1981; Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan,
1993), although there are also experiments that do not find this effect (Isaac, McCue,
and Plott, 1985; for an overview, see Ledyard, 1995: 161, 179).
Besides these background variables, we control for attitude measures that indicate
special forms of individual utility functions. Previous findings show that attitudes
towards risk correlate with contribution propensities (Suleiman and Or-Chen, 1999).
Since the contribution decision involves the possibility of a higher reward, but also
involves the risk of losing the bonus completely, subjects with a risk-seeking attitude
might have higher contribution rates (Budescu, Rapoport, and Suleiman, 1990). On
the other hand, there are arguments that in repeated social dilemmas risk aversion
increases cooperation (Raub and Snijders, 1997; van Assen and Snijders, 2002). In
our experiments, we use attitudes towards risk only as control variables. For the
measurement of risk preferences, questions with preference comparisons (see
Farquhar, 1984) were used (see Appendix 3.A.2).
Utility functions can also include altruistic elements, which certainly influences
rational decision making in social dilemma experiments (e.g., Liebrand, 1984; Doi,
1994). Subjects, who order positive utilities for the gains of others, behave differently
from individualistic ones. For the approximation of such utilities, standard questions
regarding social orientations were used. They consisted of a series of decomposed
games with an unknown person.4 We presumed that individuals are only 

(cooperative),  	, or 
 . Previous research found only these types
relevant in describing human behavior (van Lange et al., 1997; van Lange, 1999;
Suleiman and Or-Chen, 1999). Among each type we distinguished an egalitarian
tendency (cf. van Lange, 1999). Although in a two-person PD game or in a public
good experiment we should predict higher contribution rates from prosocial subjects,
it is not so evident in the IPG game. One could argue that subjects who order utility
weights for rewards of unknown others, would do this equally for everyone, including
out-group members. Consequently, their contribution rates would not be different
from individualistic subjects. A counter-argument is that prosocial (and also
egalitarian) orientation is associated with high utility for  , which is
obtainable in a relational comparison with the out-group. Hence prosocial orientation
is primarily directed towards in-group members.
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In part of the analysis, we also included interaction effects of background variables
and social control, because the relative size of internalized social control in the utility
function might depend on certain personal characteristics. There are contradictory
findings in previous experiments about whether people are more likely to think of
others of the same sex to be contributors and in general, whether men or women are
more likely to be thought of as better contributors (Ortmann and Tichy, 1999; Solnick
and Schweitzer, 1999). For explorative reasons, we control for interactions between
gender and social control. We also include as controls interactions between social
orientations and the relative weight of social control.
Experiments were combined with repeated IPG games. Repeated games followed
single-shot games in all four experimental parts. We designed the experiments so as to
exclude possible influences of previous decisions. Subjects were explicitly told before
every part that previous parts and repeated games are completely independent from
the next part. We predicted no history effects on single-shot decisions, but as a test of
this hypothesis, we included previous outcomes of repeated games as control
variables in part of the analysis.5
	"!($
2-	
203 subjects took part in the experiments at the University of Groningen in May
2000. Subjects were recruited via e-mail and board advertisements promising monetary
rewards for participation in a “team competition” experiment. All 203 subjects
completed the decision tasks and only two failed to complete the post-decision
questionnaire. Altogether, 21 sessions took place and subjects made 4060 decisions (20
each).
114 (56.2%) subjects were female. 187 (92.1%) subjects were university students at
the time of the experiments and 16 had already graduated. Students came from all
faculties of the university: 55 studied behavioral or social sciences, 47 subscribed for
literary studies or art, 26 studied natural sciences, 17 studied law, 13 studied economics,
10 were students at the business faculty, there were 8 students of medical science, 8
subjects studied spatial sciences, and one subject read philosophy. Because of
similarities and for the sake of simplicity, economic, business, and spatial sciences were
merged in the analysis (furthermore, these faculties have the same physical location)
and the student of philosophy was allocated to the category of literary studies and art.
The study direction of two subjects was unknown.
Single-shot games (only the decision rounds) took approximately three minutes in
each experimental part. During this time subjects had to make five decisions. Counting
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 In the repeated games, subjects were informed about the result of the previous round.
82 

all four parts of the experiment, every subject played in 20 single-shot games. The
entire experiment was on average 80 minutes long.
The payoff for subjects was contingent on their decisions, as well as on the decisions
of other participants of the session. Individual payoffs were calculated on the basis of
outcomes in the single-shot and in the repeated games. The weighted average of the
payoffs obtained in the decision rounds was paid to the subjects after the experiment in
sealed envelopes. Payoffs from every round of the repeated games had a single weight.
From the single-shot games, only one was selected randomly in each experimental part
to be included in the calculation. This payoff had a weight of five rounds (the number of
single-shot games in one experimental part). Payoffs varied between 14 and 32 Dutch
guilders with an average of 21.1 NLG. Reserve subjects received 10 NLG for their
appearance. If subjects ran out of decision time, a random decision was implemented.
For all such cases, final payment was decreased by 1%. Out of 4060 decisions this
happened only 26 times (0.64%). Random decisions are not included in the analysis.
21/	
Experiments were conducted in the same computer laboratory.6 Upon arrival,
subjects were randomly seated at a computer. Removable walls separated the subjects to
ensure their privacy. Subjects received instructions on paper and on their screen. After
reading the instructions they were allowed to ask the experimenter questions. After the
questions had been answered, subjects were not allowed to talk. All participants strictly
adhered to the rules. After the questions, an examination of understanding followed.
Subjects understood the task quite well, on average they answered 16.5 questions in
five minutes, from which 13.7 (83%) were right. The mean proportion of correct
answers was 80% with a standard deviation of 18%. Only nine subjects gave more
wrong than right answers, one of the nine gave answers that could be considered






  (/4     	  
 . Experiments
began with an anonymous start (Part I). Group membership was not yet announced. In
every decision round, subjects had to decide whether they would keep the 11 NLG
bonus or give it to help their group to achieve success in the competition. These two
options appeared in a randomized order on their screen. The bonus was represented
also graphically as a bag of money. Subjects were assured of the anonymity of their
decisions and that they would receive any money they earned during the experiment
in sealed envelopes, after the experiments had ended. In the single-shot games, it was
announced that every decision counts towards the final payment, but that only one
game of each part would be chosen randomly for payment.
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In the beginning of Part II, separator walls were removed and group membership
was made public by the experimenter. Red and green flags were attached to the
monitors and subjects also received an A-4 colored paper with the color of their group.
In each condition, subjects were seated behind computers due to the neighborhood
configuration of the given session. Subjects were explicitly asked to look around in the
laboratory and then played five rounds of the same IPG game again. Before every
decision in Part II, III, and IV, subjects had to give their expectations about the
subsequent decision of their neighbors. The five single-shot games were followed by
repeated games.
In Part III, monetary payoffs for social control were introduced explicitly. In 10
sessions (see Table 3.3.2) monetary confirmation rewards and in 11 sessions monetary
selective incentives were incorporated. In Part IV, the other type of social control was
also introduced in an explicit monetary form (see Table 3.3.3). As in the low
clustering condition there were no fellow neighbors, this condition was used to control
for independent learning effects (there was no change between Part II, III, and IV).
Calculation and announcement of the individual results followed the experiment.
Meanwhile subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire on their computer. Monetary
payments were supplied in sealed envelopes. The first subject, who had completed the
questionnaire, could go immediately to the experimenter to receive payment. Other
subjects had to wait until they got a signal from the server. Hence, subjects left the
laboratory individually, with a short time difference between their departure. They
were informed about the aim of the study after the experiments.
20	
The intended number of participants was ten in all the 21 experimental sessions. On
average, thirteen subjects were invited to the sessions as it was anticipated that some
would not come. Four sessions failed to be completely filled. In these cases, computer
players were included in the teams. Subjects were told that they are programmed in a
way to resemble human behavior. In fact, they were simple programs playing mixed
strategies with condition-dependent probabilities of contribution. Human decisions in
the incomplete experiments are also included in the analysis, but computer decisions are
excluded. The inclusion of simulated participants did not have a significant influence on
the behavior of subjects in the IPG games.7
Additional complications occurred due to a computer failure in three experimental
sessions. In these cases, the given subject was seated further away from the others at
another computer. No neighbors were defined for these subjects. These complications
did not cause distortions in the data.
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Some of the participants knew each other. As acquaintances might influence actual
decisions in the experiment, we included the number of acquaintances in the experiment
as a control variable in the analysis. Not only the number, but also the exact seating
location of acquaintances can be a relevant factor. However, inclusion of such variables





Let us first provide an overview of the general results of the experiments. Altogether
420 single-shot games were played (20 decision rounds in each of the 21 sessions).
There was no tendency towards equilibria as only one outcome was {0;0}, three were
{3;0}, and five were {0;3}. In the control condition, in which no minimal contact was
introduced and group membership was not announced, there were no {0;0} or {3;0}
outcomes and {0;3} occurred only twice (out of 105 outcomes).
Table 3.6.1.1 Outcomes by clustering conditions in all single-shot games
			
$
 peace conflict Total
control condition 26.97% (271) 73.03% (734) 100% (1005)
low clustering 50.23% (428) 49.77% (424) 100% (852)
medium clustering 13.75% (160) 86.25% (1004) 100% (1164)
high clustering 11.85% (120) 88.15% (893) 100% (1013)
Total N 24.27% (979) 75.73% (3055) 100% (4034)
*: Cases in parentheses are weighted (multiplied) by the number of human decisions in the given
game. For the χ2 –test unweighted outcomes are used, N=420.
As a consequence of dyadic social control, we predicted different outcomes by
clustering conditions. The segregation hypothesis predicted that conflict will be least
likely in the low clustering condition and will be most likely in the high clustering
condition. Table 3.6.1.1 summarizes the experimental outcomes by clustering
conditions. The hypothesis that the outcomes of the IPG game are independent of
clustering conditions can be rejected (χ2(3)=46.370, 
<0.001).
Table 3.6.1.1 shows that conflict was already quite likely the outcome in the control
condition. It indicates that many subjects had a relatively high baseline contribution
propensity. Conflict was much less likely in the low clustering condition, and occurred
most often in the high clustering condition, which supports the segregation hypothesis.
On the other hand, conflict was almost as likely in the medium clustering condition as




of the cases in the high clustering condition (from unweighted outcomes; 60.613, two-
tailed 
=0.541), which is counter to the segregation hypothesis.
Contribution rates by clustering conditions are summarized in Table 3.6.1.2. The
hypothesis that contribution rates are the same across different clustering conditions can
be rejected (ANOVA 7(3, 4030)=52.629, 
<0.001). This difference is the result of
internalized  direct social control. In order to test whether internalized social control
can alone cause such differences between clustering conditions, we compare the results
from Parts I and II. The comparison reveals that eye contact made an increase in
contribution rates. The difference is significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level
(61.722, one-tailed 
=0.043). However, in Part II, the contribution rate was highest in
the medium clustering condition, which contradicts the segregation hypothesis. The
hypothesis that contribution rates are the same in Part II cannot be rejected (ANOVA
7(3, 2003)=1.005, 
=0.366, not significant). Since there is an increase in contribution
propensities in the medium and high clustering conditions compared to the control
condition, social control might exist also between fellow neighbors in an internalized
form. In order to get a better indication of whether or not internalized social control is
activated when eye contact is established between subjects, we will use a multivariate
analysis and estimate parameter values of the model expressed in equation (3.4.1.3).
Table 3.6.1.2 Average contribution rates (%) in different clustering conditions and










/(8 49.64 (280) 51.81 (386) 46.61 (339) 49.45 (1005)
/(( 50.35 (282) 55.84 (385) 52.84 (335) 53.29 (1002)
/((( (
) - 58.42 (190) 47.33 (150) 53.53 (340)
( 
.) - 63.82 (199) 75.66 (189) 69.59 (388)
/((( 40.35 (285) 61.18 (389) 63.13 (339) 55.97 (1013)
/(9 (
) - 62.63 (190) 68.00 (150) 65.00 (340)
( 
.) - 71.00 (200) 81.48 (189) 76.09 (389)
/(9 25.96 (285) 66.92 (390) 75.52 (339) 58.28 (1014)
Total (without Part I) 38.85 (852) 61.34 (1164) 63.87 (1013) 55.86 (3029)
Total 41.52 (1132) 58.97 (1550) 59.54 (1352) 54.26 (4034)
*+The number of cell-relevant cases is in parentheses. All human decisions are included.
* In Part I, subjects did not know their group membership and they did not see each other. Therefore
their assignment to the different clustering conditions only illustrates baseline contribution rates in the
different experimental sessions.
Table 3.6.1.2 also shows average contribution rates in Parts III and IV of the
experiment. The hypothesis that contribution rates are the same in the different parts can
be rejected (ANOVA 7(3, 4030)=5.869, 
=0.001). We also tested whether the
introduction of different direct social incentives in Part III and IV made a difference in
contribution rates or not. The hypothesis that contribution rates are the same in the
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different conditions can be rejected both in Part III (ANOVA 7(2, 1010)=30.800,

<0.001) and in Part IV (ANOVA 7(2, 1011)=108.721, 
<0.001). Our hypothesis in
Section 3.2 predicted that the introduction of monetary selective incentives would result
in higher contribution rates than when behavioral confirmation is introduced in Part III
(64.487, one-tailed 
<0.001). "	   
. Furthermore, earlier
introduction of normative pressure made a difference also in Part IV (63.285, two-
tailed 
=0.001). This result indicates that history effects still play a role in determining
individual decision, despite the lack of feedback regarding the results of single-shot
games. We will return to this point at the multilevel analysis of results. Furthermore,





      	  
	. In Part III, under
normative pressure average contribution rates are higher in the high clustering condition
(75.66%) than in medium clustering (63.82%). On the other hand, under confirmation
pressure average contribution rates are higher in the medium clustering condition
(58.42% vs. 47.33%).
51:	
Questionnaire data can only provide partial support for the results. Most subjects
reported that they felt important differences between experimental parts, but we are not
able to establish the mechanisms behind these differences from the answers. The
analysis of actual behavior more convincingly shows the important factors that affect
individual decisions.
Table 3.6.2.1 reports some descriptive statistics of relevant questions. The question
on the importance of minimal contact (first column) was formulated as: “In the
beginning of the experiment walls were separating you and your neighbor(s). Later the
walls were removed and flags were attached to the monitors to indicate the group
membership of participants. When you had to make your decisions, how important was
this difference for you?” Most subjects answered that it was a rather important
difference, but there were also many participants for whom this was not important.
Other questions reported in Table 3.6.2.1 were formulated similarly, but they were
related to the difference between Part II and Part III and to the difference between Part
III and Part IV, respectively. We display descriptive statistics about the subjective
importance of these differences separately for sessions, in which direct selective
incentives were introduced first (second and fourth columns) and for those, in which
direct behavioral confirmation was introduced first (third and fifth columns). Only
answers of those subjects who had a fellow neighbor are reported as only they received
these new incentives. The hypothesis that subjects felt one form of social control more
important at the first introduction can be rejected (Wilcoxon rank test '=3721.5, two-
tailed 
=0.135). Furthermore, the difference between these sessions is not significant
with regard to changes made before Part IV (Wilcoxon '=3918.5, 




somewhat surprising result, since contribution rates differed significantly between these
sessions both in Part III and in Part IV (cf. Table 3.6.1.2), which implies that subjects’
opinions often do not match their behavior.
 On the other hand, the difference between the mean rank and the distribution of
those who had these new incentives and those who had no new incentives is highly
significant (Wilcoxon '=9332.5, 
<0.001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov ;65.023, 
<0.001
for the first introduction and Wilcoxon '=9151.0, 
<0.001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov
;65.126, 
<0.001 for the second introduction).

























very import. (1) 28 13 15 22 22
important (2) 67 30 30 30 25
neutral (3) 42 18 12 12 9
not important (4) 40 8 2 5 3
not imp. at all (5) 24 1 2 1 2
total answers 201 70 61 70 61
mean 2.83 2.34 2.11 2.04 1.98
st. deviation 1.24 0.96 0.93 0.95 1.01
median 3 2 2 2 2
mode 2 2 2 2 2
Other questions were related to the main intentions of subjects during decision
making in the experiment. These answers, however, were very much influenced by the





To understand the underlying mechanisms of the segregation effect on intergroup
conflict, we analyzed individual decisions. The first model in Table 3.6.3.1 reports
results for the two-level model expressed in equation (3.4.1.3). For the binary
dependent variable of individual contribution, the logit transformation was used. The
second model assumes that estimates of social control over subjects are normally
distributed around their mean. In this model the variances and covariances are estimated
as random effects. All human decisions except 23 cases (0.006%) are included. In these
23 cases subjects did not present any expectations about the behavior of their neighbors.
In total, 4011 decisions are included in the analysis for 203 subjects.
The two models provided similar estimates. All effects are in the predicted direction.
Hypotheses about the existence of internalized behavioral confirmation and internalized
88 

traitor rewards are confirmed. The effect of the third type of internalized social control
(selective incentives) was not significant. As predicted, both forms of direct social
control had a significant effect.














α baseline contribution propensity ? -.038 (.082) -.037 (.082)
0 internalized selective incentives + .109 (.072) .117 (.072)
 direct selective incentives + .407*** (.088) .363*** (.104)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .617*** (.065) .640*** (.077)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .619*** (.104) .615*** (.118)
0 internalized traitor rewards - -.175** (.055) -.173** (.057)
"=*0?.3773#
interindividual variance σ .616+++ (.085) .628+++ (.121)
σXL (0) .000 (.000)
σXL  () .300++ (.139)
σXL (0) .196+++ (.093)
σXL () .326+++ (.226)
σXL (0) .009 (.050)
 
 +
-2 Log Likelihood model 4480 4430
Improvement χ2 (df in parentheses) 939*** (5)# 50*** (20)
Table 3.6.3.1.b. Random effects: estimated covariances
σX[\ εL    
0 .000 (.000)
 -.252 (.108) .000 (.000)
0 .147 (.083) .000 (.000) -.194 (.085)
 -.359++ (.131) .000 (.000) .128 (.132) -.079 (.116)
0 -.005 (.072) .000 (.000) .425 (.153) -.169 (.109) .176 (.165)
*:N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. ** significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-
tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: ++ significant at the 1% level,
+++significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance compared to model without
random slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates).
#Basis of comparison: baseline multilevel logistic regression expressed in equation (3.4.1.1); α: 0.174**




Internalized behavioral confirmation had a very strong effect, approximately as
strong as 5 NLG monetary incentives for behavioral confirmation. The parameter
estimate of internalized behavioral confirmation 0.617 means that an additional fellow
neighbor, who is expected to contribute, increases the odds by 85.34%. For instance, in
the first model, for an average subject, the predicted likelihood of contribution is
49.05% in the control condition. In the minimal contact condition, the expected
likelihood of her contribution, if she were to have one contributing fellow neighbor and
no opposite neighbor is 66.55%. For this increase, internalized behavioral confirmation
takes the most responsibility.
For testing hypotheses about random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance
tests than the -test (cf. van Duijn, van Busschbach, and Snijders, 1999: 192-193).
Baseline contribution rates between subjects had a high unexplained variance. The
influence of behavioral confirmation and monetary selective incentives varied
significantly between subjects. The hypothesis that the sizes of traitor rewards and
internalized selective incentives are the same for the subjects cannot be rejected. High
positive deviations from the average baseline contribution rate were correlated with
negative deviations from the average importance of monetary rewards for confirmation.
This is not surprising given that our general prediction was that subjects, who evaluate
monetary gains less, would contribute more to the success of their group.
5,#

To see which personal characteristics are responsible for the high inter-individual
variation, in the next part of the analysis we extended the model by controlling for
background variables and certain attitude measures. Again, we conducted two
analyses: one assuming fixed social control effects without random variation and
another assuming a random variation and covariation of these estimates (see Table
3.6.4.1). The inclusion of control variables did not rule out the significant effects of
social control variables. The effect of internalized selective incentives remained
insignificant.
There was no significant gender effect, although simple descriptive statistics
showed that women had higher contribution propensities (55.94%) than men
(52.14%). Based also on descriptive statistics, subjects who already graduated were
more contributive (61.54%) than students (53.58%). This effect was not significant in
the model, as it was ruled out by other variables, mainly by social orientations. The
analysis of study direction did not reveal an effect of economics training. In our
experiments, students of natural sciences and law had the lowest contribution rates
(48.17% and 48.66%, respectively). They were followed by students of economics
(51.54%) and medical sciences (53.55%; this was used as a reference category in
models of Table 3.6.4.1). Subjects who studied literary studies or art and students of
social sciences had the highest contribution rates (56.91% and 55.85%, respectively).
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However, the effect of study direction was also ruled out by other variables. The
argument that experience matters at all is questioned by the insignificant effect of
participating in a similar experiment before. Again, we could probably explain the
difference in descriptive statistics (56.14% vs. 51.44%) by selection on attitude
measures.
We characterized subjects as strongly risk-averse, if they chose for risk-averse
alternatives both in simple and complex gambles. We found that 91 subjects (45.3%)
were strongly risk-averse towards gains, 92 (45.8%) were strongly risk-averse
towards mixed gambles, and 83 (39.5%) were strongly risk-seeking towards losses.
Although we did not try to estimate utilities more precisely, descriptive statistics
confirm that most individuals have an S-shape utility function (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). Effects of risk-aversion and loss-aversion are not significant in the
models.
The only personal characteristics that we measured and found highly significant in
explaining contribution propensities were  . For questions about
social orientations, 77 (37.9%) subjects gave inconsistent answers. Inconsistency was
a significant predictor of contribution rates, which is probably related to the relevance
of calculation abilities. Among subjects, who gave consistent answers, 76 (61.3%)
were prosocial, which is higher than in previous experiments (for an overview see
Schulz and May, 1989). As an exception, Liebrand (1984) found a similar high rate in
his experiments conducted in Groningen. Our results clearly support the argument that
prosocial (and also egalitarian) orientation is primarily directed towards in-group
members and therefore increases contribution rates in the IPG game. The strong
effects also indicate that social orientations are important predictors of behavior in
intergroup situations. Individuals with prosocial and egalitarian attitudes seem to be
responsible for the emergence of mutually harmful outcomes.
















α (constant) baseline contribution propensity ? .568 (.402) .736 (.389)
0 internalized selective incentives + .084 (.073) .112 (.073)
 direct selective incentives + .410*** (.089) .335** (.105)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .628*** (.066) .644*** (.080)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .635*** (.105) .604*** (.118)







gender (1=male) -.201 (.139) -.221 (.134)
student at the university (1=yes) -.268 (.360) -.393 (.346)
studies at the law faculty -.094 (.356) -.004 (.341)
studies natural sciences -.016 (.335) -.030 (.320)
studies economic, business, or spatial science -.003 (.326) .095 (.311)
studies social sciences .118 (.301) .180 (.287)
student of literary studies or arts .124 (.308) .202 (.294)
did a similar experiment before -.159 (.132) -.190 (.127)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.141 (.131) -.154 (.126)
strong loss aversion .117 (.130) .153 (.125)
consistent answers on social orientation questions -.359* (.176) -.397* (.169)
prosocial orientation .479** (.178) .485** (.171)
egalitarian orientation .382* (.172) .386* (.165)
number of acquainted subjects in the experiment -.089 (.086) -.095 (.083)
delay (minutes) at the start of the experiment .011 (.007) .010 (.007)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.005 (.004) -.006 (.004)
"=*0?.3773#
interindividual variance σ .537+++ (.078) .554+++ (.115)
σXL (0) .000 (.000)
σXL  () .311++ (.143)
σXL (0) .225+++ (.099)
σXL () .296+++ (.221)
σXL (0) .002 (.048)
 
 +
-2 Log Likelihood model 4430 4382
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 48*** (20)
vs. previous model 50*** (16) 48*** (16)
Table 3.6.4.1.b. Random effects: estimated covariances
σX[\ εL    
0 .000 (.000)
 -.195 (.106) .000 (.000)
0 .037 (.084) .000 (.000) -.213 (.089)
 -.245+ (.126) .000 (.000) .146 (.131) -.083 (.118)
0 -.035 (.070) .000 (.000) .503 (.160) -.115 (.113) .163 (.168)
*:N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, ***significant
at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: ++ significant at the 1% level, +++
significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance compared to model without random
slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates).
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There was no significant effect of how many others were acquainted to subjects in
the laboratory and delay time at the start of the experiment did not matter for
contribution propensities. This result shows that these factors that are related to the
experimental environment did not disturb the behavior of subjects.
52@		
Until now we assumed that intra-individual variation (ξLU) has a zero expected value
and it is independent from the decision round . We based this assumption on the
randomized design of single-shot games (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994). Every
decision round could be handled in an equivalent way, since only one of the rounds
would be randomly chosen for payment and subjects did not receive information
about the outcomes of previous rounds.
Although Bayesian learning effects cannot enter the series of single-shot games, we
can probably detect a different form of learning. As experimental time passes,
subjects might understand the structure of the game better and can also gather more
routine in making decisions. Previous experiments of iterated PD, public good, and
IPG games found that subjects approach the all-defection equilibrium over time
(Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985; Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni and Miller, 1993;
Bornstein, Winter, and Goren, 1996; Goren and Bornstein, 2000), which results in
decreasing cooperation rates. Besides learning the structure of the game over time,
another possible explanation is offered by Kreps et al. (1982). If subjects have an
initial belief about others being irrational, it can be better for them to contribute
initially, even if they are completely rational. Later on, they update their beliefs and
they are then less likely to contribute. Experiments that included a “coincidental”
restart of the game, however, found that contribution rates after restart went back up
to virtually the same contribution rates as observed in the very first game (Andreoni,
1988). Based on these results Dawes and Thaler (1988) refuted the learning and the
belief-updating hypotheses. However, by considering internalized reputation effects
and image scoring (Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Bienenstock, 2001) that can be
mistakenly activated in single-shot games, we could explain decreasing contribution
rates after every restart of repeated games in combination with the learning
hypothesis.
If contribution propensities are not stable in the single-shot games within
experimental parts, then we have to include an independent learning effect in the
analysis and we have to drop our assumption that intra-individual variation (ξLU) has a
zero expected value. As parts were separated by breaks, instead of checking for a
single learning trend, it is better to distinguish between a within part and a between




Figure 3.6.5.1 Contribution rates by decision rounds
*: Part I: rounds 1-5; Part II: rounds 6-10; Part III: rounds 11-15; Part IV: rounds 16-20.
We found a decay of contribution for the series of single-shot games in our
experiments (see Figure 3.6.5.1). Contribution rates decreased for those, who had
some misunderstanding of the task before the game, but also for those, who answered
quiz questions correctly. Besides the decreasing within part trend, in the last round of
every part contribution rates increased significantly. It is a quite surprising result,
since subjects knew that the outcome of the last round would neither be announced.
This is exactly the opposite of what would be predicted on the basis of arguments of
traditional game theory even if subjects had the incorrect perception that they are
playing repeated games. This  was there independent of gender, social
orientations, previous decisions, and other personal characteristics. By analyzing last
rounds only, model parameters were similar to those values that were reported in
Table 3.6.4.1, including the insignificant effect of internalized selective incentives. It
means that higher contribution propensities in the last rounds cannot be explained by
the reduction of cognitive dissonance (“in the last round I have to be nice, otherwise I
cannot look at my fellow neighbors”). The resulting U-shape trend, however, has
some correspondence to experimental findings in the iterated two-person PD and in
collective action games (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Guttman, 1986). In our
experiments, linear trend estimation provides the following parameters for within part
learning:
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where  denotes the decision round number within the part, 5 is a dummy for the last
round in each part, and standard errors are in parentheses. Multilevel analysis gives an
estimate of 0.693 (S.E.=0.089) for inter-individual variance. All effects are significant
at the 0.1% level. The constant shows the average predicted contribution propensity for
the first decision. We also tried to fit a non-linear model for within part learning, but
goodness of fit did not increase significantly. Hence we included a linear trend element
and an endgame effect as control variables in the model explaining contribution
propensities (cf. Table 3.6.5.1). Model parameters are quite close to those in equation
(3.6.5.1).
For between parts learning let us first report results from the low clustering
condition (lower curve on Figure 3.6.5.1). In this condition no direct social control
was introduced in between the parts, therefore Parts II, III, and IV were identical.
Linear curve estimation provided a parameter of –0.5257 (S.E.=0.089, 
<0.001) for
between parts learning. It means that estimates of contribution rates in the low
clustering conditions are 64.09%, 51.34%, 38.41%, and 26.94% in the four different
parts, respectively.
We included both types of trend elements in the models in Table 3.6.5.1 as control
variables. They were highly significant, as well as the puzzling endgame effect. But
learning trends and endgame effects were not the only unexpected procedure effects.
After controlling for the result of the last repeated game (if there was any), it emerged
that a mutually harmful draw (clash punishment) “burns in” the memory of subjects
and increases contribution propensities also in the single-shot games. This is probably
an indication of that subjects use their long-term memory to estimate whether or not
their decision could make a difference for the outcome in the forthcoming single-shot
game. If they believe that a draw will occur, a single individual contribution can turn
the outcome to victory. We did not anticipate these disturbances, but as we control for
them in the analysis, results show the real effect of the main variables.
There are remarkable changes in the parameter estimates of social control. The
effect of internalized selective incentives became significant and the significant effect
of internalized traitor rewards has disappeared. The large increase in the estimate of
baseline contribution propensity (constant) also indicates that the omission of learning
trends resulted in a systematic bias in previous estimates in Table 3.6.3.1 and 3.6.4.1.
Because of the negative between parts tendency, the baseline contribution rate was
underestimated and the decrease between Part I and Part II was attributed to the effect
of internalized traitor rewards. On the basis of the analysis reported in Table 3.6.5.1,
we have to conclude that after controlling for a negative learning tendency, on
average, traitor incentives in an internalized form do not influence the decision of
subjects. On the other hand, we have to be careful with this interpretation and also
with the confirmation of the existence of internalized selective incentives. The
inclusion of a between parts trend in a linear functional form in the analysis does not




experimental manipulations (the introduction of minimal contact and monetary forms
of social control), the learning effect might include part of influence that we should
attribute to other variables.
Table 3.6.5.1.a. Results of multilevel logistic regression on contribution propensities















α (constant) baseline contr. propensity ? 1.378** (.423) 1.516*** (.409)
0 internalized selective incentives + .186* (.082) .188* (.081)
 direct selective incentives + .769*** (.109) .699*** (.127)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .586*** (.067) .591*** (.080)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .718*** (.108) .705*** (.126)
0 internalized traitor rewards - .165 (.086) .142 (.086)
/	  
gender (1=male) -.176 (.143) -.196 (.137)
student at the university (1=yes) -.219 (.370) -.352 (.357)
studies at the law faculty -.109 (.366) -.015 (.351)
studies natural sciences -.057 (.344) -.065 (.330)
studies economic, business, or spatial science -.030 (.335) .095 (.322)
studies social sciences .068 (.309) .136 (.296)
student of literary studies or arts .056 (.316) .133 (.303)
did a similar experiment before -.154 (.136) -.188 (.131)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.163 (.135) -.180 (.129)
strong loss aversion .115 (.134) .132 (.128)
consistent answers on social orientation questions -.374* (.181) -.400* (.173)
prosocial orientation .511** (.183) .487** (.175)
egalitarian orientation .388* (.176) .392* (.169)
number of acquainted subjects in the experiment -.079 (.088) -.093 (.085)
delay (minutes) at the start of the experiment .008 (.007) .006 (.007)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.005 (.004) -.005 (.004)
/	
within part trend -.215*** (.036) -.213*** (.036)
endgame effect .373** (.125) .370** (.126)
between parts trend -.397*** (.060) -.379*** (.061)
last iterated game was a draw .538*** (.149) .515*** (.152)
last iterated game was lost .185 (.122) .199 (.125)






interindividual variance σ .574+++ (.083) .559+++ (.116)
σXL (0) .000 (.000)
σXL  () .322+++ (.152)
σXL (0) .202+++ (.096)
σXL () .421+++ (.246)
σXL (0) .002 (.050)
 
 +
-2 Log Likelihood model 4247 4198
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 49*** (20)
vs. previous model 183*** (6) 184*** (6)
Table 3.6.5.1.b. Random effects: estimated covariances
σX[\ εL    
0 .000 (.000)
 -.163 (.109) .000 (.000)
0 .037 (.083) .000 (.000) -.192+ (.090)
 -.287+ (.133) .000 (.000) .063 (.143) -.084 (.123)
0 -.018 (.071) .000 (.000) .476 (.169) -.054 (.117) .152 (.180)
*:N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, ***significant
at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: + significant at the 5% level,
+++significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance compared to model without
random slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates).
There is another complication in relation to the difference in contribution
propensities between Parts I and II.   (Bohnet and Frey, 1999)
enters social dilemma experiments, when subjects are able to see each other. The
visibility of others decreases social distance, allows for empathy and helps to
conceptualize the experimental situation. We might predict this to be correlated with
utility weights for social identity, consequently with higher contribution propensities.
However, we cannot separate this effect from the influence of internalized social
incentives that are not contingent on predictions (selective incentives and traitor
rewards). If silent identification is a valid mechanism in the IPG game, our analysis
overestimates the effect of internalized selective incentives. The unexpected positive
sign of the  estimate can also be partly explained by silent identification.
55(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As we have seen in Table 3.6.5.1, the significant effect of internalized traitor
rewards disappeared after the inclusion of learning trends. It might be possible that we




but have another nature. They might stem from the presence of the other group as a
whole or they exist only in certain dyadic relations.
The extension of the model by interaction effects helps with some clarification (see
Table 3.6.6.1). It seems that internalized traitor rewards are activated in the dyadic
context, but not in every neighborhood relation. Only neighbors of the opposite sex
provide a significant control in the form of traitor rewards. This indicates that
internalized pressure against contribution in the presence of opposite group members
is activated only, if substantive distinction can be made apart from minimal group
membership. Gender is possibly the most apparent characteristic that can be the
source of this distinction between strangers. With respect to the interaction between
gender and internalized behavioral confirmation, we did not find a significant effect
on contribution propensities. However, descriptive statistics showed that subjects
expected contribution more from fellow neighbors of the same sex and additionally,
women were expected to contribute more.
Acquainted neighbors did not experience stronger social control than unknown
ones did. Similar to the insignificant effect of the number of acquainted subjects in the
experiment, this result can be probably attributed to the fact that they were not close
acquaintances or to subjects’ tendency to view laboratory conditions as impersonal.
Prosocial and egalitarian attitudes were not correlated with higher relative weight of
internalized social control. Only the interaction between traitor rewards and prosocial
orientation proved to be significant. This effect indicates that subjects with prosocial
orientation like to be “local heroes”, who contribute even if they are surrounded by




Table 3.6.6.1.a. Results of multilevel logistic regression on contribution propensities
with personal characteristics, procedure effects, and cross-level interactions








α (constant) baseline contr. propensity ? 1.346*** (.402) 1.491** (.477)
0 internalized selective incentives + .176* (.082) .165* (.084)
 direct selective incentives + .769*** (.110) .745*** (.135)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .589*** (.119) .618*** (.141)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .703*** (.109) .681*** (.125)
0 internalized traitor rewards - .223 (.132) .238 (.134)
/	  
gender (1=male) -.089 (.146) -.135 (.143)
student at the university (1=yes) -.177 (.372) -.201 (.364)





studies natural sciences -.101 (.349) -.161 (.341)
studies economic, business, or spatial sciences -.080 (.339) -.002 (.330)
studies social sciences -.001 (.312) .000 (.305)
student of literary studies or arts .045 (.317) .066 (.309)
did a similar experiment before -.179 (.136) -.221 (.133)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.172 (.134) -.157 (.132)
strong loss aversion .131 (.133) .164 (.131)
consistent answers on social orientation questions -.397* (.180) -.404* (.176)
prosocial orientation .330 (.206) .353 (.202)
egalitarian orientation .419* (.203) .394* (.200)
number of acquainted subjects in the experiment -.066 (.089) -.066 (.087)
delay (minutes) at the start of the experiment .006 (.007) .006 (.007)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.004 (.005) -.005 (.005)
/	
within part trend -.178 (.121) -.188 (.122)
endgame effect .379** (.126) .381** (.127)
between parts trend -.397*** (.061) -.386*** (.062)
last iterated game was a draw .527*** (.150) .495** (.157)
last iterated game was lost .180 (.123) .186 (.128)
last iterated game was won .214 (.124) .266* (.128)
 
0× number of acquainted opposite neighbors -.153 (.196) -.164 (.194)
0× number of acquainted fellow neighbors .302 (.261) .338 (.312)
0× number of opposite neighbors of the other sex -.351** (.134) -.373** (.137)
0× number of male opposite neighbors .191 (.134) .156 (.136)
0× number of fellow neighbors of the same sex -.038 (.084) -.128 (.102)
0× number of female fellow neighbors .302 (.261) .017 (.108)
0× prosocial orientation .275* (.131) .256* (.132)
0× prosocial orientation .052 (.134) .098 (.161)
0× egalitarian orientation -.057 (.149) -.025 (.149)
0× egalitarian orientation .039 (.143) .004 (.172)
within part trend × quiz questions correct % .000 (.001) .000 (.001)
"=*0?.3773#
interindividual variance σ .563+++ (.082) .512+++ (.084)
σXL (0) .000 (.000)
σXL  () .549+++ (.187)
σXL (0) .143+++ (.089)
σXL () .379+++ (.240)
σXL (0) .000 (.000)
 
 +
-2 Log Likelihood model 4211 4169
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 42** (20)




Table 3.6.6.1.b. Random effects: estimated covariances
σX[\ εL    
0 .000 (.000)
 .037 (.107) .000 (.000)
0 .004 (.072) .000 (.000) -.145 (.093)
 -.200++ (.118) .000 (.000) .201 (.152) -.031 (.116)
0 .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
*:N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, ***significant
at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: ++ significant at the 1% level,
+++significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance compared to model without
random slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates).
Additionally, we included an interaction variable to test whether or not subjects,
who did not fully understand the experimental task, have different learning
tendencies. The insignificant effect indicates that learning the structure of the game
during the experiment is a general tendency and does not depend on the initial stage of
understanding.
	"01'%''$
The focus of this chapter differed from the mainstream experimental tradition of
social dilemmas and attempted to incorporate sociological insights into the explanation
of individual contribution rates. Our main objective was to show how internalized and
direct social control enter into simple experimental situations and can affect individual
decisions in an intergroup competition situation that we modeled by an Intergroup
Public Goods game (Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987). As an aggregated result of
different forms of social control, we tried to demonstrate 	
	
. To discover the underlying mechanisms, we
investigated what is the exact nature of  and what are the forms that are
already present in a condition with only eye contact between subjects. In order to test
our hypotheses we introduced a 	<	 $
 based on special seating
arrangements in the laboratory. With our setup we were able to target social control of
the immediate environment that is believed to be influential also in real life.
By comparing clustering conditions we found that intergroup conflict was least
likely in a completely mixed setting and was most likely when members of the groups
were seated according to a segregated pattern, which confirms the segregation
hypothesis. Furthermore, as predicted, the segregation effect was stronger under
normative pressure than in the confirmation pressure condition.
By analyzing individual decisions, we uncovered mechanisms of social control that
cause the segregation effect at the aggregated level. We found that  
 is the form of social control, which strongly affects individual contribution
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propensities, also in an internalized form. Subjects adjusted their decisions towards the
expected decision of their fellow neighbors even when eye contact is established among
them. Our model parameters indicate that under the chosen reward structure,
internalized confirmation pressure affected contribution propensities as much as
monetary confirmation incentives did. We did not find, however, strong support for the
presence of other forms of internalized social control in the minimal contact condition.
Internalized selective incentives continued to have a significant effect after controlling
for a between parts trend. However, the net effect of these incentives might diminish, if
we consider silent identification (Bohnet and Frey, 1999) as a disturbing factor.
Internalized traitor rewards might be activated in a dyad with minimal contact, but it is
not a general mechanism. We found its clear presence only between neighbors of the
opposite sex. Direct social control that was introduced in a form of additional monetary
incentives had a significant effect.
In contradiction to what we predicted in the segregation hypothesis, contribution
rates in the minimal contact condition were highest in the medium clustering condition.
A possible explanation is that there is a similar to what we observed in
high ranges of clustering in the simulation results (cf. Figures 2.8.1.2, 2.8.2.1, 2.8.2.2).
This explanation is supported by evidence of high likelihood of conflict in the medium
clustering condition (cf. Table 3.6.1.1). Another reason might be that the strength of
internalized social control is a nonlinear function of the number of fellow neighbors. As
a consequence, there is a marginal decrease in the segregation effect on the likelihood
of intergroup conflict and already medium levels of clustering are often associated with
harmful outcomes.
Among personal characteristics, we found a strong predicting power of social
orientations. Subjects with prosocial and egalitarian attitudes found to be more
contributive and consequently were found to be also more responsible for the
emergence of mutually harmful outcomes between the groups. Another indication of
that prosocial orientations are correlated with more generous behavior for the in-group,
but more hostile behavior towards the out-group, is the positive interaction effect of
traitor rewards and prosocial orientation. This implies that subjects with prosocial
orientation behave as local heroes. If they are surrounded by members of the other
group, they do not surrender at all. As a macro consequence, mutually harmful
outcomes can occur even in the case of complete mixing, if there are enough prosocial
individuals.
Although these effects appeared to be quite strong, we have to mention a limitation
of the model. Little attention was devoted to individual utility functions and we were
only interested in general tendencies. A complex utility assessment, however, is usually
beyond consideration because it requires a lot of experimental time and answers are
often inconsistent.
The analysis of the repeated IPG games included in these experiments is a target of
subsequent chapters. First, in Chapter 4 we introduce theoretical concepts about effects







Instructions in the experiment were translated into Dutch. The first pages





• After you have listened to the verbal introduction and read the instructions, there will be time to ask
questions.
• The instructions on your screen and on the paper are exactly the same.
• Please leave the instructions next to your computer when leaving the room.
• VERY IMPORTANT: Any kind of communication with other participants is  

during the experiment. We kindly ask you to keep this rule. Violation can result in money withdrawal
from your earnings or your exclusion from the experiment.
• The experiment will take approximately 90 minutes and you will receive your payment at the end of
the experiment. How much you earn will depend on your decisions and on the decision of other




This experiment is about competition between groups. There are 10 participants in this experiment;
you are one of them. The participants are divided into 	
 Both teams consist of 5 members. Your
group membership and the membership of other participants will be announced later in the experiment.
The experiment will take several decision rounds. All decision rounds will count in your final
payment! At the end of the experiment, the computer will calculate your AVERAGE earning in the
decision rounds. This will be your real money, what you will receive in cash after the experiment has
finished. If you want to earn a lot of money, try to gather as much symbolic money as possible!
At the beginning of each decision round, you will receive 11 Dutch guilders as a bonus. The bonus
appears on your screen and you have to decide
• whether to give away this bonus to help your team to reach success in the team competition
• or to keep the bonus.
Other participants have to make exactly the same decisions. Decisions are kept strictly confidential.
You will not know the decision of others and they will not know your decision.
The team, in which more members gave away their bonuses, wins the competition and the other team
loses. For every member in the winning team (irrespective of his or her own decision) the same amount of
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15 guilders are distributed. From every member of the losing team (irrespective of his or her own
decision) 15 guilders are subtracted. In the case of a draw, 11 guilders are subtracted from every
participant (irrespective of his or her own decision). The only exception is when in both teams there are
   	 who are willing to give away their bonuses. In this case not enough interest is
recorded in the team competition and therefore no money is distributed or subtracted.
For your better understanding of how much money you earn in one round please consider the
following table:












0 15 -11 -15
*$%
'$ 4*$%/$%' 11 11+15 = 26 -11+11 = 0 -15+11 = -4
After the experiment, you will receive the average of what you have earned in the different rounds.
This amount will be increased by 15 guilders to guarantee you a positive earning regardless of what
you do.
Please remember that all team members are real people. The computers are only here to record your
decisions. Your decisions will be correctly saved and you will always receive completely true
information during the experiment.
Before the real experiment starts, we would like to be certain that you have understood the decision
task correctly. You will be kindly asked to answer the quiz on your computer. In this quiz of
understanding, the decision of others is generated randomly by the computer. The fictive money you gain
in the quiz will not count in your real payment.





We would like to be certain that you understood the decision task correctly. For this reason please
consider the following possible outcomes. We ask you to select what you think your reward would be in
the given situation. Now and also later during the experiment you can get help by looking at Table 1 in the
instructions.
(	/(
The quiz hopefully helped you to understand the decision task correctly. Once again, during the




This is the real experiment. What you gain in this round, will count in your score. Be careful, if you
run out of time, the computer will decide randomly for you. For each case that this happens there will be
1% decrease in your final payment.
We will also ask you to give some predictions about the outcome of the competition. Please take into
consideration, that every prediction that you do not answer, decreases your final payment by 0.2%.
From the first 5 rounds, only one will count in your final payment. The computer will select this round
randomly.
   	 	  	 	  	 	      

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We kindly ask you to avoid any form of communication with other participants.
As soon as this information disappears from your screen, the experiment starts.
(	/((
$%$,+$%/'(
Now we announce your team membership and the membership of others. The members of the two
teams will receive red and green flags. Participants with red flags consist of one team and participants
with green flags consist of the other team.
Now the experimenter distributes the flags. Please look around you and see whether your neighbors
are from your team or from the other team. We kindly ask you not to stand up from your place and not to
talk with other participants. Please do not remove your flag from your computer during the experiment.
You can also see who are your neighbors from your screen. Be aware that your neighbors know in
which group you are and they might know what your decision was.
Now we will continue with the experiment. You will receive 11 Dutch guilders as a bonus at the
beginning of each decision round. As before, you will be asked to decide
• whether to give away this bonus to help your team to reach success in the team competition




You are still in the same group as before and your teammates did not change either. At the beginning
of the following decision rounds, you will receive 11 Dutch guilders as a bonus, as before. You again
have to decide
• whether to give away this bonus to help your team to reach success in the team competition
• or to keep the bonus.
Other participants have to make exactly the same decision. Just to recall how much money you can
earn in one round please consider the following table again:
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0 15 -11 -15




Please look around whether your neighbor is from your team. A neighbor is a participant, who is
sitting next to you on your left and/or on your right. Your neighbor is from your team if there is a flag of
the same color on your monitor and on his or her monitor. (	 	


[for conditions in which behavioral confirmation is introduced]
7$%-!+%'*$%6,*$%$(''*$%+(/$('
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If you have two neighbors from your team, this rule applies to both of them. It means that you can
earn 10 (2x5) guilders if you and both of your neighbors do the same in that round. If the decision of these
two neighbors is different, then you earn 5 guilders.









Now you can ask questions.
4	)A
Instructions before Part IV were constructed similarly.
=1.	)	
Experimental evidence shows that individuals have different risk attitudes towards
gains, losses, and mixed rewards, and typical risk preferences are best described by an
S-shape function (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1992). Since we had to avoid a long
questionnaire, we could only make a very superficial assessment of individual attitudes
towards risk. We constructed six questions, enough to determine some basic
characteristics of utility functions, but not enough to reconstruct them entirely.
As a measurement, we used the method of preference comparisons (see Farquhar,




were applied. In both cases, separate questions were related to gains, to losses, and to
mixtures of gains and losses. With the standard gamble method we measured whether
the subject is characterized as risk-averse or risk-seeking. The complex gamble was
used to get an indication of individual behavior toward compound lotteries. Since
decision in the IPG game has some correspondence to such a compound lottery, this
instrument probably measures risk attitudes in this specific context more accurately.
The gambles were constructed to represent the possible decision dilemmas subjects
have faced during the experiment. Therefore, numbers in the gamble were close to
monetary rewards that were at stake in the IPG game (see Table 3.A.2.1).





 0.5,  15; 
 0.5,  37]
losses 26 [
 0.5, -  15; 
 0.5, -  37]
standard
gamble
method gains and losses 0 [
 0.5, -  11; 
 0.5,   11]
gains [
 0.5,  26; 
 0.5,  31] [
 0.5,  15; 
 0.5,  37] +
 [
 0.5,  0; 
 0.5,  5]
losses [
 0.5, -  26; 
 0.5, -  31] [
 0.5, -  15; 
 0.5, -  37] +
[
 0.5,  0; 
 0.5, -  5]
complex
gamble
gains and losses [
 0.5,   0; 
 0.5,   5] [
 0.5, -  11; 
 0.5,   11] +
[
 0.5,  0; 
 0.5,  5]
We classified subjects as strong risk-averse towards gains, if they chose the risk-
averse option (option 1 in Table 3.A.2.1) both in the standard and in the complex
gamble with positive rewards. They were classified as strong loss-averse, if they
chose the risk-seeking option (option 2 in Table 3.A.2.1) both in the standard and in
the complex gamble with negative rewards. These variables were used as predictors in
the analysis of contribution propensities (Sections 3.6.4 till 3.6.6).
=.	
Although in theory many types of social values are identified (cf. Liebrand, 1986),
experimental evidence shows that the vast majority of people can be characterized as
prosocial (cooperative), individualistic, or competitive (Suleiman and Or-Chen, 1999).
For the classification of individuals into these categories two techniques are used. The

 consists of a series of decomposed games with an unknown,
randomly assigned person (see van Lange et al., 1997). Individuals have to make
decisions between alternatives of paired monetary rewards for themselves and for the
other. The triple-dominance measure of social values has the clear advantage that from
few (6 or 9) questions social orientations can be detected in a reliable way. In
comparison, the 	 of social values (McClintock and Liebrand, 1988; van
106 

Lange, 1999) consists of choices between 24 pairs of self-other outcome combinations.
The ring measure gives a better approximation of the weights assigned to the outcome
for the self and for the other. In the self-other outcome space, these weights can be
conceptualized in terms of the angle θ between the horizontal axis and the line
connecting the individual’s ideal point with the origo (Doi, 1994):
,sincos $B θθ += (3.A.3.1)
where $ denotes the outcome for the self and  denotes the outcome for the other. A
graphical representation in Figure 3.A.3.1 indicates ranges of prosocial (cooperative),
individualistic, and competitive orientations. Dashed lines separate these ranges.
Figure 3.A.3.1. Graphical representation of social orientations with an example of
prosocial (cooperative) individual values
Due to this model of social values, individuals have linear indifference curves in the









=        (3.A.3.2)
indicating the constant rate of substitution for individual  For individuals, who are
exactly at the border of individualism and competition, the rate of substitution is 1+√2.
It means that they enjoy the same social utility, when one unit decrease in their own
outcome is compensated by 1+√2 unit decrease in the outcome of the other. For
competitive individuals, the substitution rate is higher than this value. Individuals at the
border of cooperation and individualism have a -1-√2 substitution rate. They have the















1+√2 unit increase in the outcome of the other. For individuals with cooperative social
orientation, less compensation is satisfactory.
The triple-dominance measure of social orientations revealed good internal
consistency and test-retest reliability over a considerably long period (e.g., Kuhlman,
Camac, and Cunha, 1986; van Lange et al., 1997). However, the method is constructed
only to a specific range of possible outcomes. All outcomes used by the measurement
are expressed as gains, both for the self and for the other (see van Lange et al., 1997).
Furthermore, the outcome for the self is never smaller than the outcome for the other.
Because of these restrictions, some paradoxes might arise showing inconsistencies
and incompleteness of the social utility function in equation (3.A.3.1). Since
individual behavior is significantly different toward gains and losses for the self
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), we expect violations of the consistency of social
orientations, where subjects have to decide over self-other pairs of losses or mixtures
of gains and losses. Violations could also occur due to the decreasing marginal utility
of money. Such a phenomenon might also exist for the outcome of the other.
Furthermore, individual decisions can differ when a higher outcome is offered for the
other from when it is offered to self. It is well known in social psychology that
relational interpersonal comparisons affect psychological well-being (utility).
In a recent study, van Lange (1999) proposed an integrative model of social
orientations. He claimed that the social utility function of cooperative individuals
includes a weight assigned for the equality of the outcomes. His experimental findings
provided support for this hypothesis. Previously, Knight and Dubro (1984)
incorporated egalitarianism into the social utility function. In the analysis of
individual behavior in the ultimatum game, which has a close correspondence with the
measurement of social orientations, fairness was a major motivational concern for
non-selfish behavior (Bethwaite and Tompkinson, 1996). Fairness was conceptualized
as a utility element for the distance between individual payoffs. The smaller the
difference is the higher the social utility of the individual.
The difference between the outcomes for the self and for the other may also matter
for individuals with competitive or individualistic orientations. Kuhlman, Camac, and
Cunha (1986) discussed that competitive individuals are either appetitive or aversive.
Appetitive individuals have a positive desire to surpass others. On the other hand,
aversive competitiveness results from a fear of being surpassed. Bethwaite and
Tompkinson (1996) introduced this concept into the utility function as envy. Their
experimental results showed that it was less important than fairness, but still it had an
influence on behavior in ultimatum games (Bethwaite and Tompkinson, 1996).
For the problems with social orientations that occur as anomalies Schulz and May
(1989) provided an elegant solution. There are individuals, who are individualistic
when the outcome for self is smaller than it is for other and they are cooperative when
the outcome for self is larger than the outcome for other. For them, the parameter of
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social orientations, which is represented as the angle θL (see Figure 3.A.3.1) is
different for the ranges $D and $E (let us denote these by θL$ and by θL%). Assuming
that the utility function is continuous at the point, where $6, this special case of
conditional utility fits in the more general description of social utility (Schulz and
May, 1989), given as
 $$B −−+= (3.A.3.3)
where L, L are the individual weights assigned to the outcome for self and for
other, and L is an individual parameter assigned to egalitarian and other relational



























For the sake of interpersonal comparisons and graphical representation, Schulz and
May (1989) introduced the restriction LFLFL6- for the weights. In this way,
social orientations can be represented as points on the surface of a sphere. Simple
social orientations that can be described properly by the utility function in equation
(3.A.3.1) are located on the equator plane. There is a third dimension that represents
the importance of interpersonal comparisons. Poles of the sphere mark extremely high
importance (positive or negative) for interpersonal comparisons. Schulz and May
(1989) detected that social orientations of many people fall outside of the equatorial,
and thus cannot be described simply as individualistic, cooperative, or competitive.
Our experiments are conducted on computers, which made it possible to ask
subjects to choose self-other outcome combinations, conditional on their previous
response. A new measurement is proposed here, which uses only four questions, can
classify subjects into subcategories of social orientations, can detect egalitarianism,
and includes a consistency check. This method, similar to the triple-dominance
measure of van Lange et al. (1997), is only related to behavior towards positive
outcomes in the $E range. However, the method could be used in the positive E$
range (4 additional questions), towards negative outcomes (4+4 questions), and also













Table 3.A.3.1Measurement of social orientations for$E
question 1 question 2 question 3 question 4
               
24 2  25 10  25 25  29 7 






29 28 31 27 

27 4  25 25 







































=reward for the self, =reward for the other
In the first step, subjects are classified into the three main categories (cooperation,
individualism, and competition) in the classical way. They have to choose between
three alternatives of outcome pairs. Options are constructed in order to represent the
borders between the categories (dashed lines on Figure 3.A.3.1). In the second step,
theθLparameter is approximated, assuming thatL is close to zero. The third step is
constructed to detect egalitarianism. If subjects choose for the egalitarian choice in
this question, the assumption of L≈C will be violated (assuming that θL was
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approximated correctly). The fourth question is a consistency check. Numbers that are
close to the rewards of the experiment were applied (cf. Tables 3.A.3.1 and 3.A.3.2).
Table 3.A.3.2Measurement of social orientations for$D
question 5 question 6 question 7 question 8
               
12 14  13 22  25 25  17 19 






28 30 19 38 

15 16  25 25 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The major theoretical contribution of Chapter 2 was the incorporation of structural
embeddedness and social control in the team games model of intergroup relations. In
Chapter 3, we showed that social control in different forms influences individual
decisions in single-shot game experiments, even if only eye contact is established
between the subjects. A new experimental design was applied to test which forms of
social control influence decisions and to analyze how can social control lead to higher
likelihood of intergroup conflict in segregated settings. As an aggregated consequence
of micro mechanisms, harmful group conflict was least likely in a setting with low
segregation.
In this chapter, we construct a model about individual behavior in 	

			
. In repeated interactions, temporal embeddedness together with
structural embeddedness constrains individual behavior (Granovetter, 1985; Buskens,
1999). While there is no doubt about the validity of this statement, there is less
consensus on   embeddedness constrains individual action.
With regard to 		
, we are interested in finding answers for the
same questions as in the single-shot games. Individual actions are embedded
structurally also in repeated intergroup relations; it is therefore natural to investigate the
role of structural embeddedness in repeated IPG games. In particular, we would like to
answer whether there is a segregation effect on the likelihood of intergroup conflict.
Furthermore, we attempt to uncover the underlying mechanisms of the segregation
effect. Principally, we are interested in how different forms of social control from the
close environment influence individual decisions and consequently the outcome of
intergroup competition. We do not go into details about research questions concerning
structural embeddedness, since there are no differences in the major factors we predict
to influence individual behavior in single-shot and in repeated IPG games. These major
factors are different forms of social control, namely social selective incentives,
behavioral confirmation, and traitor rewards. A theoretical discussion of these effects
can be found in Chapter 2 and the hypotheses about their effect in the experimental IPG
games in Section 3.2.
With regard to 	
, we are interested in the question of   do
the past and the future govern present decisions. Furthermore, we are interested if there
are typical scenarios of intergroup conflict and peace in the experiments that are
comparable with histories of intergroup relations in real life. In pursuit of underlying
mechanisms of macro dynamics, we examine regularities of behavior at the individual






	 were suggested by related research as relevant mechanisms of human
behavior in similar situations (see Section 1.7). Following these recommendations, in
this study we attempt to trace these behavioral mechanisms in the laboratory. As a new
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development compared to previous research, we test the existence of different
behavioral mechanisms simultaneously.
With regard to 
		
  		 
 	 
, we are
interested whether observed scenarios of intergroup conflict and peace differ in
structural conditions. At the individual level, we test whether behavioral mechanisms
are applied conditional on the structural environment and we examine the impact of
local reciprocity that is a heuristic triggered by previous actions in the neighborhood.
These questions are addressed in the repeated IPG game experiments. In the next
section, we specify them more concretely. Subsequently, in Section 4.3.1 we discuss
how we build on the foundations of the model we used for explaining individual
behavior in the single-shot games. In Section 4.3.2 we explicate our hypotheses about
the behavioral mechanisms of criticalness, reinforcement learning, and intergroup
reciprocity. Section 4.3.3 demonstrates that structural and temporal embeddedness
might interact with each other. Particularly, local reciprocal strategies receive focus
here. At the end of this section, we give a summary of the main hypotheses. In Section
4.3.4 we discuss effects of other variables and their interactions that might be important
for individual decisions and consequently for the outcome of repeated IPG games. In
Section 4.4 we provide arguments for the multilevel methodology we use to analyze
experimental data.
	)* #+"  
In Section 1.7 we discussed how the question of whether the past  the future
governs decisions is related to debates over individual 	
	. We argued that
neither the clearly forward-looking perspective, nor the clearly backward-looking
model is appropriate to describe human behavior. In the forward-looking perspective,
individuals always choose for the alternatives that offer the best future consequences,
irrespective of the past. In the extreme backward-looking model, individuals are not
influenced by their expectations about the future; they only base their decision on past
experience. We believe that reality is somewhere in between, as both the past and the
future influence individual decisions.
In order to answer the question of   the past and the future affect present
decisions, based on arguments of bounded rationality we consider  
	. In Section 1.7 it was argued that individuals can neither perfectly calculate
all possible future consequences nor can they remember and use all information from
the past. Another practical advantage of considering simple behavioral rules is a
parsimonious model of individual action. This is required, because of the limited
number of observations. Even if relevant, it would be difficult to test the existence of
more complex decision rules.
As we put it forward in the previous section, when formulating hypotheses, we












	 Arguments on their relevance are driven by previous research that were
discussed in Section 1.7. Here we only characterize their meaning in the specific
context of repeated IPG games.
"	
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For a forward-looking but shortsighted individual, who looks one encounter ahead,
contribution is a beneficial action when a single contribution would change the outcome
of the game. In any other situation, defection brings higher rewards. Criticalness in this
&	 sense provides the main rationale for the influence of  criticalness on
individual decisions in the IPG game.
In repeated games, subjects receive information about the previous outcome. This is
a major difference compared to single-shot games. This information is highly valuable
for decisions in the subsequent round. In our hypotheses about how subjects use this
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	. It is a guideline to react nicely to
nice action of others and to give a nasty response to nasty behavior. Reciprocal behavior
might relate to global (the intergroup context) and also to local (neighbors) stimuli
(Whatley et al., 1999). The intergroup context provokes vengeance in 
	

relations between members of the opponent groups, but actions within the group might
also be reciprocated. ) 	 is a similar mechanism to behavioral
confirmation with the exception that it works as a reciprocation of past action and not as
confirmation to expected future actions. We discuss the relation between local
reciprocity and behavioral confirmation in more detail in Section 4.3.3.
Additionally, we need to provide arguments for handling the behavioral rules of
criticalness, reinforcement learning, and reciprocity 	
. Previous research
focuses most often on the evaluation of only one, without controlling for other
mechanisms. Exceptions that made use of both reinforcement learning and reciprocal
strategies are Macy (1996) and Flache (1996) for repeated PD games and Goren and
Bornstein (1999) for repeated IPD games. Other attempts tried to unify belief-based
models including criticalness with choice reinforcement (Ho and Weigelt, 1996;
Camerer and Ho, 1999).
Handling all three mechanisms as important might help to overcome predicting
failures of previous research, which originated in the oversimplification of human
decision processes (cf. van Assen, 2001). *	, an integrative view of behavior is
necessary, because different individuals play different strategies. As long as we are
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interested in explaining the behavior of a representative subject, we have to control for
the presence of relevant strategy rules among the subjects. 
, we are also
convinced that the very same subject can also follow different behavioral rules. In
repeated games, where individuals have opportunities to change their heuristics based
on experience, behavior is best described by softwired and not by hardwired strategies
(Macy, 1996). Subjects might switch from one rule to another as a result of
experimentation, previous failures, pattern recognition, or simply by inconsistency.
Individuals also follow different heuristics in different real life situations, based on the
framing of the situation (Lindenberg, 1993; Lindenberg and Frey, 1993; Vanberg,
2002). Although it is difficult to observe and explain the timing of switches, at least we
should not exclude the possibility of strategy changes for the very same individual.
These basic heuristics, however, are not supplementary and at some points they
provide contradictory predictions. At these points, we leave the question of which effect
is stronger open for an explorative analysis of the data. The exact hypotheses about
these behavioral principles and about their interrelations are formulated in Section 4.3.2.
The primary goal of this study is to explain certain types of conflicts between
groups. For the explanation of repeated conflicts, the role of behavioral heuristics is
essential. They are, together with structural effects, the focus of our explanation.
Therefore it is necessary to consider what  
+
 these individual
behavioral rules imply in the repeated IPG game and what are the outcome scenarios
that follow as aggregates from individual behavior.
"	
 reinforces old contributors and provokes free riders to contribute after a
clash situation. In a hypothetical situation, in which everyone follows the principle of
criticalness, once groups are in a clash situation, clash is repeated over and over again
and full contribution is established. On the other hand, peace and unconditional defeat
decreases the chance of contribution, consequently a scenario of 	  would
follow. Criticalness might contribute to long lasting peaceful scenarios and to the 
 
	 after a clash situation, but also supports a tendency towards a peaceful





 also stabilizes peace. However, after a victory of one group,
reinforcement learning will not decrease contribution rates in the winning group. When
everyone sticks to this principle, members of the losing side will continue to change
their decisions in the hope of a better outcome (assuming that the evaluation of
monetary payoffs as satisfying or not does not change over time). Conflict can only be
stopped when contribution rates are equal in the two groups. After a clash, only those
who were previously free riders have higher propensities to contribute. In a uniform




	 	 also supports 	 . Contrary to reinforcement
learning, it decreases contribution rates in the winning group after a clear victory. When







the alternation of victory and defeat in the two groups. However, in a uniform world of
reciprocators when both groups establish collective action conflict is stabilized and a

	 reaches full contribution. Step by step 	 drives in the
direction of uniform action. Consequently, it supports either a  or a 

	 scenario.
It is quite unrealistic to consider that everyone follows the criticalness principle or
there are only reinforcement learners or reciprocators. Subjects not only differ in their
propensities toward baseline contribution, but they differ also in their reactions to
certain outcomes, in their expectations, and consequently in the behavioral mechanisms
they follow. Furthermore, they do not apply certain schemes mechanically, but they
might experiment with their decisions. They might switch to different strategies and
they might also give inconsistent choices. Subject behavior has a probabilistic feature
(cf. Rapoport and Chammah, 1965: 109). Therefore we should consider a 
	

of the stochastic versions of these behavioral rules in our explanation. However, in this
way, macro level predictions become far more complex. Without knowing the
proportion of certain types in the population, it is impossible to make exact predictions
about macro outcomes and testing can only take place at the individual level.
Still, there are scenarios that are generally supported by the behavioral mechanisms
and therefore we could predict their occurrence in the experiments. After an initially
low contribution level, all mechanisms predict a further deflation of contribution rates.
The  leads to a stabilization of the peaceful outcome (	). On
the other hand, all behavioral principles provide some support for  
	.
Furthermore, with the exception of reinforcement learning, all mechanisms predict a
  
	 after a clash situation. These are the scenarios of intergroup
competition that are most likely also in empirical situations (Fearon and Laitin, 1996).
We are interested in whether we can also find them in our repeated IPG game
experiments.
At the end of this introduction, Table 4.2.1 summarizes the main research questions
we address in the repeated IPG game experiments. The first group of questions is
related to 		. The question of how intergroup conflicts are affected
by factors of structural embeddedness, especially by 	
, was the primary focus
of previous chapters. Here we continue our investigation of structural effects on
intergroup conflict, since they are also highly relevant in repeated IPG games. Besides,
our main research questions are centered around effects of temporal embeddedness and
interaction effects of structure and time on intergroup conflict.
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Outcomes are the aggregated consequences of 
. Our next group
of research questions is related to the explanatory mechanisms that connect processes at
the individual level with macro outcomes. These questions are centered on the general
problem of how structural and temporal embeddedness and their interaction affects
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Besides these main research questions, we would like to know, what are the most
important other influences we should consider as control variables in the investigation
of contribution propensities. The motivation for the inclusion of control variables stems
from findings of previous research and from the need to disentangle undesired effects of
the experimental procedure. These control variables are discussed briefly in Section
4.3.4.




The explanation of choices in single encounters focused on the effects of structural
embeddedness. For analyzing repeated intergroup situations, we choose the same
modeling framework of intergroup interdependence as in the single-shot interactions,
except that the IPG game is repeated over time. The payoff structure in every repetition
is identical with the one in the single-shot games (cf. Section 3.3). The two (red and the
green) teams consisted of the same five-five players in an unchanged seating
arrangement. This also means that we could anticipate similar effects of structural
embeddedness as in the single-shot games. The major difference is that subjects in
repeated games are affected by previous outcomes and decisions, but future interactions
might also influence their choices. Hence, we also have to count on effects of temporal
embeddedness.
Our research questions about changes in aggregated outcomes can be answered by
looking at elementary statistics or by analysis of variance. On the other hand, testing for
underlying mechanisms behind the aggregated outcomes is only possible by analyzing
decision-level data. In this way, we can test which behavioral rules are effective, what
are the structural constraints, and what other variables are interfering in individual
contribution decisions in repeated IPG games. In the analysis of contribution choices,
we use model foundations of the single-shot games. In this section we briefly
summarize the model and describe the main effects that should be included also in the
investigation of repeated games.
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The analysis of repeated games is far more complicated with regard to the
interdependence between observations within subjects and within sessions. The major
difference in comparison to single-shot games is that within session independency
cannot be assumed. The outcome of the intergroup game is the same for all observations
within a session in a given round. Because of the hierarchical structure of observations
(decisions – individuals - sessions) multilevel logistic regression seems to be the best
tool for the analysis of contribution decisions (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein,
1995). In the multilevel analysis, decisions () are the first level observations,
individuals () are at the second level, and experimental sessions () are at the third
level.
The basic elements of the model are discussed in Section 3.4.1. The baseline model
is identical to what is expressed in Equation 3.4.1.1 except that we consider three levels
instead of two, and therefore a session level error term is also included (see Equation
4.A.1 in the Appendix). Our predictions about social control effects are identical to
hypotheses formulated in Section 3.2 for the single-shot games. Social control effects
are incorporated in the model similarly as in the single-shot games (cf. Equations
3.4.1.3 and 4.A.2).
Besides social control effects, in repeated games temporal embeddedness also
influences individual decisions. Some time effects might also interact with variables of
social control. Hence, the really essential formulation of an explanatory model for









For the repeated games, we have to extend the explanatory model of the single-shot
games by effects of 	
. In this section, we derive exact hypotheses
about some main effects of temporal embeddedness. Specification is necessary because
the theoretical concepts of criticalness, reinforcement learning, and reciprocity do not
provide us with punctual directives about how subjects would behave in the laboratory.
Despite the limitations, our main hypotheses for subject behavior in repeated games are
derived from the main theoretical principles. As we emphasized before, explanatory
mechanisms at the micro level, including social control, criticalness, reinforcement
learning, and reciprocity are all very important for understanding and explaining how
and why embeddedness influences the outcomes of repeated intergroup competitions at
the macro level.
A forward-looking heuristic that can be particularly important in the experiments
with repeated IPG games is 	
(Caporael et al., 1989; Rapoport, Bornstein, and
Erev, 1989) or perceived efficacy (Kerr, 1989). Experiments with step-level public
goods showed that criticalness is an important predictor of contribution (Rapoport,







Komorita, 1998). Subjects might expect that their choice would be decisive on the basis
of three rational arguments. First, the experimental game is a step-level public good
game, therefore an individual contribution might change the outcome, if the number of
contributors is just under the minimal contributing set (MCS). Second, the payoff
structure includes a punishment payoff for clash (equal level of collective action). In the
case of clash, one additional contribution is sufficient to change the harmful outcome
into victory. Third, groups in the experiments are small (five members), therefore the
likelihood that contributions are at a critical level is not extremely small. Still, there are
much more situations, in which a single contribution does not make any difference and
it is just a waste of bonus rewards. However, there is evidence that people overestimate
their criticalness in the game and have illusions of efficacy (Kerr, 1989). We also do not
require judgements of criticalness to be precise. It is more important that we believe that















Subjects were asked to forecast the result of the next game at the same time when they
had to make their decisions. When they made these forecasts, they could already
incorporate in their calculations their own subsequent decisions. They had to choose
only one of the following options: peace, defeat, victory, or clash. These outcomes were
formulated using the terminology “there will be not enough interest,” “my team will
lose,” “my team will win,” and “there will be a draw,” respectively. On the basis of the
criticalness principle, if someone anticipated a clash, then contribution is his consistent
choice. Contribution is consistent in the sense of criticalness, but it is not supported by
economic benefits, since the bonus for free riding is larger than the difference between
the payoffs of defeat and clash. In case the subject anticipated defeat or peace, then his
decision cannot make a difference for the outcome (if the subject believed that it could,
then his expectations were inconsistent). Hence, not to contribute should be the
appropriate action. If the subject expected a victory of his team, then we do not have a
clear indication what his decision would be considering the principle of criticalness. By
consulting the outcome of the previous round, we might get some hints for deriving a
hypothesis. If his team did not win the previous round and he anticipated victory for the
following round, then we can assume that he thought his choice might be the decisive
one, therefore our prediction is that he will contribute. If his team won the previous
round and he anticipated victory again, then we do not have enough information to
derive clear predictions about what criticalness dictates.
By focusing on the expectations of subjects, we could separate perceived













Table 4.3.2.1 Predicted effect of subjects’ perceived criticalness




peace () any -
defeat () any -
victory () not victory +
victory () victory () ? (reference category)
clash () any +
We captured perceived criticalness through expectations of subjects about the
subsequent round. In operationalized terms the 	
	 is formulated as
the effects of four expectation dummies on contribution propensities (see Table 4.3.2.1).
The case, in which the previous round was victory and the subject anticipated a victory
for the subsequent round, is used as a reference category in the analysis. This is
necessary to avoid multicollinearity, but also handy because criticalness did not provide
clear predictions for this case.







 we have to rely on the previous outcome and decision. Hypotheses are
formulated in stochastic terms, because of the presence of other effects and because





 prescribes to stick to the same decision, if the previous round
resulted in a satisfactory outcome, and to change the decision, if the previous outcome
was unsatisfactory. Similar to the sucker’s payoff and the punishment reward in the
two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g., Macy, 1996), defeat and clash can be considered
as unsatisfactory outcomes that evoke a shift in the individual decision. Respectively,
peace and victory are satisfactory outcomes that reinforce the choice of the subject. We
assume a very simple reinforcement mechanism that is a stochastic version of the Win-
Stay, Lose-Change (WSLC) strategy and has its reference point at the zero payoff. The
zero payoff is a natural division line that separates gains and losses, therefore choosing
this as a reference point is not an arbitrary assumption. Unlike in more complex
reinforcement models (for an overview see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Macy and
Flache, 2002) we assume that this reference point is fixed over time and not adjusted, if
success or failure is repeated continuously. For instance, in the control and in the
minimal condition of the experiment, the fixed interior reference point equals the
reward for peace, if the subject contributed his or her bonus in that round. We assume a
fixed interior reference point for the sake of simplicity and for the opportunity to
integrate the reinforcement mechanism with reciprocity and criticalness in a transparent
model. We do not make any additional assumption about the speed and accuracy of
learning. In Section 4.3.4 we discuss to what extent our predictions are different, if we







The strategy that resembles the principle of 
		 is based on the
same mechanism as the TFT strategy in the two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (Axelrod,
1984). For the purpose of this study, it is more relevant to consider a probabilistic
version of the intergroup TFT strategy. A stochastic version of TFT is more forgiving,
which has proved to be an additional advantage compared to the deterministic version
of TFT in two-person PD simulations (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992; Kollock, 1993).
An individual, directed by a probabilistic version of the intergroup TFT strategy,
would decrease his or her contribution propensity, if the other group behaved
peacefully in the previous round. Respectively, his or her contribution propensity
would increase, if there was a collective action in the other group. However, subjects
were not always able to recognize whether or not collective action was achieved in the
other group, since they were only informed about the outcome of the previous round
(peace, defeat, clash, victory). This is important in the case of a previous victory.
Victory does not exclude the possibility that collective action was established in the
other group. Therefore, subjects cannot be completely sure that there is nothing to
retaliate. On the other hand, their group was certainly more effective in mobilizing its
members, which provides reasons to decrease contribution propensities based on
reciprocal arguments. Intergroup reciprocity in this sense is an adjustment of
contribution levels in comparison to the efforts of the other group. Hence, we could
predict a negative tendency in contribution rates after a victory of the team in the IPG
games, but because of the uncertainty, we handle this case as a reference category of
intergroup reciprocity.
In general terms, we formulated the following hypotheses about reinforcement
learning and intergroup reciprocity:
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For the operationalization of the hypotheses, we summarized predictions based on
perceived criticalness, intergroup reciprocity, and reinforcement learning in Table
4.3.2.2. The table provides an overview of the cases in which theoretical concepts
coincide and under which circumstances they give contradictory predictions. In each
cell, there are three characters. The first sign indicates predictions derived from the
criticalness principle, the second stands for predictions of intergroup reciprocity, and
the third is for predictions of reinforcement learning in the absence of monetary
selective incentives and confirmation rewards. A positive sign means that based on
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the corresponding decision heuristic the subject would contribute more likely in the
forthcoming round than what his or her baseline contribution propensity would
prescribe. A negative sign implies a decrease in the probability of contribution.
Question marks denote situations in which the direction of effect cannot be derived
from the theoretical principle. This is a consequence of limited feedback for the
subjects in the experiment.
Table 4.3.2.2 Summary of predictions derived from criticalness, intergroup reciprocity,
and reinforcement learning in the absence of additional monetary incentives.
expectation of subject peace () defeat () victory () clash ()
previous decision C D C D C D C D
() - - ? - - - - - ? - - - + - ? + - - + - ? + - -
	() - + - - + + - + - - + + + + - + + + + + - + + +
	() - ? + - ? - - ? + - ? - ? ? + ? ? - + ? + + ? -

	
() - + - - + ? - + - - + ? + + - + + ? + + - + + ?
8	9Signs indicate predictions of these mechanisms, in this order.
If the outcome was a victory, subjects did not know how many contributors were in
the other group and whether it was above the minimal contributing set or not. In other
words, the origin of uncertainty is that subjects did not have information about
whether the losing group had a competitive or peaceful attitude, i.e., whether they
established collective action in the previous round or not. Hence, we handle this case
as a reference category of intergroup reciprocity.
There are also question marks at reinforcement learning. This is when the previous
outcome was peace and the subject gave away his or her bonus. It means that we are
not sure whether this situation is evaluated as a gain (“Our group did not lose and
there is peace.”) or as a loss (“I gave away my bonus and our group did not win in the
competition.”). In this case the received zero reward equals the zero reference point.
There are question marks also in cases, if the previous outcome was a clash and the
subject kept his or her bonus. In these situations, the 11 NLG bonus compensates for
the 11 NLG deduction for the clash outcome.
Since the intergroup reciprocity and reinforcement learning hypotheses are
completely independent from expectations of the subject, the effect of perceived
criticalness could be smoothly separated. We have problems with contradictory
predictions only with regard to intergroup reciprocity and reinforcement learning.
Table 4.3.2.2 shows that contradictory predictions occur in cases where the subject
contributed in the previous round and the outcome of the previous round was a clash






in the absence of monetary selective incentives
and confirmation rewardsagain in Table 4.3.2.3. The first sign indicates predictions
derived from intergroup reciprocity and the second is for predictions of reinforcement







These predictions are operationalized as effects of dummy variables concerning the
previous outcome and decision on contribution propensities. The exact specification of
how these dummies were built in the multilevel model can be found in the appendix to
this chapter. Since we found that previous repeated games affected contribution
propensities in the single-shot games (cf. Chapter 3), these dummy variables include
the outcome of the last round of the previous experimental part for single-shot games
and for the first round of repeated games.
Table 4.3.2.3 Predictions of intergroup reciprocity and reinforcement learning (in this




contribution (C) - ?peace ()
defection (D) - -
contribution (C) + -defeat ()
defection (D) + +
contribution (C) ? +victory ()
defection (D) ? -
contribution (C) + -clash ()
defection (D) + ?
8	9Signs indicate predictions of these mechanisms, in this order.
In Section 4.2 we discussed the 	
 of uniform applications of individual
behavioral mechanisms 	 

		
. It was mentioned that
	  is a scenario at the macro level that is supported by all three micro
mechanisms (criticalness, reinforcement learning, and intergroup reciprocity).
STABLE PEACE HYPOTHESIS: We predict that peace is a stable outcome of
intergroup competition and this outcome is repeated in subsequent rounds.
Stable peace can be reached after a relatively low initial contribution rate. In such
cases, all three behavioral mechanisms imply a further deflation of contribution rates.
SPIRAL OF PEACE HYPOTHESIS: If the outcome of intergroup competition is
peace, we predict a gradual decrease in contribution rates.
The transformation from behavioral mechanisms at the individual level to macro
scenarios is less transparent in other cases. Criticalness increases the chance that clash
situations are repeated after each other. If everyone follows this principle, there is no
way out from overall conflict. Intergroup reciprocity would also support the spiral of
clashes. Reinforcement learning, however, would lead to a drop in contribution
propensities. As reinforcement works in the opposite direction, the prediction about a
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spiral of conflict does not stand on as firm micro foundations as the previous
hypotheses.
SPIRAL OF CONFLICT HYPOTHESIS: After a close result of the intergroup
competition with conflict as an outcome, we predict that contribution rates are likely to
increase gradually.
Macro predictions are also contradictory about what is likely to happen after conflict
with victory of one side. In such cases, criticalness supports a tendency towards a
peaceful resolution. Exceptions would be cases, in which victory has been reached by
a minimal margin. More exactly, since subjects do not know the difference in the
number of contributors, exceptions are cases in which subjects believe that victory has
been reached by a minimal margin. As a result of reinforcement learning, contribution
rates would generally 
. In the winning group, high contribution rates would
stabilize. In the losing side, there would be more alternation of choices, which would
establish a one-sided regime with repeated exploitation. On the other hand, it is more
likely that intergroup reciprocity  the contribution rates of the winning group
and definitely increases the contribution rates in the losing group. This might lead to a
clash or even to an alternation of victory and defeat. As we assume the presence of the

	
 of these principles, observed macro dynamics are predicted to be
somewhere in the middleway. Conflict is likely to be the permanent outcome, but it
might occasionally change which side is winning and which is losing.
DURABLE CONFLICT HYPOTHESIS: We predict that conflict is likely to be
repeated in subsequent rounds.
These scenarios are the macro consequences of individual behavioral mechanisms
that might vary between structural conditions. Hence, there could be differences in
which scenarios occur in different structures. Hypotheses about these interactions of
structural and temporal embeddedness are discussed in Section 4.3.4.






	   	  	

	
. After the control
condition, eye contact was established between subjects. In general, the principles of
criticalness and intergroup reciprocity are not hurt by this change, or by the introduction









. We assumed that the
reinforcement process has an interior reference point at the zero payoff. Gains are
interpreted as sources of positive reinforcement and losses as sources of negative
reinforcement. In Part II, internalized social incentives might change the evaluation of
outcomes of the team competition. These incentives have no monetary value, but







payoffs. There is a definite shift in the evaluation of outcomes in Parts III and IV
because of the introduction of additional monetary incentives.
In which direction subjects are influenced depends on the composition and previous
decisions of the neighborhood and it depends on the relative weight of social control in
the utility function of the subject. There are no major complications in the low
clustering condition in which subjects have 

		 and
therefore only internalized traitor rewards can be present. Traitor rewards suppress
contribution under all circumstances. Therefore defection choices are reinforced more
and contribution choices are reinforced less than before. Hence all signs concerning
reinforcement learning should be shifted in the negative direction in Table 4.3.2.2. The
relative differences between the predictions in the cells do not change. Internalized
traitor rewards cause a similar change also in the medium clustering condition.
We have a more complicated situation with respect to changes in the reinforcement




	 increase contribution rates in any case and therefore all prediction signs are
shifted in the positive direction in Table 4.3.2.2. The effect of 
	
,
however, is dependent on the previous decision of every fellow neighbor and on the
previous choice of the subject. There are no complications in the high clustering
condition, if the decisions of two fellow neighbors were 
	 in the previous round.
Behavioral confirmation rewards make either choice equally beneficial. All prediction
signs in Table 4.3.2.2 are shifted in the positive direction, because of selective
incentives.
In case fellow neighbors made 
 decisions (or the subject had only one fellow
neighbor) prediction signs also change relative to each other. If the decision of the
fellow neighbor(s) 
 with the decision of the subject, then this decision gains
positive reinforcement (predictions are shifted in the positive direction in the case of
contribution and predictions are shifted in the negative direction in the case of
defection). If the decisions 
	
, then there is no additional monetary gain for
the subject and there is no direct loss, either. However, there were opportunity costs for
the subject: if he had chosen otherwise, he would have gained extra rewards. Hence the
outcome is evaluated as a loss and the subject’s willingness to change his action
increases.
 
Consequently, it is worthwhile to examine the effect of reinforcement learning
separately in the experimental parts. Besides, if additional monetary incentives are
introduced, predictions of reinforcement learning have to be controlled for the
previous decisions of fellow neighbors. Exact hypotheses about interaction effects with




In this section, we extend our model to include effects of previous neighbor
decisions. Personal experiences and the experiences of friends and neighbors can be
important in determining individual action in the intergroup context. Such influences
might also enter the repeated IPG game experiments.
Additional to behavioral confirmation, we assume that confirmation exists in a more
direct form, which can be called  	 (Whatley et al., 1999) or 		

(Pingle, 1995). Subjects might be motivated to imitate their neighbors, because they
think this is an easy way to find an optimal choice (Pingle, 1995). On the other hand,
they might reciprocate the previous defection of neighbors to give them a lesson to
cooperate (e.g., Poundstone, 1992). We can interpret the assurance process (Chong,
1991; Oberschall, 1994) in repeated collective action dilemmas similar to local
reciprocity. If a friend or a neighbor participates in the collective action, the next time I
might also join. If he or she does not contribute, why should I care at the following
occasion? Simulation research also provides evidence for the success of local reciprocal
strategies (Watanabe and Yamagishi, 1999).
These reasons suggest that subjects learn and adopt behavior from their neighbors.





and behavioral confirmation is specified as an imitation of
expected future action. Based on evidence of 
6	 (Brewer, 1981) our
prediction is that a contribution choice of a fellow neighbor in the previous round will
increase the chance of contribution and a defection choice will decrease this chance.
Equation 4.3.1.3 already includes an element that is related to the effect of
neighbors from the 	 . We called this form of social control traitor
rewards. When subjects play the repeated game and they receive information about
the behavior of their neighbors, evidence of treachery becomes clear. Subjects then
can punish or give indication to their neighbors that they have chosen inappropriate
actions. On the other hand, they can also reward their well-behaved (defecting)
neighbors. This signaling can only be done by choosing the adequate decision in the
forthcoming round (defection or contribution). Such a strategy can be derived from
the reciprocity principle. As a result of local reciprocity, we predict that a contribution
choice of a neighbor from the opposite team in the previous round will increase the
chance of contribution and a defection choice will decrease this chance.
In general terms with regard to previous behavior of neighbors, we formulate the
following hypothesis:





















How this hypothesis is built in the general model of individual decisions in the
experiment can be found in the appendix to this chapter. At the aggregated level, local
reciprocity drives stepwise in the direction of uniform behavior. When every subject
would follow a local reciprocal strategy, either a  or a 
	
would emerge, depending on the initial distributions. This supports the hypotheses that
were formulated about macro scenarios in the previous section.
In Parts III and IV, because of the introduction of direct social control in the medium
and high clustering conditions, the effect of local fellow reciprocity is predicted to

. For this reason, in the explanatory model we include two parameters for local
fellow reciprocity, one is when there are no monetary confirmation rewards and another
when this direct form of social control is introduced. Just as in the case of behavioral
confirmation, we assume that subjects reciprocate the behavior of all fellow neighbors
equally. The effect of an additional (second) fellow neighbor is as strong as the
influence of the first fellow neighbor.
Another research question concerned the 
		
	 of behavioral mechanisms
and structural conditions. We were interested whether subjects follow different
behavioral principles in different experimental conditions or not. We do not have strong
arguments to believe that decision heuristics differ according to structural conditions.
Hence, our hypothesis is that 		 
	
  
 	 	 
  
		    	 . On the other hand, we still predict differences
regarding the extent to which these behavioral rules can be traced in the different
clustering conditions. As an aggregated consequence, observed scenarios in the IPG
game would be also different. This is because we expect that contribution propensities
vary between structural positions, due to different social control effects. These initial
differences evoke different responses, because there are opportunities to imply only
certain intergroup and local conditional strategies.
In the  	

	
 subjects have neighbors only from the other group,
therefore there is only a pressure that decreases contribution propensities in the form of
internalized traitor rewards. Peaceful behavior of others leads to lower contribution
rates as a result of intergroup and local reciprocity. Consequently, we predict the
occurrence of a    scenario, in case contribution rates were not
exceptionally low originally. After the decrease, peace will be the likely outcome of the
game and not much change can be predicted during the experiment (	 
hypothesis). Therefore, there will not be many cases of reciprocation of collective




 subjects are surrounded by fellow neighbors. They
therefore experience pressure towards contribution in the form of internalized and
monetary selective incentives. Besides, they will reciprocate higher contribution rates,
in case they are influenced by intergroup and local reciprocity. We can therefore predict
a   




After the discussion of interaction effects of structure and time, we can summarize
our main hypotheses (see Table 4.3.3.1). Our major research questions were centered on
the effect of structural and temporal embeddedness in repeated IPG game experiments.
Structural effects have been discussed in detail and analyzed in single-shot games in
Chapter 3. In this chapter, by turning towards repeated interactions, we formulated
hypotheses about the effects of temporal embeddedness and their interactions with
structural factors. Part of our research questions concerned the outcomes of the game
through time and by different experimental conditions. These questions are related to
the 	 
+
 of individual decisions. On the basis of the principle of
methodological individualism, hypotheses for these macro questions were derived from
micro hypotheses about individual behavior. The upper row in Table 4.3.3.1 is a wrap-
up of the main macro hypotheses and the lower row includes the corresponding micro
hypotheses. As key mechanisms at the individual level, we predicted that structural
effects are mediated by different forms of social control, and temporal embeddedness
influences through certain behavioral mechanisms.






























- Spiral of peace.
- Spiral of conflict.
Stable peace and the
spiral of peace is more
likely, if segregation is
low and durable
conflict and the spiral
































- There is no direct














In this section, we discuss effects of other variables and their interactions that might
be important for individual decisions and consequently for the outcome of repeated IPG
games. These variables include 
			 and 		 that are not
covered by the main explanatory factors.
One time effect that might cause differences in baseline contribution rates between
sessions is  time at the start of the experiment. Sessions were expected to start
punctually, but some subjects arrived to the laboratory late, therefore causing others to
wait. Meanwhile they were waiting, they might have gained some silent identification
due to a minimal contact between them. However, this sort of identification might
increase as well as decrease contribution rates.
Changes in individual behavior can be due to 
 in addition to modifications
in the task. Intra-individual variation of contribution rates might be time-dependent.
Results of previous experiments with iterated games support the argument that subjects
learn the basic characteristics of the game during the experiment, consequently
outcomes get closer to overall defection over time (cf. Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985;
Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Bornstein, Winter, and Goren, 1996;
Goren and Bornstein, 2000). On the other hand, based on a similar argument, learning
the structure of the game would mean an increase in contribution rates in segregated
structures where new incentives make contribution more attractive. The most accurate
analysis would take it into account that learning works differently in different structural
positions and in different incentive structures. Instead of testing all trend elements in
one model, which would create a huge amount of variables, we group similar structural
positions and conditions and control for learning trends in these groups.
To summarize, we include the following trend variables as controls in the analysis:
within part trend for no additional incentives, trend for session parts in which selective
incentives are introduced, trend for parts in which behavioral confirmation is
introduced, and trend for parts in which both selective incentives and behavioral
confirmation are introduced. With the exception of the trend for no additional
incentives, we distinguish between medium and high clustering conditions.
Detection of independent trends is only possible if the main effects of criticalness,
reciprocity, and reinforcement learning are already included in the analysis. In previous
research, both linear and exponential learning trends have been found. Since we do not
have strong theoretical support for any of them, our analysis for this control variable is
of an explorative kind.
Another control variable is the 
	 of the single-shot games. Single-shot
games were played in each experimental part five times and subjects knew this in
advance. There should not be an endgame effect in the repeated games, because the
number of decision rounds was determined randomly. Subjects did not know how many
rounds they were playing. However, subject might have thought of some possibilities
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(e.g., five or ten repeated games) in association with the number of single-shot games
played. There could be effects that are related also to the total number of repetitions in
earlier parts. Subjects might get bored, feel fatigue, or might handle the experimental
tasks mechanically as time passes. For this reason, we control in the analysis for the
number of rounds played before in the given session.
In the repeated games, subjects were informed about the result of the game (victory,
clash, defeat, or peace). Since subjects knew in advance that they receive this
information, in the beginning of repeated games, they might try to build their
reputations towards group fellows. A good reputation or image is expected to evoke
contributions from group fellows, which is beneficial for the self in the long run (Raub
and Weesie, 1990; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000;
Bienenstock, 2001). However, what is beneficial within the group, might lead to
harmful consequences in the intergroup context. Therefore we control for a reputation
effect, but we do not formulate predictions about its direction. From another
perspective, the introduced reputation variable indicates the net (otherwise unexplained)
difference between single-shot and repeated games.
 Among our main explanatory variables, we discussed the effect of criticalness on
contribution rates in the subsequent round. "	
	    
6	
	. Stability of the outcome might signal the subjects that their contribution does not
make a difference. Therefore a series of the same result (except clash) might decrease
contribution rates. This prediction assumes that subjects use long-term experiences to
determine their decisions. Since this is not really obvious, we handle the long-term
effect of criticalness only as a control variable.
Instead of leaving inter-individual variation unspecified, it is worthwhile to control
for certain 
 		 that might partly explain this variation. These
control variables include social orientations, experience with similar experiments,
direction of study, and number of acquaintances in the experiment. Their effect is not
likely to be different from the single shot games as personality and sociological
background variables are more likely to influence baseline contribution rates and less
likely to influence changes in contribution propensities. However, previous
experimental research shows that certain background and attitude variables have more
complex or even reversed effects in repeated encounters.
With regard to 
, there is experimental evidence that initial differences might
disappear after repetitions (Mason, Phillips, and Redington, 1991). One interpretation of
this result is that payoff incentives drive subject behavior towards equilibrium outcomes
regardless of initial predispositions (Mason, Phillips, and Redington, 1991: 232). Other
experiments, however, found that gender differences in contribution rates do not
diminish over time (Nowell and Tinkler, 1994). Because of these contradictory findings
we do not explicate a hypothesis about the interaction effect of gender and time, but we







Arguments about the effect of  
 can also be different in repeated
interactions and in single encounters. There are arguments that risk averse individuals
are more likely to contribute in repeated social dilemma situations than risk seeking
people (Raub and Snijders, 1997; van Assen and Snijders, 2002). In the two-person PD,
if the continuation probability is high, the equilibrium pair of conditionally cooperative
strategies ensures higher payoffs than the equilibrium in which both players defect. Risk
averse individuals are less likely to deviate from this equilibrium path and are not as
much motivated by temptation incentives. However, this argument cannot be directly
applied to repeated IPG games. Since overall defection is mutually harmful, risk
aversion is not likely to be associated with higher contribution rates.
Besides these control variables, we consider some interactions of the main
behavioral mechanisms. Predictions about criticalness and reciprocity do not change
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	 	. In clustered structures, where selective incentives and behavioral
confirmation are distributed, all choices are more likely to be reinforced because of
higher payoffs. Comparing the relative attractiveness of defection and contribution,
contribution receives additional gains due to the introduction of monetary selective
incentives.
 In clustered structures in Parts III and IV, some of the predictions regarding
reinforcement learning change. In comparison with Table 4.3.2.2, differences are as
follows. *	, if there was peace in the previous outcome and the subject contributed,
this decision is certainly reinforced because of additional monetary incentives (there
was a question mark at this point in Table 4.3.2.2, first row). This has an implication for
the overall effect of the previous outcome on the subsequent decision (cf. Table 4.3.2.3,
first row): the clearly negative predicted sign disappears. 
, if the previous game
was lost, shifts in decision under certain conditions cannot be predicted. The previous
decision is reinforced in Part IV in the high clustering condition for all subjects, who
had two fellow neighbors both with identical action to theirs in the previous round. In
this case, the subject earned money, though his or her team lost the competition. It is a
very special case that is not likely to happen often during the experiment. If only one of
the fellow neighbors had an identical action, then the subject receives a zero payoff (or
1 NLG in the case of defecting choice, which we consider as negligible). Since we
assume that this is the reference point, we have no predictions whether his or her action
is reinforced or not. Otherwise predictions are as in Table 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.3. , if
the previous round ended in a clash, two fellow neighbors and at least one identical
action is sufficient to elicit reinforcement of the previous decision. Otherwise
predictions are as in Table 4.3.2.2 (negative sign after contribution and question mark
after defection).
All these changes in our predictions are due to the introduction of additional
monetary incentives in Parts III and IV. The analysis of these effects certainly raises
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some complications also concerning their interpretation. Basically, they are interaction
effects of reinforcement learning, the experimental part, the clustering condition, and
local reciprocity. However, for the sake of simplicity, we can interpret them simply as
operationalizations of reinforcement learning in the new payoff structure.
We have already discussed in Section 4.2 that  	 and 

	
 can be interpreted quite similarly. The difference is that local reciprocity is
an imitation of previous action and behavioral confirmation is an imitation of expected
future action. In the single-shot games only behavioral confirmation was relevant, but in
the repeated games both might play important roles. Complications arise because these
two are not independent and expectations are highly influenced by previous action.
However, these complications are easily solved when we use regression analysis and
include both previous action and expectations among the predictors. If we did not
include previous action, the coefficient for behavioral confirmation would also include
the indirect effect of previous decision. In the model that includes both predictors, the
indirect effect will appear as part of the local reciprocity effect. Hence, there is no need
to include an interaction variable at this point.
We know from everyday experience that people differ, according to temperament, in








		. In their classic book on the repeated
two-person PD, Rapoport and Chammah (1965) found that men in general were more
cooperative than women, but not at the beginning of the experiments. For the
explanation of this change, they looked at conditional responses to previous decisions.
They found that on one hand men were more likely to respond cooperatively to a
cooperative choice than to retaliate defection and on the other hand women were much
more likely to retaliate defection than to give a cooperative response for cooperation.
Besides, men in general were more inclined to play TFT than women (Rapoport and
Chammah, 1965: 192). In the repeated IPG game experiments we might encounter
similar gender differences regarding reciprocal behavior, therefore we include such
interaction variables in the analysis.
	)	&&%  
Finally, we have to be more specific about the 	 we use for analyzing the
experimental data. We consider individual decisions as separate observations. These
observations are definitely not independent. First, decisions made by the same subject
cannot be handled in the same way as decisions made by different subjects. There are







explanatory variables might vary between subjects. In these cases, where we have
nested sources of variability, we should use multilevel analysis (cf. Section 3.4.1).
Second, decisions made within one experimental session cannot be handled in the
same way as decisions in different sessions. In the single-shot games there was no
feedback after decision rounds, hence we could completely control for the effects of
experimental manipulations. However, in the repeated games, where information is
provided to the subjects after each decision round, complete control for session effects
is impossible. Therefore, we need to introduce a third level to the analysis. An example
of a variable at the session level that might influence individual decisions is delay time
at the start of the experiment.
To summarize, we conduct a multilevel analysis in which single decisions are the
first level observations, subjects are at the second level, and experimental sessions are at
the third. Since our dependent variable (single decision) is a binary variable, we use
multilevel logistic regression (Goldstein, 1995: Chapter 7). Exact specification of our
model used to explain individual contribution propensities can be found in the
Appendix to this chapter.
In this chapter, first we discussed our objectives for analyzing repeated experimental
situations and introduced the theoretical concepts on which we built our integrated
model. We formulated hypotheses about effects of structural and temporal
embeddedness in the repeated IPG game. We explicated predictions of the main
mechanisms that determine individual decisions as well as of possible control variables
and interactions. We also discussed that what scenarios can be predicted at the
intergroup level as a result of aggregation of individual decisions. At the end of this
chapter, we described the research methods we use to analyze the repeated games. After
this we can start reporting our results. Because of the complexity and multitude of





Here we specify the multilevel models we used for explaining individual
contribution propensities in repeated IPG games. As we discussed in Section 4.3.1, we
use the logit function as the core of the model, since the dependent variable (individual
decision) is discrete. Using the same notations as there, the baseline three-level model is
expressed as
( )











	 of cooperation ,UL[ in decision round  (level one) of actor 
(level two) in experimental session  (level three). The propensity of cooperation is
specified by the logit link function (Goldstein 1995: Chapter 7). The baseline model
contains an intercept α that is interpreted as the baseline contribution propensity, a
session level error term ϕ[, a subject level error term εL[, and an intra-individual
variation ξUL[. The latter term represents the residual variance that is not estimated in
models that include the random intercept. We assume that
ϕ[~N(0, ρ) and
εL[~N(0,σ),
where the variances ρand σ are estimated.
This baseline model is extended by the predictors of structural embeddedness (see
Equation 4.3.1.3). These include internalized social control effects, namely selective
incentives, behavioral confirmation, and traitor rewards, and effects of monetary
rewards for social control, namely selective incentives and behavioral confirmation.
Parameter estimates of these effects were denoted by 	, and , respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, let us denote the vector of these parameter estimates by β6:
β′6=[	, ].
The vector β6 estimates the effect of vector UL[ on contribution propensities, where UL[
is:

















where L denotes the number of fellow neighbors and L indicates the number of
neighbors from the other group. The expression within the parentheses denotes the
difference between the expected number of contributing and defecting fellow neighbors
of player  in round . The dummy,, has a value of one from the first round of Part II,
the dummy V equals one, if monetary selective incentives are introduced, and the
dummy E indicates the introduction of monetary confirmation rewards. Using these
vectors, the three-level model that includes the structural effects can be expressed as:
.0 UL[L[[UL[6UL[ , ξεϕβα +++′+= (4.A.3)
After this, we specify the effects of temporal embeddedness, namely perceived
criticalness, intergroup reciprocity, and reinforcement learning are incorporated in the
explanatory model. In operationalized terms 	
 is formulated as the effect of
subjects’ expectations about the outcome of the subsequent round. Let us denote the
vector that contains the values of four dummy variables about expectations (anticipation
of peace, defeat, clash, and victory, if the previous round was not victory) by "UL[ (see
Table 4.3.2.1) and the corresponding vector of parameter estimates by β&. For tracing

	 	, we use three dummy variables about the outcome of the
previous round (peace, defeat, and clash) and consider a previous victory as the
reference category. We denote the vector that contains their values by -UL[ and the





 change during the experiment with the introduction of new monetary
incentives. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we created two dummy variables, one
that indicates when reinforcement drives towards contribution and another that indicates
when reinforcement prescribes defection. We used the case in which the direction of the
effect of reinforcement learning is uncertain as a reference category (see Section 4.3.4).
The values of these two dummies are included in the vector 'UL[ and the corresponding
parameter estimates in β5. The model that includes all these effects of temporal
embeddedness can be written as:
,0 UL[L[[UL[5UL[*UL[&UL[6UL[ '-", ξεϕββββα +++′+′+′+′+= (4.A.4)




 are zeros for the rounds without information about
the previous rounds (;5<). On the other hand, these vectors include the outcome of
the last repeated game before single-shot games in Part II, III, and IV of the experiment.
Regarding local reciprocity, let us denote the parameter estimates of reciprocating
actions of neighbors from the other group by 	, of fellow reciprocity by , and of
additional reciprocation, if behavioral confirmation is introduced in a monetary form by
. The introduction of the latter term is necessary, because monetary side payments for
local coordination provide strong incentives to reciprocate the decision of fellow
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neighbors. For the sake of simplicity, let us denote the vector of these parameter
estimates by β/:
β′/=[	, ].
The vector β/ estimates the effect of vector )UL[ on contribution propensities, where )UL[
is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ],,,[ )1()1()1()1()1()1( ELUGLUF,,LUGLUF,,LUGLUFUL[ ) −−−−−− −−−=′
=<,	((, (4.A.5)
where FUL denotes the number of neighbors of , who belonged to the opposite group
and who contributed in the previous round. Similarly, GUL denotes the number of
fellow neighbors of , who defected in the previous round. Vector entries are zero in the
control condition (Part I) and in the first six rounds of Part II, since subjects had no
information about decisions of neighbors in these rounds. On the other hand, for single-
shot games in Parts III and IV, information from the last repeated game is used.
After including local reciprocity the three-level model can be written as:
.0 UL[L[[UL[/UL[5UL[*UL[&UL[6UL[ )'-", ξεϕβββββα +++′+′+′+′+′+= (4.A.6)
Equation 4.A.6 contains all of our main explanatory variables. Some of them might
interact with each other and there are also important personality characteristics that
cause significantly different behavior. In the extended versions of the model, these are
simply added as additional predictors.
Until now we described a model in which we assumed that parameter estimates do
not vary between individuals. However, it is possible that our main predictors influence
decisions differently subject by subject. For instance, one subject may reciprocate more
the actions of his or her neighbors while another only considers whether his or her
decision resulted in a satisfactory outcome. Hence, we analyze also a model in which
we allow for a random variation of the parameter estimates of our main explanatory
variables around their mean. We assume that this variation follows a normal
distribution. If we denote the vector of parameters by 2(2′;[β′6,β′&, β′*,β′5,β′/]) and
the vector of observations by capital >(>′;[′,"′, -′,'′,)′]), then it means that under
this model equation (4.A.6) can be written as








2L;2?L[,      (4.A.8)
where L[ is an error vector that follows a multivariate normal distribution with
L[~(/, Ω),
where the elements of the covariance matrix Ω are going to be estimated. To keep the
analysis simple and parsimonious, we restrict the covariance estimates to zero. In
general, fixing covariances to zero should be based on deviance tests that compare
models that include and exclude them (van Duijn, van Busschbach, and Snijders,
1999). These covariances would not be meaningless, but with their estimation our
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In this chapter, we present results of the analysis of repeated Intergroup Public
Goods (IPG) game experiments. We describe characteristics of the subject pool and the
experimental procedure in Section 5.2. The structure of the rest of the chapter follows
the classification of our main hypotheses (see Table 4.3.3.1) as it is summarized in
Table 5.1.1.
















outcome(s) of the game












First dynamics of intergroup conflict and peace are investigated under different
structural conditions in Section 5.3. This investigation is related to macro hypotheses
about the effect of structural embeddedness, of temporal embeddedness, and of their
interaction on intergroup conflict. In particular, we test whether conflict is more likely
in segregated structures, we try to trace typical scenarios of intergroup relations and
we discuss differences in scenarios by structural conditions.
We turn to the analysis of individual behavior in Section 5.4. We discuss how
decisions are conditional on subjects’ expectations, on their previous decisions, on
previous outcomes, and on previous decisions of neighbors. This investigation is related
to micro hypotheses about the effect of temporal embeddedness and of interactions of
structure and time.
In Section 5.5, we analyze questionnaire data that provide an indirect test for the
micro hypotheses about the use of certain decision heuristics, including criticalness,
reinforcement learning, intergroup and local reciprocity. These main micro hypotheses
are tested directly in Section 5.6. In this section, the results of multilevel analyses are
presented, explaining individual contribution propensities.
Additionally, in Section 5.7 we take a closer look behind the 	

by analyzing the origins of different subjective expectations. We summarize our results





Repeated games followed the single-shot games in each experimental part. The
subject pool was exactly the same. The major characteristics of the subjects were
discussed in Section 3.5.1. As in the single-shot games, in case a subject ran out of
decision time, a random decision was implemented. For all such cases, final payment
was decreased by 1%. Altogether, it has happened only 31 times from 14275 decisions
(0.22%). 26 out of the 31 cases were during the single-shot games. Random decisions
are not included in the analysis.
!$$'
Structural conditions were the same in the repeated games as in the single-shot
games. Details about the design were discussed in Section 3.3. Repeated games were
embedded in the procedure that is described in Section 3.5.2. In each experimental part,
five single-shot games were played first. After the fifth round subjects were notified by
a short message “From now on every decision round will count in your final payment.”
This message was on their screens for ten seconds.
From the sixth round on, subjects received the information of what was the outcome
of the previous round. At the beginning of Part II, separating walls were removed and
flags were attached to the monitors to indicate group membership. Additionally,
subjects also received colored A-4 size papers with the color of their group. After the
sixth round in Parts II, III, and IV subjects also received information about the decision
of their neighbors. This information appeared on their screens for ten seconds together
with a flag indicating the group membership of their neighbors. No information was
provided about the decision of other players.
Subjects had the same amount of time for every decision in the repeated games.
They had to make their decision whether they would keep the 11 NLG bonus or give it
to help their group to achieve success in the competition. They also had to indicate
which outcome they anticipate and what kind of actions they expect from their
neighbors in the subsequent round. Subjects had 22 seconds to make a decision and to
provide information about their expectations. A clock was indicating how much time
they had, counting backwards from 20 seconds. After 15 seconds a warning message
appeared on the screen (“Decide now!”). Decisions made with some delay (two
seconds) were still accepted. Subjects could reconsider their decision until they clicked
on the confirmation button. If there was no click on the confirmation button, the last
selection was interpreted as final choice.
  The number of decision rounds in the repeated games was determined randomly.






number of rounds varied between 13 and 22, with one outlier of 29 rounds. On average,
in one experimental part subjects played 17.51 rounds (of which five were single-shot






In Section 5.3, we provide statistics that are related to our research questions about
aggregated outcomes of the repeated IPG games. First, in Section 5.3.1, we compare
outcomes and contribution rates between the different structural conditions of the
experiments. The main dependent variable at the macro level is the outcome of the
game. As before, the category 
 is used for all outcomes, in which at least in one
of the teams the number of contributors exceeded the minimal contributing set (victory,
defeat, and clash). Including single-shot and repeated rounds, altogether 1471 IPG
games were played in the experiments. From these, 1081 (73.5%) ended in conflict. In
861 (58.5%) cases, one of the teams achieved victory and in 220 (15.0%) cases there
was a clash with equal numbers of contributors in the teams.









 peace conflict Total
control condition 29.7% (1041) 70.3% (2463) 100% (3504)
low clustering 59.9% (1830) 40.1% (1223) 100% (3053)
medium clustering 11.4% (454) 88.6% (3516) 100% (3970)
high clustering 13.1% (490) 86.9% (3258) 100% (3748)
Total N 26.7% (3815) 73.3% (10460) 100% (14275)
+: Cases in parentheses are weighted (multiplied) by the number of human decisions in the given
game. For the χ2–test unweighted outcomes are used, N=1471.
The 	
 (Section 3.2) predicted that conflict would be least likely
in the low clustering condition and would be most likely in the high clustering
condition. Table 5.3.1.1 summarizes the frequency of intergroup conflict and peace by
clustering conditions in the repeated IPG games. The hypothesis that outcomes are
independent of clustering conditions can be rejected (χ2(3)=251.143, <0.001). As
predicted, peace was most likely in the low clustering condition. Conflict, however,
occurred slightly more often in the medium than in the high clustering condition, which
contradicts our structural hypothesis.
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Similar to the overall figures (cf. Table 5.3.1.1), in Part II conflict occurred more
frequently in the medium clustering condition (84.6%) than in the high clustering
condition (78.3%). This could be explained by a 
 , according to which
internalized forms of social control evoke sufficiently high number of contributions
already in the medium clustering condition. In relation to our theoretical analysis, this
corresponds to results from the normative pressure condition under which the likelihood
of conflict was already high in the middle ranges of clustering (cf. Figures 2.8.1.2,
2.8.2.1, 2.8.2.2). Conflict occurred frequently in the medium clustering condition in Part
III, regardless of whether behavioral confirmation (87.7%) or selective incentives were
introduced (89.3%). On the other hand, there was a clear difference (,4.215, <0.001)
between these two conditions in the high clustering condition (70.5% and 96.9%
respectively). The relative frequency of sequences of conflict is similar to these figures.
Table 5.3.1.2. Average contribution rates (%) in different clustering conditions and
















)- 45.57 (937) 50.31 (1270) 46.89 (1286) 47.48 (3493)
'	(
	
	) 43.93 (972) 58.50 (1323) 53.23 (1255) 52.65 (3550)
(
	
.) - 59.51 (699) 51.15 (610) 55.61 (1309)
(
	) - 67.68 (659) 75.53 (617) 71.47 (1276)
'	

'		 33.08 (925) 63.48 (1358) 63.41 (1227) 55.44 (3510)
(
	
.) - 61.55 (632) 71.65 (589) 66.42 (1221)
(
	) - 73.08 (650) 88.62 (668) 80.96 (1318)
'	
.
'	.	 27.86 (1152) 67.39 (1282) 80.67 (1257) 59.58 (3691)
Total (without Part I) 34.57 (3049) 63.08 (3963) 65.79 (3739) 55.86 (10751)
Total 37.16 (3986) 59.98 (5233) 60.96 (5025) 53.94 (14244)
+#The numbers of cell-relevant cases are in parentheses. All human decisions of single-shot and
repeated games are included.
* In Part I subjects did not know their group membership and they did not see each other. Therefore their
partition into the different clustering conditions only illustrates baseline contribution rates in the different
experimental sessions.
We predicted a segregation effect on intergroup conflict because we assumed that
contribution rates differ in these conditions. Table 5.3.1.2 gives a summary of
contribution rates by clustering conditions. The hypothesis that contribution rates are
the same in the different conditions can be rejected (ANOVA /(3, 14240)=304.482,
<0.001). There is an interesting contrast between this table and Table 5.3.1.1. In the
high clustering condition conflict occurred less often, but the total contribution rate was
higher (65.79%) than in the medium clustering condition (63.08%; ,2.484, one-tailed
=0.007). Additional to the ceiling effect, Table 5.3.1.2 provides an indication why it is
the case. Subjects in the medium clustering condition by chance were more likely to






(contribution rates in the control condition were 50.31% and 46.89%; ,1.733, one-
tailed =0.042). We could observe this already in the single-shot games of the first
experimental part (see Section 3.6.1). In Part II, the difference in favor of the medium
clustering condition became higher, which provides indirect support for the intergroup
reciprocity hypothesis.
Contribution propensities were highest in the medium clustering condition in all
experimental parts except when monetary selective incentives were introduced. It is not
surprising that the introduction of monetary selective incentives made a radical turn in













. Subjects recognized the change in the payoff structure and were more
motivated to contribute if they received selective incentives twice. The high frequency
of conflict in Part III increased contribution rates also in Part IV. This explains the
difference in contribution rates in Part IV between conditions where behavioral
confirmation and where selective incentives were introduced first as additional rewards.
The hypothesis that contribution rates are the same in Part II can be rejected
(ANOVA /(2, 3547)=24.307, <0.001). Contribution rates are significantly highest in
the medium clustering condition (compared to the high clustering condition =1.931,
one-tailed =0.028). This indicates that history effects in the repeated games
strengthened group composition effects. A comparison of Part I and II reveals that
minimal contact made an increase in contribution rates compared to the control
condition (,4.088, <0.001).
By considering the change in contribution rates through experimental parts, the
hypothesis that contribution rates are the same in the different parts can be rejected
(ANOVA /(3, 14240)=35.625, <0.001). Test of linearity shows that there is no
significant deviation from a linear trend through experimental parts (/=0.513, =0.599).
This partly supports that, similar to the single-shot games, analysis of individual level
data should be controlled for a linear between-parts trend.
We also tested whether the introduction of different monetary incentives in Parts III
and IV made a difference in contribution rates (see Table 5.3.1.2). The hypothesis that
contribution rates are the same in the different conditions can be rejected both in Part III
(ANOVA /(2, 3507)=175.890, <0.001) and in Part IV (ANOVA /(2, 3688)=474.154,
<0.001). As predicted, the introduction of monetary selective incentives resulted in
higher contribution rates than did the introduction of behavioral confirmation (,8.493,
<0.001). Which incentives were introduced first made a significant difference also in
Part IV (,8.452, <0.001). This result indicates that history effects play a significant
role in between experimental parts.
This section concerned our macro hypotheses about structural embeddedness. We
compared outcomes and contribution rates between different conditions of the
experiment. The 	
 is partly supported by the data. As predicted,
conflict was least likely in the low clustering condition. Intergroup conflict, however,
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was not more frequent in the high clustering condition than in medium clustering. This
result was partly the consequence of a ceiling effect and was partly caused by high
baseline contribution propensities in the medium clustering condition. Furthermore, we
also found support for the hypothesis that the segregation effect would be stronger
under normative pressure than under confirmation pressure.
!($ 

This section reports experimental results that are related to our macro hypotheses
about effects of temporal embeddedness. Particularly, we show how conflict emerged
and changed over time in the experiments.
Figure 5.3.2.1 The likelihood of intergroup conflict over time aggregating all
experimental parts and all experimental conditions
+#Rounds 1-5 are single-shot games. N=84 for rounds 1-13, N=81 for ,14, and N=71 for ,15.
Figure 5.3.2.1 demonstrates how the likelihood of intergroup conflict changed within
experimental sessions. There was a clear decreasing tendency in the first four rounds of
the single-shot games (cf. Section 3.6.5). In the first repeated game (round 6) the
frequency of intergroup conflict increased basically to the same level as it was in the
first single-shot game. This was followed by a similar decrease as in the single-shot
games. The gradual decrease was interrupted in round 10 with a sudden positive shift.
From round 12, there was a slight increase in the frequency of conflict again.
Real reasons for these changes can only be found after the deeper analysis of micro
processes that is going to follow in the subsequent sections. If we do not find
convincing support for these macro outcomes relying only on the assumed micro
mechanisms, we could consider the following * explanation. The surprising shift
could be explained by a 	
	 that is an indirect consequence of
Proportion (%) of conflict over time
Decision round














single-shot games. Subjects played five single-shot rounds and they might have
(falsely) believed that there would be also five rounds of repeated games. Similar to
the peculiar end-behavior in the single-shot games, subjects increased their
contribution propensities at the hypothetical end. Since we did not ask subjects about
such expectations, we cannot test this alternative hypothesis in this data.
In the control condition (Part I), there are no neighborhood effects and consequently
no structural effects, either. Therefore, we gain an important insight by looking at data
from this condition separately. The frequency of conflict in this part is reported in
Figure 5.3.2.2. Conflict was the most frequent in the very first single-shot game. After a
gradual decrease, conflict occurred more often in the last single-shot game. In the first
repeated game, conflict was even more likely, but still not as likely as in round 1. In
later rounds, there was less conflict, with a nadir in round 12. In the last rounds, the
proportion of conflict increased again.
Figure 5.3.2.2 The likelihood of intergroup conflict in the control condition (Part I)
+#Rounds 1-5 are single-shot games. N=21 for rounds 1-13, N=20 for ,14, and N=16 for ,15.
Figures 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 provided aggregated statistics about how conflict
occurred over time within experimental parts. In order to get a somewhat closer view on
scenarios of intergroup conflict and peace, we report how different outcomes followed
each other in the experiment. This brings us closer to the testing of 		 and
	 
 hypotheses. Table 5.3.2.1 contains information on transition
probabilities between different outcomes.1 For example, the fourth cell in the first row
indicates that clash occurred after peace in 17 cases and the transition probability from
peace to clash is 4.4%. A peaceful outcome was repeated in 57.6% (N=223) of the cases
and conflict elicited further conflict in 85.8% (N=822) of the cases, which supports the
                                                          
1
 The total number of cases in columns and in rows are different, since previous outcomes do not include
results of the last round and subsequent outcomes do not include results of the first repeated game in Part
I. Results from the single-shot games of Part I are not included.
Proportion (%) of conflict over time in the control condition
Decision round











 hypotheses. If we assume some random variation in
the decisions, it is not surprising that a clash outcome was not so frequently repeated.
Instead, clash was more likely followed by victory of one team.































































































+#Number of cases. Color labels have not been introduced yet in the control condition. For single-
shot games and for the first repeated game the outcome of the last round in the previous part is
considered as a previous outcome.
Table 5.3.2.1 reported transition probabilities between outcomes in the entire
experiment. To demonstrate the 
 effect of temporal embeddedness, we report in
Table 5.3.2.2 how outcomes followed each other in the control condition (Part I). In this
part of the experiment, there were no effects of structural embeddedness and social
control. Results show clear support for the 	 	 and 	 

hypotheses. Peace followed peace in 62.3% (N=43) of the cases and conflict was
repeated in the subsequent round in 80.7% (N=134) of the cases. The frequent repetition
of intergroup conflict is a consequence of high baseline contribution rates.
Since color labels had not been introduced yet in the control condition, all
differences between the red and the green groups are simply coincidental. It seems from
Table 5.3.2.2 that subjects, who by chance were assigned to the green group, were less
consistent in their decisions. They moved their group more often out of peace, but they






Table 5.3.2.2 Frequency of outcomes conditional on previous outcomes in the
































































































+#Number of cases. Color labels have not yet been introduced in Part I.
As we are interested in tracing typical scenarios, we should not look merely at
subsequent rounds. If we consider all 0
 of four subsequent outcomes, we find
that out of 349 cases, in 140 (40.1%) cases, peace was repeated in the last three rounds
before a peaceful outcome. This supports the 	 	 hypothesis. Sequences of
intergroup conflict were even more likely. Out of 954 cases ended in conflict, 629
(65.9%) were preceded by three conflicting outcomes. However, sequences of conflict
in most cases did not mean that the same outcome was repeated. There were 68 (7.1%)
cases, in which the red team won the competition four times in a row. The same
happened 60 (6.3%) times with the green team. Clash almost never took place four
times in a row (3 cases). The latter means that the 	  
hypothesis that
could be derived from the criticalness and reciprocity micro principles did not gain
support from the data. On the other hand, groups hardly found the way out of 	

.
Looking at the same figures in the control condition, in which there were no effects
of structural embeddedness, we find that peace occurred three times in a row before a
peaceful outcome in 20 (30.8%) cases. A sequence of three conflict outcomes preceded
conflict in 70 (54.7%) cases. These figures are lower relative to the overall case,
indicating that the introduction of structural embeddedness increased the likelihood of
		 and 	
.
Our hypotheses about typical scenarios imply that the number of contributors in the
red and in the green group should correlate. Indeed, by looking at all experimental
parts, we find that there is a significant correlation (Pearson =0.391, <0.001). On
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the other hand, we should not find significant correlation in the single-shot games of
the control condition, because there is no feedback information about previous
outcomes. For these rounds, there was no significant correlation between the number
of contributors in the red and in the green group (Pearson = -0.063, =0.526,
N=105).
When subjects learned the outcome of previous rounds in the repeated games of
the control condition, the correlation between the number of contributors in the red
and in the green group became significant (Pearson =0.192, =0.002, N=256). This
correlation increased in repeated games in later parts of the experiment (Pearson
=0.255, <0.001, N=262 in Part II; Pearson =0.465, <0.001, N=257 in Part III; and
Pearson =0.557, <0.001, N=276 in Part IV). This implies that the likelihood of a
clash is also increased and it was more likely that single individual decisions were
decisive. These correlations support the 	  
 and 	  	
hypotheses.
Although subjects were informed only about the outcome of the previous round and
not about the exact number of contributors in the two groups, it is interesting to look at
these figures. Before the introduction of minimal contact, there were no other incentives
at stake than the monetary payoffs. Under these conditions, subjects are almost always
better off by keeping their bonus. However there were only 5 cases out of 361 outcomes
in the control condition without any contributors. Three of the five {0;0} outcomes
occurred in the last repeated games of the same session. This was the only session in
which we could trace an emergence of the overall defection equilibrium.
In this section, in relation to our macro hypotheses about effects of temporal
embeddedness, we analyzed how conflict and other outcomes of the IPG games
changed over time in the experiment. We predicted the occurrence of certain typical
scenarios, such as 		 and 	
. We found evidence of both. On the
other hand, 	
 did not mean that groups engaged in a series of clashes. In
this section, we did not discuss differences of observed scenarios between structural
conditions. These differences together with the tests of the 		and 	





This section is still related to research questions that regard aggregated consequences
of individual decisions over time. However, the focus now is closer to the individual;
instead of examining the outcomes of the repeated IPG game, we summarize statistics
about individual decisions.
Figure 5.3.3.1 reveals that after the radical decrease in the single-shot rounds,






correspond with any of the typical scenarios we predicted. However, an average
oscillation at a medium level can also be an aggregation of decreasing and increasing
trends in different experimental sessions. While in some experiments intergroup
reciprocity leads to a 	
, in other sessions it leads to a 		. In
order to see whether that was indeed the case, we examined the dynamics of 21
experimental sessions separately. We analyzed contribution rates in the repeated games
of the control condition, because in this part of the experiment there were no effects of
structural embeddedness.
The experimental data do not support the hypothesis that the average oscillation at a
medium level is an aggregation of counterpolar trends. We conducted logistic
regression analyses on data from each experimental session, assuming a linear trend
over time. Results showed no significant change in 18 sessions. There was a significant
decrease over time only in three sessions (<0.05, in two cases <0.01). In one
additional case, contribution rates increased significantly until round 10 and then
dropped again. From the remaining sessions, there were huge fluctuations in
contributions in three experiments. In most of the experimental sessions (14) however,


 	 	 	  . These findings support the 	
	 and 	 
hypotheses, but show no correspondence with the 	 
	 and 	
hypotheses. To find more convincing explanations for the
changes in average contribution rates, we will turn to the analysis of individual behavior
in the following sections.
Our macro hypotheses about interactions of structure and time predicted that there
are different scenarios under different structural conditions. Results show clear support





Considering all sequences of four subsequent outcomes in the low clustering condition,
we find that out of 187 cases, peace was preceded 122 (65.2%) times by a sequence of
three peaceful outcomes. This is a higher proportion than what we have experienced in
Part I (30.8%) and also higher than the overall figure (40.1%).
On the other extreme, 
 	 		 





. All 129 games ended in conflict except one. Still, there was only a
single case in which there were four clashes after each other. Sequences of four
victories of the red team occurred 15 times (11.7%) and series of four victories of the
green team took place in 4 cases (3.1%). Thus, in most cases, 	
 meant
changing fortune for the two sides. In Part IV, there was not much hope for peace in the
medium clustering condition, either; the outcome of the game was conflict in 120 of the
131 cases (91.6%). Peaceful outcomes concentrated in few sessions (five of them
occurred in one session). Sequences of four conflict outcomes were therefore frequent
(N=100, 83.3%).
For a closer investigation of our main hypotheses about the macro dynamics of the
repeated games, let us consider average contribution rates over time. To search for
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any evidence of a 	 
 or a 	  	 in any of the experimental
conditions, we will also analyze trends in different structural conditions separately.
Figure 5.3.3.1 Contribution rates by decision rounds within parts
+#Single-shot games are rounds 1-5. Results are shown for the first 15 repeated games.
As Figure 5.3.3.1 shows, without controlling for other variables, contribution rates
decrease over time, but with surprising fluctuations. When the positive endgame effect
of the single-shot games is handled as an outlier, results show a sharper decrease in
contribution rates in the single-shot games than in the repeated games. Contribution
rates in the control condition (lower curve in Figure 5.3.3.1) are most closely
comparable to anonymously played repeated PD, IPD, and IPG game experiments.
Typically, these experiments find a quick decrease in contribution rates in the beginning
of the experiment and a smooth decrease in later rounds (cf. Bornstein, Winter, and
Goren, 1996; Goren and Bornstein, 1999). Contribution rates over time in our
experiment show quite a different pattern with a smooth decrease throughout the
repeated games with an exception of a larger drop in late rounds.
 Similar to the upward shift that was observed in the dynamics of intergroup conflict
in Figures 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2, we can detect a rise in contribution rates in round 10 (cf.
Figure 5.3.3.1). This local maximum is followed by a decreasing pattern and an even
more characteristic increase around rounds 14 and 15. In Section 5.3.2 we discussed
that surprising shifts could probably be explained by hypothetical endgame effects. This
alternative hypothesis, however, cannot be directly tested in this data, as we did not ask
subjects about endgame expectations. Instead, later in the multilevel analysis of
individual decisions, we will handle these shifts as outliers from the general tendencies.
The light line in Figure 5.3.3.2 represents the overall mean rates of contribution and
the dark line shows contribution rates in the low clustering condition. The latter could
Contribution rate by decision rounds within experimental parts
overall contribution rate control condition
Decision round















be the basis of comparisons with similar experiments, because in the low clustering
condition, no new incentives were introduced. Because of structural breaks between
parts, however, the comparison with other experiments is quite difficult.
Figure 5.3.3.2 Contribution rates by decision rounds
+#Single-shot games are rounds 1-5 in each part. Results are shown only for the first 10 repeated
games in each part, total N=14244 and N=6542 in the low clustering condition.
Figures 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2 also show a significant rise in contributions in every part
in the first repeated game. As we discussed in Section 4.3.4, this is possibly a result of
reputation effects or image scoring (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000; Bienenstock, 2001). It seems that subjects, in the hope of long term
benefits, signal unselfish behavior towards group members in the beginning of the
repeated games.










 of the experiment.
With regard to the 	  	 hypothesis, we predicted that contribution rates
would decrease over time in the low clustering condition until 		 prevails. On
the other hand, we anticipated 		
 in the medium and especially in the
high clustering condition that would later lead to 	
. Looking at the data
session by session we hoped to distinguish these typical scenarios in the experiment.
We found evidence for the 	  	 in sessions of the  

condition. In all the six sessions there was a significant downward linear trend at least in
Contribution rates (%) by decision rounds
overall contribution rate low clustering condition
















one of the experimental parts (<0.05). However, there are differences with respect to
when did this occur. In one session, there was a significant decrease both in Part II
(<0.05) and in Part III (<0.001) and the number of contributors remained stable at a
low level in the last part (around two contributors). In another session, in which there
was a significant decrease in Part I (<0.01), the contribution rate was relatively low in
Part II, but with some sudden peaks. Later, in Part III the contribution rate decreased
again significantly (<0.01) and it remained stable and low in Part IV. There were two
sessions that produced an unexpected significant increase in Part II (<0.01). In one,
contribution rates dropped significantly in Part I (<0.01) and remained stable and low
in the first repeated rounds of Part II. At the end of this part, more and more subjects
contributed, but the contribution rate fell back to a low level again in Part III and
remained low with some sudden but short peaks. In the other case, there was no
significant decrease in Part I, and the rise in Part II was followed by extreme
fluctuations in Part III, until the contribution rate decreased significantly in Part IV
(<0.05). In the remaining two sessions no clear pattern could be recognized in the first
two parts, but there was a significant downward trend in Part III (<0.05 and <0.01,
respectively). In both cases, only a few people contributed in most of the rounds in Part
IV, but there were some sudden and short peaks.
To summarize, it is hard to say that these scenarios look the same, but to a certain
extent all sessions gave some support for the 		 hypothesis. Common in all
sessions of the low clustering condition is that in Part IV the contribution rate was
already at a low level, below which there was no way to go. Some diehard contributors
were not willing to change their decisions and eventually they provoked some
fluctuations in the contribution rate.
Probably we have the clearest picture from the 
 condition. In this
condition, there are no indications of any recognizable trends. There was neither a
significant decrease nor increase in any part of the eight sessions. Contribution rates
were oscillating around a certain contribution rate, which is probably an indication of a

. To tell more about what is behind the stable or oscillating contribution
rates, we will rely on the analysis of individual data.
There were some surprises in the results from the 
 condition. There
was no significant increase of contribution rates in any parts of the seven sessions.
Consequently, we do not find support for the 	









	 	s. In five of the seven
sessions, as predicted, they stabilized at a high level (eight or nine contributors) in Part
IV, which is a unique characteristic of the high clustering condition. In three sessions,
this high level had already been reached in Part III. All these sessions belonged to the
condition in which monetary selective incentives were introduced in Part III, which









. On the other hand, we found a significant decrease in
Part II (twice <0.05, once <0.01) in three sessions, which is contrary to our






new incentives were distributed. A possible explanation for why contribution
propensities dropped in some sessions is that subjects might have been highly
influenced by internalized social control in the beginning of the experimental part, but
they became disappointed in later rounds, as their nice behavior did not bring positive
results.
In this section, we summarized the observed dynamics of the repeated games and
related the results to our macro hypotheses about effects of temporal embeddedness and
interactions of structural and temporal factors. We found evidence of scenarios of 	
	 and of the 		. As we predicted, these scenarios appeared most likely
in the 
 condition. We also found evidence of 	
, especially
in 	 structures. It did not mean, however, that one particular outcome was
repeated. Moreover, contribution rates increased 
 experimental parts and
therefore we could not trace the 	  
 scenario. The test about the
mechanisms behind these macro processes should be based on the investigation of










One of our major research questions concerned simple behavioral heuristics that






, and  would play a crucial role here. In
this section, we first look at how decisions were conditional on expectations and
previous outcomes, which is a first step towards direct testing of our micro
hypotheses.













2 any - 9.52% (2919)
"12 any - 25.55% (1926)
, ,  + 77.03% (4166)
victory () ? 78.38% (2433)
 !+12
no previous round ? 70.85% (590)
	 4567824%763
 %$12 any + 62.72% (2114)
! 53.93% (14148)
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With respect to 	
, we must analyze the relationship between expectations
and decisions of subjects. Table 5.4.1.1 summarizes these statistics. As predicted,
contribution rates are much lower than the overall mean, when the subject anticipated
peace (9.52%) or defeat (25.55%) and they are higher, when the subject expected a
clash (62.72%) or victory (76.98%).    	
 . The
hypothesis that contribution rates are the same after different expectations can be
rejected (ANOVA /(3, 14144)=2230.847, <0.001).
If victory is anticipated, individual decision is obviously not critical. We use the
outcome of the previous round as an additional source of information to see whether
the criticalness argument is appropriate to explain high contribution propensities. We
believe that there is a higher chance that an individual perceives his or her decision as
critical if the previous round was not victory (and he or she still believes in the
success of the group). In this case subjective expectations are likely to be wrong, but
actual decisions are not in contradiction with subjective expectations. Self-efficacy is
illusionary (cf. Kerr, 1989), but decision is rational in expected utility terms. Subjects
fell into this illusion quite often (N=4166).
If victory is anticipated, the criticalness argument is not supported by the data.
Contribution rates are larger in case the previous round was victory (78.38% versus
77.03%; ,1.277, one-tailed =0.101, not significant). It is still possible that subjects
believed that their contribution was crucial to reach victory in the previous round and
it would be exactly so in the next round. They did not have complete information
about the outcome (number of contributors in the teams) and therefore on the basis of
responsibility aversion (see Section 2.4.4) they might continue to contribute. This
does not fully explain, however, the very high contribution rates in case victory was
anticipated. These rates are even higher than when clash was expected (,12.254,
<0.001). There should be something else besides criticalness that is responsible for
this result, given that in the latter case the decision of the subject is certainly critical.
A possible explanation could be that people like to be part of the winning side and
they experience this feeling more intensely in case they also made sacrifices for the
team success. For some people, 


   
 
. A similar 	
	
 	
 was traced in the
empirical analysis of mass legal political protests (Finkel, Muller, and Opp, 1989) and
of voter turnout (Hong and Konrad, 1998). The crucial relevance of the bandwagon
effect in our experiment has origins in the fact that subjects expected the victory of
their team more than any other outcome (in 50.81% of all cases). This blind optimism
together with a bandwagon effect substantially increased contribution rates.
We did not predict the influence of a bandwagon mechanism in advance, but we
can formulate an * about this effect.











 A direct test of this hypothesis is left for subsequent research. In this study, we can
only test bandwagon effects implicitly. If subjects value active participation to the
winning side highly, we could predict that after victory, on average, contribution rates
would increase in the winning team. In this team, both previous contributors and
previous defectors are likely to have had high contribution rates. A problem with this
implicit testing is that it assumes that forward-looking actors with bandwagon
tendencies use past experience in the same way. To emphasize this difference, here
we formulate a backward-looking hypothesis for which we could obtain independent
support from the data.
(BACKWARD-LOOKING) BANDWAGON HYPOTHESIS: "& 	 
  
    	




Average contribution rates conditional on the previous outcome do not support this
hypothesis (see Table 5.4.1.2). There is no clear evidence for backward-looking
bandwagon effects. Victory in the previous round provoked contributions of relatively
low proportion of defectors (43.8%). This proportion deviates significantly from the
overall mean (,3012.7, <0.001).
Table 5.4.1.2. Effect of intergroup reciprocity and reinforcement learning on
contribution rates in the entire experiment
hypotheses contribution rates N total (C+D)

 C D C D C D C rate N
 - ? - - 51.15% 29.57% 954 2831 35.01% 3785
 + - + + 61.62% 53.79% 1597 2043 57.23% 3640
 ? + ? - 71.64% 43.84% 2870 771 65.75% 3641


 + - + ? 69.24% 52.54% 1453 512 64.89% 1965
	 65.96% 41.30% 6874 6157 54.31% 13031
+: Among hypotheses, the first sign indicates hypothesis based on intergroup reciprocity and the
second is based on reinforcement learning.For single-shot games and for the first repeated game the
outcome of the last round in the previous part is considered as a previous outcome.









As Table 5.4.1.2 shows, contribution rates were always higher after a contribution
choice than after a defection choice, which shows some stability of individual
contribution propensities (the overall means 65.96% and 41.30% differ significantly;
,29.109, <0.001). Contribution rates were highest if the previous round was won by
the group (65.75%). In more than half of the cases subjects immediately retaliated the
defeat or clash punishment of the group by contributing in the next round. Victory and
clash reinforced the most contributing decisions. Defection choice was reinforced by
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peace. Altogether, mean contribution rates show support for the combined presence of
intergroup reciprocity and reinforcement learning and to a less extent for bandwagon
effects. A more sophisticated test in the form of multilevel logistic regression will
follow in Section 5.6.
To provide a general overview of the relative strength of the criticalness,
intergroup reciprocity, and reinforcement learning mechanisms on conditional
contribution probabilities, we report mean contribution rates in Table 5.4.1.3 in the
same structure as our main hypotheses were summarized in Table 4.3.2.2. For
example, the first cell in the first row (expected peace and previous contribution
column, C) indicates that subjects contributed 52 times (16.72%) in those decision
situations (N=311), in which they expected peace in the forthcoming round, they
contributed in the previous round, and the previous outcome was peace.
Table 5.4.1.3. Contribution rates (%) in the 
 experiment by subjects’ expectations
about the next round, previous decisions, and previous outcomes2
subject’s expectation

























































































































































+: Numbers of cases are in parentheses. In each cell, signs indicate predictions derived from
criticalness, intergroup reciprocity, and reinforcement learning, in this order. For single-shot games and
for the first repeated game the outcome of the last round in the previous part is considered as a previous
outcome.
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A first conclusion we can draw from Table 5.4.1.3 is that none of the behavioral
rules would predict these figures 	
. The integration of different mechanisms in the
explanation was certainly necessary to get a better understanding of subject behavior
in the repeated IPG games. Based on these descriptive statistics,   	 

     	
 
. Contribution rates are immensely
higher, if victory or clash is anticipated than if peace or defeat is expected,
irrespective of the previous outcome. There is a significant difference after a previous
contribution (,46.452, <0.001) and also after a previous defection (,56.049,
<0.001). High differences in contribution probabilities after a contributing and after
a defecting choice (,29.047, <0.001) show that contribution propensities are
relatively stable over time.
Statistics in Table 5.4.1.3 also provide support for the 
 
hypothesis. If we compare cells that have positive prediction signs for intergroup
reciprocity in Table 4.3.2.2 with cells that have negative prediction signs (see also
superscripts in Table 5.4.1.3), we find significantly higher contribution rates in cells
with positive prediction signs (,24.557, <0.001). This difference is significant after
a previous contribution (,7.682, <0.001) and also after a previous defection
(,18.336, <0.001), thus we have some indication that reciprocity works in both
directions. However, three columns of Table 5.4.1.3 show that there are some
conditions, in which conditional contribution rates do not support the intergroup
reciprocity hypothesis. First, when the subject anticipated peace and contributed in the
previous round (C column in Table 5.4.1.3), we predicted higher contribution rates
after a defeat than after peace. However, we did not find this in the data. The second
irregularity occurs, if the subject defected in the previous round and he or she
anticipates victory for the subsequent round (D column in Table 5.4.1.3). In this
case, we predicted that contribution rates are higher after a clash than after peace.
Probably subjects feel their contribution more substantial in the latter case, which
outweighs the reciprocal intentions and might explain why our prediction failed.
Finally, after a defection and an anticipated clash, we predicted a subject to contribute
more likely, if the previous outcome was also clash than if it was peace (see D
column in Table 5.4.1.3). Mean contribution rates reveal just the opposite.




 hypothesis from the
descriptive statistics. If we compare cells that have positive prediction signs for
reinforcement learning in Table 4.3.2.2 with cells that have negative prediction signs
(see also superscripts in Table 5.4.1.3), we find significantly higher contribution rates
in cells with positive signs (,20.247, <0.001). This difference is significant after a
previous contribution (,5.305, <0.001) and also after a previous defection (,6.824,
<0.001). From this we could conclude that reinforcement works in both directions.
However, what we have here is a classic case of 		
		. After a previous
contribution choice, we predicted that reinforcement learning elicits contribution after
victory and impedes contribution after a harmful clash. Considering overall statistics
for these cases, we find that indeed, contribution rates were higher after victory
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(71.6% versus 69.3%), although this difference was not significant (,1.628, one-
tailed =0.052). Meanwhile, in all of the subcategories the relationship was in the
other way around (see columns C, C, C, and C in Table 5.4.1.3)! After a clash,
contribution rates were always higher than after victory. The misleading aggregated
relationship was caused simply by the huge number of cases in the












. It seems that reinforcement learning does not work in a symmetric
way.
In this section, we summarized mean contribution rates conditional on expectations
of subjects about the next round, on previous decisions, and on previous outcomes of
the IPG game. This way, we provided some insight in the underlying micro
mechanisms that influence individual behavior in the experiment. Mean contribution
rates provided support for our criticalness hypothesis, but with a necessary adjustment
for forward-looking bandwagon tendencies. We found some support for the
intergroup reciprocity hypothesis, but we found evidence of reinforcement only after
defection choices.
!1$9	
This section focuses on the 	 hypothesis that predicts that &
		

. Hence, this hypothesis relates to a
micro mechanism that depends on the local structure as well as on the shadow of the
past. For this hypothesis, we have to consider contribution rates conditional on the
previous decisions of neighbors. Since we are interested in the conditional choices and
not in the previous neighbor decisions  , choices that are implemented by the
computer instead of the neighbor are also included in the analysis. If a subject did not
make a decision in time, his or her choice was randomly determined. Neighbors did
not know, in which cases decisions were real and in which cases they were
implemented by the computer, therefore we can handle them equivalently.
We predicted that a previous contribution of a neighbor elicits contribution and a
previous defection induces defection, irrespective of the group membership of the
neighbor. Table 5.4.2.1 summarizes contribution rates depending on the number of
contributing and defecting neighbors in the previous round.3 The first cell in the first
row is a special case. It indicates the mean contribution rate of three subjects, who had
no neighbors because of some technical difficulties during the experiment (cf. Section
3.5.3). These subjects contributed 46 times (38.33%) out of 120 decision situations.
                                                          
3
 Since no information was provided about the behavior of neighbors before round 7 in Part II, local
reciprocity might have played a role only in decisions afterwards. We included only the latter cases in










	 	. On the other hand, there was no convincing
support that the presence of an additional defecting neighbor decreased contribution
rates.
Table 5.4.2.1 Contribution rates (%) by number of 	 
, who contributed





: % $ 	
: 38.33 (120) 37.03 (721) 37.72 (1853) 37.56 (2694)
% 60.65 (958) 56.27 (3160) - 57.29 (4118)
Number of
contributing
neighbors in % $ 72.68 (2734) - - 72.68 (2734)
Total 68.57 (3812) 52.69 (3881) 37.72 (1853) 56.13 (9546)
+: Numbers of cases are in parentheses. All cases, in which the previous decision of the neighbors
was known, are included.
Table 5.4.2.2 Contribution rates (%) by number of  
, who





: % $ 	
: 35.05 (3347) 55.52 (1403) 42.73 (344) 41.21 (5094)
% 71.65 (2744) 64.91 (778) - 70.16 (3522)
Number of
contributing
fellow nbs in % $ 84.73 (930) - - 84.73 (930)
Total 55.93 (7021) 58.87 (2181) 42.73 (344) 56.13 (9546)
+: Numbers of cases are in parentheses. All cases, in which the previous decision of the neighbors
was known, are included.
Table 5.4.2.3 Contribution rates (%) by number of 
,





: % $ 	
: 66.98 (2895) 56.30 (1746) 28.98 (1049) 56.70 (5690)
% 64.69 (2634) 31.35 (874) - 56.39 (3508)
N of contributing
neighbs from the
other group in % $ 44.25 (348) - - 44.25 (348)
Total 64.61 (5877) 47.98 (2620) 28.98 (1049) 56.13 (9546)
+: Numbers of cases are in parentheses. All cases, in which the previous decision of the neighbors
was known, are included.




, Tables 5.4.2.2 and 5.4.2.3 show the same statistics separately for
these two groups. As predicted, contributing fellow neighbors elicited contribution and
defecting fellows decreased contribution in the subsequent round. However,
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contribution rates were lowest in the case of no fellow neighbors (35.05%), due to
stable peace in the low clustering condition and shows that structural effects were
stronger than local reciprocity. With regard to reciprocal effects towards neighbors from
the other group, descriptive statistics show that contribution decisions were not
reciprocated, but defection choices decreased contribution rates. For a more accurate
test of local reciprocity, we will have to rely on the multivariate analysis of the data that
follows in the subsequent sections.
In this section, we summarized mean contribution rates conditional on the previous
decision of neighbors. In this way, we provided statistical evidence about the nature of
local reciprocal mechanisms. We found that local reciprocity works only under certain
conditions. Subjects on average reciprocated contribution decisions of fellow neighbors





After the discussion of results related to the local reciprocity hypothesis, let us return
to the reinforcement learning hypothesis. Predictions derived from the principles of














(cf. Section 4.3.2). This might partly explain
why we did not find convincing support for the reinforcement learning hypothesis from
overall descriptive statistics (cf. Table 5.4.1.3). Below we will have a look at these
statistics under different experimental conditions separately. In this way, we can also
see whether the effect of criticalness and intergroup reciprocity changed in experimental
parts.
Table 5.4.3.1 displays contribution rates in Part I of the repeated IPG game
conditional on expectations of the subject, on previous outcome, and on previous
decision. In the first part of the experiment there were no additional monetary rewards
and the effects of internalized social control can also be excluded. Hence, these data can
be used to test predictions of reinforcement learning as they were expressed in the
corresponding cells of Table 4.3.2.2.





the subject  in the previous round. In this case, as predicted, a defeat elicited a
relatively higher willingness to contribute (51.42%) and peace and victory reinforced
previous defection (30.00% and 41.24% respectively). However, the data strongly
contradict predictions derived from reinforcement learning after a 

 choice.
As in the overall figures (cf. Table 5.4.1.3), contribution rates are higher after a clash
than after victory (see columns C, C, and C), which has nothing to do with any kind
of reinforcement principle. We cannot simply blame the introduction of new monetary






This conditional support for the reinforcement mechanism is fairly similar to Flache’s
findings (1996: 188-189). In his experiments, subjects who shirked at some point
discovered the advantages of this backward-looking rule, unlike contributors, who
tended to take it easy after their compliance decision.
Table 5.4.3.1. Contribution rates (%) in the 


 by subjects’ expectations
about the next round, previous decisions, and previous outcomes.
subject’s expectation
peace () defeat () victory () clash () totalprev.

















































































































+:Numbers of cases are in parentheses. Only repeated games are included.




expectations about the next round, previous decisions, and previous outcomes.
subject’s expectation
peace () defeat () victory () clash () totalprev.

















































































































+:Numbers of cases are in parentheses. Data is from Parts II, III, and IV. For single-shot games
and for the first repeated game the outcome of the last round in the previous part is considered as a
previous outcome.
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With regard to the other behavioral mechanisms, we find overwhelming support for
	
 and slight support for 
  in Part I. For intergroup
reciprocity there are also some contradicting cases. This might partly be a consequence
of relatively unstable contribution propensities (contribution rates are sometimes higher
after a defecting choice than after a previous contribution) and partly of low
identification with the group.
In order to see the effect of minimal contact on conditional responses, consider the

 condition. In this condition, there were no changes between Part II and
Parts III and IV. Hence, we can examine the effect of minimal contact on conditional
response strategies in a longer perspective. As Table 5.4.3.2 shows, intergroup
reciprocity was not strengthened over time in this condition. There is no support for
the hypothesis that subjects reciprocated the previous collective action of the other
group (cf. relatively low contribution rates in rows  and  of Table 5.4.3.2). On the
other hand, expectations still have a huge impact on actual decisions (see totals in
columns in Table 5.4.3.2). High contribution rates after an anticipated clash and
victory show support for the combined relevance of criticalness and forward-looking
bandwagon effects.
As in Part I, 		    
 



















be satisfied with the confirmation of our hypothesis, but a difference between Part I
and the low clustering condition is puzzling. Do subjects “learn to learn” only at later
stages of the repeated games?
In this respect, it is especially interesting to look what happens in the medium and
high clustering conditions in Parts II, III, and IV. In order to have a sufficient number
of cases in the cells, we handle the medium and high clustering conditions together.
Table 5.4.3.3 displays average conditional responses in Part II, when minimal contact
was introduced without new monetary incentives. Table 5.4.3.4 shows conditional
contribution rates in Parts III and IV after the introduction of monetary selective
incentives and behavioral confirmation rewards. In clustered structures in these
experimental parts, the predictions of reinforcement learning change (see Sections
4.3.2 and 4.3.4): they become conditional on the previous decision of neighbors. In
general, because of additional monetary incentives, they shift towards the stabilization
of the previous choice.
As average contribution rates show, 
	; (see differences
between C and D columns in Table 5.4.3.4). In the last parts, both contribution and
defection choices are repeated more often than in Part II and much more often than in
Part I. Similar to the low clustering condition, stabilization goes together with a
process of “learning to learn,” at least after a previous defection. While in Part II there
is only slight support for reinforcement after defection, in later parts this support is






contribution, even if we consider adjustments in the predictions because of new
incentives.






 by subjects’ expectations about the next round, previous decisions, and
previous outcomes.
subject’s expectation
peace () defeat () victory () clash () totalprev.

















































































































+:Numbers of cases are in parentheses. For single-shot games and for the first repeated game the
outcome of the last round in Part I is considered as a previous outcome.







 by subjects’ expectations about the next round, previous
decisions, and previous outcomes.
subject’s expectation
peace () defeat () victory () clash () totalprev.

















































































































+:Numbers of cases are in parentheses. For single-shot games and for the first repeated game the
outcome of the last round in the previous part is considered as a previous outcome.
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With regard to the other behavioral mechanisms, the presence of 	
 is




 , criticalness can explain high
contribution rates in case victory or clash is anticipated and can explain low




 , as contribution rates after a previous victory
and defection are relatively low (42.15%). This is significantly lower than the average
rate after defection (52.16%; ,1626.6, <0.001). Furthermore, there is only limited
support for the 
.







, we created two
dummy variables. For one of them, we assigned a value of one in case the adjusted
reinforcement learning predictions are in the positive direction. The other variable got
a value of one, if the adjusted predictions are in the negative direction. For cases, in
which we do not have clear predictions, because payoffs for the subject are at the
aspiration level of zero, both variables have zero values. These two variables will be
included in the multilevel analysis in the subsequent sections as predictors of
reinforcement learning. Since in Part II internalized social control effects are difficult
to numeralize, for this part we did not make adjustments in the predictions compared
to those reported in Table 4.3.2.2.
Mean contribution rates in the cases of positive predictions of reinforcement
learning are higher (69.39%; N=3662) than for negative predictions (47.06%;
N=6880). The difference is highly significant (,22.997, <0.001). As predicted,
contribution rates in cases with unclear predictions lay in between (52.13%; N=2494).
In this section, in relation to our main micro hypotheses, we presented statistics
about mean contribution rates. First of all, we gained confirmation that we need to
incorporate different behavioral mechanisms in a unified model in order to have a
satisfactory explanation for individual decisions in the repeated IPG games. Some of
the decision rules have obviously higher impact on individual choices than others. We
have seen that forward-looking 	
 is a major factor, irrespective of previous






. However, it seems that reinforcement does not work
in a symmetric way: we did not find confirmation for this hypothesis after a previous
contribution. We have only experienced such a tendency in later parts of the low
clustering condition. Similar to reinforcement after a defection choice in clustered







. Besides, we have only slight support for the intergroup reciprocity
and partial support for the local reciprocity hypotheses. For the surprisingly high
contribution rates after an anticipation of victory, we formulated an * 
explanation that is based on a forward-looking 	
	
 mechanism. It seems that
people like to make contributions to the team success more than enjoying victory as






looking bandwagon considerations do not influence subjects in the experiment. For a
closer test of the main micro hypotheses, we will consider subjective perceptions of
the behavioral mechanisms in the following section, based on results from a post-
experiment questionnaire. We will turn to multilevel analysis of decision data in
Section 5.6.
	*	3&%!
In this section, we report results of the post-experiment questionnaire that subjects
had to fill in on their computer. Subjects received their payments after they completed
the questionnaire. Because of some technical difficulties, we have data from 201
subjects (out of 203).















(I wanted …) N % mean median 1 2 3
to get as much money as possible 76 37.8 1.99 2 -0.14 -0.04 -0.79
to avoid loosing 47 23.4 1.84 2 0.06 0.78 -0.24
to do the best for my team 47 23.4 2.21 2 0.08 0.71 0.35
to look trustworthy for others 14 7.0 2.91 3 0.47 0.50 0.17
to do the same as my neighbor did 9 4.5 3.05 3 0.91 0.07 -0.06
to help my neighbor(s) 5 2.5 3.32 3 0.89 0.11 0.14
to do harm for the other team 0 0 4.48 5 -0.02 0.03 0.68

		
		 1 0.5 - - - - -
		
=	 1 0.5 - - - - -
	
	 1 0.5 - - - - -
+# Categories with italics are self-reported to the open “other” category. 1=very important, 5=not
important at all. Factor loadings are obtained from an explorative factor (principal component) analysis.
Rotated varimax solution with Kaiser normalization. N=201.
Some of the questions concerned the motivations of subjects for their decisions in
the experiment. Self-reported evaluation of different intentions can be biased, but it
gives an indication of which factors were consciously taken into account at the
decisions. Table 5.5.1 displays frequencies of answers for a question that asked about
the main intention during the experiment. Seven categories were created in advance,
three subjects reported a different main motivation to an open “other” category. These
answers are also included in Table 5.5.1. Additionally, subjects were asked to mark the
importance of the seven created categories separately on a five-point scale (from 1=very
important to 5=not important at all). Means and medians for these questions are also
shown in Table 5.5.1.
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Most subjects felt monetary incentives the most important in the experiment. On
average, loss aversion was ranked as of the highest importance (mean rank 1.84). These
two motivations together with intentions to help the team were mentioned as the three
most important driving forces in the experiment. Surprisingly, neighborhood effects
were ranked quite low by the subjects, although the lowest evaluation was received by
the competitive category of doing harm for the other team (mean rank 4.48). A null
hypothesis that the mentioned motivations are evaluated in the same way can be
rejected (Kendall >=0.45; χ2(6)=542.47, <0.001). With regard to the importance of
neighborhood effects, they are evaluated significantly lower than the three leading
motivations. The hypothesis that the best ranked imitation of neighbors is at least
equally important as doing the best for the team can be rejected (Wilcoxon signed rank
test ?=6.646, <0.001).
It seems that the intentions of subjects cannot be put on a unidimensional scale.
Such a scale has a reliability of α=0.56. This relatively low reliability is mainly
caused by subjective perceptions of monetary rewards that have negative correlations
with the ranks of other intentions. By leaving the item “I wanted to get as much
money as possible” out of the scale, reliability would jump up to α=0.65. The number
of subjects is not sufficient to conduct a powerful multidimensional scaling or factor
analysis. However, for illustrative reasons, we report factor loadings in Table 5.5.1
that are results of an explorative factor analysis. Three underlying factors have been
found in the analysis. The first factor explains 33.01% of the variance and can be
interpreted as 	 		
 with positive loadings for neighborhood specific
concerns. It is more difficult to find a meaningful interpretation for the second factor
that increases explained variance by 17.23%. Possibly it is related to 

	
 in a broader sense. This includes risk aversion and group specific concerns
(importance of helping the team, trustworthiness) with positive loadings. Adding a
third factor increases explained variance by 15.03%. This factor can be
conceptualized as a 		
 scale with negative loadings for monetary concerns.
Despite the low number of subjects and items, it seems that subjective intentions can
be nicely fitted in a three-dimensional space, in which neighborhood concerns, group
concerns, and monetary concerns constitute the different dimensions.
Subjects were also asked to evaluate procedural changes during the experiment. The
evaluation of minimal contact and new monetary incentives was relevant for the
discussion of single-shot games and therefore we analyzed these questions (see Section
3.6.2). In comparison to other procedural changes, the introduction of minimal contact
and new monetary incentives were evaluated as less important than information about
the outcome of the previous round (mean=1.791, median=2) or information about the
decisions of the neighbors (mean=1.920, median=2). The difference is highly
significant (comparing the latter with minimal contact, the Wilcoxon signed rank test






particular relevance for imitating or helping their neighbors, they highly appreciated
information about their decisions.
Another group of questions was related to conscious application of certain simple
strategies that are conditional on the past. These were simple yes or no questions related
to whether subjects considered the given strategy during the experiment. Reinforcement
learning was consciously taken into account by many subjects, but mainly only for
repeating successful choices and less frequently for shifting from unsuccessful choices
(see Table 5.5.2). Intergroup reciprocity was reported to be important after a defeat and
clash. Many subjects were willing to retaliate nasty actions of the other team, but quite
few of them appreciated nice actions of the other side. Local reciprocal strategies were
considered by half of the subjects, but substantially more of them felt pressure from the
direction of their fellow neighbors.4 On the other hand, almost nobody reported pressure
from the direction of a neighbor of the opposite team. Besides, many subjects claimed
to consider a backward-looking bandwagon effect.







win new incentives-stay 70.7changes in reinforcement






local reciprocity imitation (repetition) of neighbor decision 54.7
traitor pressure 6.5internalized social control
internalized selective incentives 72.1
bandwagon effect (backward) victory-contribute 66.0
victory-defect framed in long term benefits 23.9
victory-defect framed in free riding benefits 32.8other
random 18.4
+:Proportion of subjects who considered the given strategy, N=201.
Questionnaire data can provide insights whether subjects developed a certain

	
 with other participants during the experiment. To get some indication of
this, we asked subjects about how would they divide 100 guilders of their hypothetical
gain between them and certain other subjects. Answers show a strong identification
with fellow team members. Fellows who were not neighbors would get significantly
higher proportions of the money than would members of the other team (13.30 guilders
                                                          
4
 Subjects, who had no fellow neighbors were asked about a “hypothetical” fellow neighbor.
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versus 5.69 guilders; ,8.420; <0.001). On average, non-neighbor fellows were
rewarded even more than neighbors (12.25 NLG for left neighbors, 12.38 NLG for right
neighbors). However, it really made a difference to which team the neighbor belonged.
Strong bonds evolved towards fellow neighbors (16.49 guilders for left fellow
neighbors, 17.97 guilders for right fellow neighbors) and weak bonds towards
neighbors from the other team (9.01 NLG and 8.19 NLG respectively). The difference
is significant for both left (,3.761, <0.001) and right neighbors (,4.737, <0.001).
An attachment to a neighbor from the other team was still stronger than to other
members of the opposite team.
In this section, we summarized results from the post-experiment questionnaire. We
tried to show how subjects perceived and evaluated their decisions in the repeated IPG
game. Most subjects reported that their major intention was to receive as much money
as possible. They consciously took into account reinforcement of successful choices,
although data about actual behavior shows the contrary (see previous section).
Questionnaire data also supports that subjects consciously applied hawkish intergroup
retaliations and intended to join the effort of others after victory.
	*4%&%!"$&+%%
In this section we will test our main micro hypotheses by using multilevel logistic
regression analysis. The exact specification of the models can be found in the appendix
to Chapter 4. We tested two types of models. In the first type we fixed the size of
prediction parameters over subjects. In the second type we allowed a random variation
of the slopes of main explanatory variables. We assumed that these random variations
follow a normal distribution around their mean. The analyses have been done by using
the MLwiN 1.02 software (Rasbash et al., 1998).
We included all cases in the analysis, when a subject made a real decision and
excluded all decisions that are implemented by the computer. For handling missing
values for independent variables, we used imputation of the mean for variables on
interval scale and we imputed the median for categorical variables. Exceptions were
dummies concerning the outcome of the previous round: they were all given a zero
value (there was no peace, no defeat, no victory and no clash in the previous round). For
predictions about reinforcement learning two dummy variables were used. One of them
got a value of one in case of positive predictions and the other one for negative
predictions. For the first single-shot games and for cases with no clear predictions both
variables have zero values.
It should be noted that all likelihood statistics are rough approximations. Since the
number of random components in the model is limited, in the second type of models we






the slopes are estimated. For testing these random effects we used deviance tests instead
of -tests (cf. van Duijn, van Busschbach, and Snijders, 1999: 192-193).
Incorporating all independent and control variables in the analyses results in an
extensive model. In such extensive models, testing several null hypotheses and
conducting a huge amount of -tests simultaneously can only be done with reservations
(Cohen, 1990). The incremental validity of new variables is very low and the predicting
power of the model does not increase substantially, although improvement statistics
provide significant values. These limitations are only of secondary importance, because
driven by theoretical arguments, we  include these variables. We need controls to
determine what are the real explanatory factors behind individual decisions. This is the
only way to judge our main micro hypotheses correctly.5
!5%

In this section, we report results of a multilevel logistic regression analysis that
included all of our main independent variables. Table 5.6.1.1 includes estimates of two
models, one that includes only fixed effects of main variables and one that allows for a
random variation of slopes. Log likelihood statistics of the first model are compared to a
baseline model that includes only a constant with interindividual and intersession
variation.6 None of the models in Table 5.6.1.1 show variation of contribution
propensities between the sessions. It means that we did not find any indication of
session specific scenarios or session specific variation of contribution propensities. The
variation between sessions can be entirely attributed to effects of our main explanatory
variables. In this way, there are no substantial differences between results from a two-
level (decisions-subjects) and from a three-level (decisions-subjects-sessions) model.
Still, grounded on the original theoretical argument that explanatory variables are not
likely to cover all intersession variation, we will report results from the three-level
model.
As in the case of single-shot games, most hypotheses about social control effects are
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	;		. As a macro consequence of
social control effects, conflict is more likely in segregated structures.
                                                          
5
 Strictly speaking, in our analyses we do not test hypotheses as “the given variable has a positive effect
on contribution propensities”. Instead, as conventional, we test null hypotheses as “the given variable
has no effect on contribution propensities”.
6
 The baseline model provides a parameter estimate of 0.177 (0.124) for the α baseline contribution
rate, 0.432+++ (0.051) for interindividual variance and 0.270+++ (0.099) for intersession variance.  The
-2 Log Likelihood of the baseline model is 18560.7.
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Table 5.6.1.1. Results of multilevel logistic regression on contribution propensities







α0 baseline contribution propensity ? .745*** (.082) .749*** (.083)
STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS
0 internalized selective incentives + .194*** (.046) .188*** (.057)
 direct selective incentives + .573*** (.063) .531*** (.082)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .245*** (.039) .215*** (.048)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .611*** (.061) .632*** (.083)




 anticipated peace - -2.722*** (.097) -2.594*** (.144)
 anticipated defeat - -2.038*** (.090) -2.036*** (.111)
 anticipated clash + -.716*** (.079) -.742*** (.089)
 anticipated victory (not victory in % ) + .268** (.091) .270** (.099)


 peace in % - -.151 (.092) -.115 (.095)
 defeat in % + .156 (.088) .149 (.092)






predicted increase of contribution propensity + -.110 (.068) -.135 (.073)
predicted decrease of contribution propensity - -.212*** (.059) -.181** (.062)
9	
 towards opposite neighbors + .003 (.030) -.013 (.030)
 towards fellow neighbors + .119** (.045) .114* (.047)
 towards fellow neighbors, if  is introduced + .043 (.064) .018 (.068)
)C+BD<A//A "
interindividual variance .625+++ (.071) .601+++ (.080)
intersession variance .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
variance of 0 internalized selective incentives .075+++ (.036)
variance of  direct selective incentives .117++ (.067)
variance of 0 internalized behavioral confirmation .070+++ (.029)
variance of  direct behavioral confirmation .335+++ (.091)
variance of 0 internalized traitor rewards .000 (.000)
variance of  anticipated peace 1.829+++ (.301)
variance of anticipated defeat .588+++ (.146)
variance of anticipated clash .214++ (.086)
variance of anticipated victory (not  in % ) .191+++ (.071)
variance of peace in % .000 (.000)
variance of defeat in % .001++ (.055)
variance of clash in % .002+ (.077)
variance of positive reinforcement .078 (.061)
variance of negative reinforcement .043 (.045)
variance of local reciprocity  towards opposite neighbors .000 (.000)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .007+ (.019)









-2 Log Likelihood model 10523 10363
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 160*** (17)
vs. previous model 8037.7*** (17)
+:N=14244 decisions for 203 subjects in 21 experimental sessions. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant
at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: + significant at the 5% level,
++significant at the 1% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance
compared to model without random slopes)
With regard to hypotheses about temporal embeddedness, analysis shows that effects
of all variables that are related to expectations of subjects about the forthcoming round
are highly significant. As we predicted, contribution rates decrease when peace or
defeat is anticipated. Contribution rates significantly increase when victory is expected,
but not experienced. 	
. However, an anticipation
of a clash decreases contribution rates (estimates are -0.716 and -0.742 in the two
models), which is contrary to our predictions. This finding is related to high
contribution rates after the anticipation of victory (77.6%). The reference category for
the criticalness dummy variables is the case in which victory is experienced and
anticipated. In this case, contribution rates are unexpectedly high; estimates for other
variables therefore are all biased in the negative direction. These high rates after the
anticipation of victory cannot be entirely explained by the principle of criticalness (cf.
Section 5.4.1). Therefore we offered a supplementary hypothesis. We claimed that
subjects like to take a constructive part from the victory of their side and therefore they
join the bandwagon and leave behind free rider benefits. Criticalness combined with
this forward-looking bandwagon effect explains huge negative effects of anticipated












 However, a direct test of forward-looking bandwagon effects is not
available, because if we include anticipated victory as a dummy among the predictors,
we would run into a perfect multicollinearity of independent factors.
There is 
. A previous result of
peace and defeat drives in the predicted direction, but controlling for other main factors,
these effects are not significant. Moreover, the sign of the parameter estimate of the
effect of previous clash is in the opposite direction than predicted (-0.019 and -0.041).
These results are also related to the perceptions of subjects about victory. When the
team won in the previous round, subjects contributed more than what we could derive
from the intergroup reciprocity principle. Since this was the reference category, the
effects of dummy variables concerning other outcomes than victory in the previous
round all shifted in the negative direction. We do not get significantly positive




 . It is more surprising that the effect of
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previous peace is not significant, which contradicts the intergroup reciprocity
hypothesis even if we control for possible backward-looking bandwagon tendencies.

















. As we have seen by
looking at conditional contribution rates, reinforcement learning works asymmetrically
in the experiment. We found that the reinforcement principle was more likely to be
activated 	 a previous defection (see Section 5.4.1). The analysis in Table 5.6.1.1
shows that reinforcement works if it drives 	 defection. The repetition of a
beneficial defection choice is much more likely than the repetition of a successful
contribution decision. Estimates for the dummy that indicates when contributions are
predicted based on reinforcement, have surprisingly negative signs (-0.110 and -0.135).
This indicates that contribution rates in the reference category are 	 higher
than in cases, when contribution could be expected based on the reinforcement
principle. This result does not give support for the reinforcement learning hypothesis,





















. Honoring local reciprocal behavior by
new monetary incentives in Parts III and IV did not have an additional effect.
Since most independent variables are dummies, comparison of effect size is not
meaningless. Expectations of subjects make the largest impact on actual decisions in the
manner that is likely to be a 







. Monetary social control has also a very strong influence on
individual contribution choices. The relative strength of these and other effects can
provide a basis for an * estimation of the importance of different principles. In a
follow-up study, these results can be used to determine assumptions about weights of
these behavioral mechanisms in individual decision making that can consequently lead
to more accurate predictions of intergroup processes.
The second model in Table 5.6.1.1 allows for a random variation of the slopes of the
main variables. Meanwhile the number of parameters to be estimated is almost the
double in comparison to the first model, there are no big changes in the parameter
values or in their significance. It is also not much of a surprise that we found significant
random variations for the slope of those variables that have highly significant fixed
effects. There is a disparity between subjects in the extent to which they rely on
criticalness and bandwagon principles and in the magnitude they are influenced by
different forms of social control. On the other hand, we cannot claim that any of the
insignificant effects were caused by the diversity of the strength and direction of these
variables on different subjects.
To summarize, our multilevel analyses that contained the main explanatory variables






embeddedness. Social control of fellow neighbors both in an internalized and in a
monetary form had a significant effect on individual decisions. On the other hand, our
micro hypotheses about the effects of temporal embeddedness received only partial
support. The criticalness hypothesis had to be adjusted for a bandwagon tendency, there
was no indication of intergroup reciprocity, and reinforcement seemed to work only, if
it drives towards defection. In addition, the local reciprocity hypothesis also received





In this section, we first extend the multilevel analysis of Section 5.6.1 by including
certain subject-level characteristics. Individual decisions in the repeated IPG game
cannot be assumed as independent from certain attributes of the subjects. Second, there
are effects of temporal embeddedness that are not embraced by our main independent
variables. These effects might have a significant impact on contribution propensities.
Moreover, in case of close associations, their omission might cause bias in the
parameter estimates of the main independent variables. For this reason, we include
these control variables in the subsequent models.
Table 5.6.2.1 summarizes the effects of control variables and displays the results of
the multilevel analyses. As results show, the inclusion of personal characteristics in the
model did not cause any substantial change in the parameters of our main independent
variables. Significant effects remained significant and insignificant effects remained




	 		 for individual decisions is
persuasively demonstrated by the analysis. None of the subject-level variables has a
significant effect on contribution propensities. This includes the insignificant 

effect. The differences in mean contribution rates (55.23% versus 52.19%) in favor of
women can be explained by effects of structural and temporal embeddedness. Similarly,
the difference in contribution rates of subjects who already graduated (59.57%) and
students (53.46%) was ruled out by our main independent variables.
As in the single-shot games,  
 did not have a significant effect.
Students from the Faculty of Economics (that does not include business and spatial
sciences) had even the highest contribution rate (58.63%) in comparison with students
from all other faculties. This also means that students of economics behaved
differently in the single-shot and in the repeated games. This is probably an indication
that they recognized the difference between the two, and that they were thinking more
likely in equilibrium terms than others in the experiment. Still, controlling for other
effects, training in economics had no significant effect. On the other extreme, students
of spatial sciences and law had the lowest contribution rates (42.88% and 46.07%,
respectively). These are also insignificant predictors in the multilevel regression
model. Another sign that questions the importance of previous *
 is that
participating in a similar experiment before did not have a significant influence on
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contribution propensities. The difference in mean contribution rates (52.43% if a
subject did take part in a similar experiment before and 55.02%, if he did not) can be
attributed to other effects.
) 
 also turned to be insignificant predictors. The only personal
characteristics we measured and found significant in explaining individual decisions
in the single-shot games were 	
	
. However, they had no significant
effects on decisions in the repeated IPG games. The reason for this striking difference
between single-shot and repeated games could lie in the relationship between
temporal embeddedness and social orientations. In case expectations of prosocials and
proselfs differ, the net effect of social orientations can disappear. To test this *
hypothesis, we will return to the analysis of the relationship between social
orientations and expectations in Section 5.7. Another possible reason is that prosocial
(and egalitarian) orientation is no longer directed so closely towards in-group
members. Feedback information may allow prosocials to feel sympathy also towards
out-group members.
Table 5.6.2.1. Results of multilevel logistic regression on contribution propensities with
personal characteristics







α0 baseline contribution propensity ? .886* (.361) .737* (.375)
STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS
0 internalized selective incentives + .186*** (.046) .184** (.056)
 direct selective incentives + .596*** (.064) .544*** (.084)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .252*** (.039) .222*** (.048)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .612*** (.061) .628*** (.086)




 anticipated peace - -2.744*** (.098) -2.612*** (.143)
 anticipated defeat - -2.059*** (.091) -2.058*** (.112)
 anticipated clash + -.721*** (.080) -.749*** (.091)
 anticipated victory (not  in % ) + .271** (.092) .276** (.100)


 peace in % - -.159 (.093) -.122 (.096)
 defeat in % + .156 (.089) .150 (.092)






predicted increase of contribution propensity + -.114 (.068) -.142 (.074)
predicted decrease of contribution propensity - -.215*** (.059) -.186** (.062)
9	
 towards opposite neighbors + .001 (.030) -.016 (.030)
 towards fellow neighbors + .122** (.046) .119* (.048)










gender (1=male) -.028 (.129) .018 (.135)
student at the university (1=yes) .086 (.335) .233 (.349)
studies at the law faculty -.336 (.333) -.472 (.351)
studies natural sciences -.025 (.313) -.230 (.328)
studies economic, business, or spatial sciences -.255 (.305) -.428 (.319)
studies social sciences -.122 (.282) -.215 (.295)
student of literary studies or arts -.127 (.290) -.354 (.302)
did a similar experiment before -.124 (.124) -.134 (.129)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.080 (.122) -.046 (.127)
strong loss aversion -.022 (.120) -.054 (.126)
consistency on social orientation questions .005 (.163) .012 (.170)
prosocial orientation .297 (.165) .320 (.172)
egalitarian orientation .261 (.159) .268 (.166)
number of acquainted subjects in the experiment -.022 (.080) -.011 (.083)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.002 (.003) .000 (.004)
)C+BD<A//A "
interindividual variance .582+++ (.071) .534+++ (.074)
intersession variance .001 (.023) .000 (.000)
variance of 0 internalized selective incentives .071+++ (.035)
variance of  direct selective incentives .124 (.069)
variance of 0 internalized behavioral confirmation .075+++ (.031)
variance of  direct behavioral confirmation .367+++ (.096)
variance of 0 internalized traitor rewards .000 (.000)
variance of  anticipated peace 1.742 (.293)
variance of anticipated defeat .600+++ (.148)
variance of anticipated clash .252+++ (.091)
variance of anticipated victory (not  in % ) .193+++ (.071)
variance of peace in % .000 (.000)
variance of defeat in % .000 (.000)
variance of clash in % .000 (.000)
variance of positive reinforcement .101++ (.063)
variance of negative reinforcement .027 (.044)
variance of local reciprocity  towards opposite neighbors .000 (.000)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .009++ (.019)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .000 (.000)
-2 Log Likelihood model 10372 10269.2
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 102.8*** (17)
vs. previous model 151*** (15) 93.8*** (15)
+:N=14244 decisions for 203 subjects in 21 experimental sessions. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant
at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: + significant at the 5% level,
++significant at the 1% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance
compared to model without random slopes).
Besides subject-level variables, we have to control for certain 	 
and for influences of 	 
 other than our main independent
variables. Before extending the multilevel model with these predictors, let us briefly
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report about a procedural variable that will not be included in the multilevel analysis.
This is the  	 of the team (red or green). Even though some scientists
working on visual perceptions would disagree, we presumed that the color of the flag
on the computer has nothing to do with actual choice. After color labels were
introduced in Part II, members of the red team contributed in 55.47% of all decisions
and members of the green team contributed in 56.40% of all cases. The null
hypothesis that contribution rates are independent from color labels cannot be rejected
(=0.966, two-tailed =0.334). The difference was higher in the control condition
(46.55% versus 49.00%), which indicates that subjects, who were assigned into the
green team had higher baseline contribution rates by pure chance, although the
difference is not significant (=1.452, two-tailed =0.146). Color labels did not make a
significant difference for individual decisions indeed.
Table 5.6.2.2 reports the results from two multilevel analyses. Procedural effects
together with other control variables that are related to temporal effects are incorporated
in these models. Although the inclusion of these variables resulted in significant
improvement statistics, there was no substantial enrichment in the explanatory power of
the model. Still, unlike subject characteristics, some temporal effects had a significant
influence on contribution propensities.
The introduction of these variables resulted in two major changes with regard to
testing our main independent variables. /, defeat in the previous round increases
contributions significantly. It means that subjects retaliate the severe loss caused by the
other group. On the other hand, other elements of intergroup reciprocity are not
significant. For instance, a previous clash  	 does not generate more
contributions at all (estimates are -0.018 and -0.032). Since the retaliation of defeat was
also insignificant in the previous models, we have to consider why it has become
significant in this extended analysis. The possible main reason is controlling for
different trends in the experiment. Subjects become more familiar with the payoff
structure during the experiment, which results in a natural tendency towards defection
in case keeping the bonus is beneficial. On the other hand, it also might take time until
players realize that newly introduced incentives make contribution more attractive.
These linear tendencies might demolish some effects of intergroup reciprocity in case
we do not control for them in the analysis. For instance, contribution rates of subjects in
the defeated team does not increase nor decrease significantly, because retaliating
intentions are in conflict with motivations to defect as a result of equilibrium concerns
that are learned during the game. If we leave one of these variables out of the analysis,
the parameter estimate for the other one will be biased.
"
, internalized traitor rewards have a significant effect in the model that
assumes variation in the slopes of main independent variables. However, this effect is in
the opposite direction from that predicted (0.104 and 0.135). Estimates for internalized
traitor rewards behaved strangely also in the single-shot game. The pattern is similar






estimate is in the right direction or close to zero. However, when we control for time
effects, the estimate becomes positive, meaning that the presence of a neighbor from the
opposite group 
	 contribution propensities. A possible explanation for this can
be based on the silent identification effect (Bohnet and Frey, 1999). Visual contact
between the subjects decreases social distance between them and leads to empathy and
to some sort of silent identification. As a consequence of silent identification, after the
inclusion of a between part trend variable, our analysis overestimates the effect of
internalized selective incentives, but also shifts the estimate of internalized traitor
rewards in the positive direction (see more in Section 3.6.5). Another indication for the
presence of silent identification with neighbors of the opposite group is provided by
questionnaire data. Subjects in the hypothetical dictator games were more generous
towards members of the opposite group, who were neighbors, than towards other out-
group members (see Section 5.5).
Results show that  






 on individual contribution rates. Insignificant effects include
session-level variables as delay time at the start of the experiment and length of play.
Length of play has no net effect also because of the inclusion of trend variables in the
analysis. We found a clear downward trend in the first two experimental parts. In these
parts, the IPG game was played in the original payoff structure, without additional
monetary incentives. In this setting, it seems that subjects learned over time that
keeping the bonus is more beneficial than contributing. We found another significant
trend in the random slope model for the medium clustering condition in Part III when
monetary rewards were introduced for behavioral confirmation. This is somewhat
surprising, because other trend variables (for instance, the trend within the high
clustering conditions in Part III) were not significant.
Besides, the analyses show that all peaks we experienced in contribution rates over
time (see Figures 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2) are the results of other temporal effects. These






. Hence, we do not need to
rely on additional arguments about hypothetical endgame effects and the speculations
we raised in Section 5.3.2 are not justified. On the other hand, it is somewhat puzzling
that the significant endgame effect of the single-shot games has disappeared. This might
be another indication that the repeated games caused significant distortion in behavior
in the single-shot games, but it is difficult to determine the mechanisms of how. There
is also no indication of the fact that subjects increase their contribution rates in the
repeated games in order to gain reputation from others or to establish a good image.
Unlike in the single-shot games, we did not find a significant decay of contribution
between different parts of the game. It seems that if independent learning occurred at
all, it occurred as a continuous process without structural breaks. Therefore the
differences in contribution rates between experimental parts (see Section 5.3.3) did not
result from an independent between parts trend. It is reasonable to believe that the
182  	!
significant between parts trend in the single-shot games is also a consequence of within
part trends through the repeated games.
Table 5.6.2.2. Results of multilevel logistic regression on contribution propensities with
personal characteristics and control variables of temporal embeddedness







α0 baseline contribution propensity ? 1.138** (.410) 1.030* (.429)
STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS
0 internalized selective incentives + .217*** (.053) .217*** (.063)
 direct selective incentives + .589*** (.085) .544*** (.105)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .255*** (.039) .223*** (.048)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .602*** (.063) .624*** (.089)




 anticipated peace - -2.720*** (.098) -2.592*** (.144)
 anticipated defeat - -2.074*** (.092) -2.068*** (.112)
 anticipated clash + -.751*** (.080) -.770*** (.091)
 anticipated victory (not  in % ) + .251** (.092) .267** (.101)


 peace in % - -.058 (.096) -.050 (.099)
 defeat in % + .213* (.093) .194* (.096)






predicted increase of contribution propensity + -.050 (.072) -.086 (.077)
predicted decrease of contribution propensity - -.167** (.061) -.142* (.063)
9	
 towards opposite neighbors + -.016 (.030) -.027 (.031)
 towards fellow neighbors + .139** (.046) .128** (.048)
 towards fellow neighbors, if  is introduced + -.004 (.048) -.021 (.071)
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
gender (1=male) -.018 (.130) .024 (.136)
student at the university (1=yes) .113 (.340) .233 (.352)
studies at the law faculty -.352 (.337) -.460 (.352)
studies natural sciences -.046 (.317) -.242 (.329)
studies economic, business, or spatial sciences -.269 (.309) -.422 (.321)
studies social sciences -.137 (.285) -.217 (.296)
student of literary studies or arts -.153 (.293) -.358 (.304)
did a similar experiment before -.115 (.125) -.121 (.129)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.064 (.123) -.032 (.128)
strong loss aversion -.022 (.122) -.053 (.126)
consistency on social orientation questions -.011 (.165) .005 (.171)
prosocial orientation .309 (.166) .325 (.173)
egalitarian orientation .263 (.160) .269 (.166)
number of acquainted subjects in the experiment -.019 (.081) -.009 (.083)









CONTROL VARIABLES RELATED TO TEMPORAL EFFECTS
delay (minutes) at the start of the experiment .006 (.007) .006 (.007)
length of play (number of rounds) .005 (.008) .007 (.009)
within part trend, if no new incentives -.023* (.010) -.024* (.011)
within Part III trend, , medium clustering -.006 (.015) -.010 (.016)
within Part III trend, , high clustering -.018 (.019) -.018 (.020)
within Part III trend, , medium clustering -.023 (.014) -.034* (.015)
within Part III trend, , high clustering -.020 (.015) -.021 (.016)
within Part IV trend, medium clustering .004 (.015) -.009 (.016)
within Part IV trend, high clustering .025 (.017) .023 (.018)
endgame effect in round 5 -.066 (.100) -.048 (.100)
endgame effect in round 10 .020 (.094) .019 (.094)
endgame effect in round 15 .092 (.106) .092 (.105)
between part trend -.208 (.149) -.232 (.168)
reputation effect .022 (.081) .031 (.081)
long term criticalness -.118* (.060) -.074 (.061)
)C+BD<A//A "
interindividual variance .591+++ (.072) .538+++ (.075)
intersession variance .005 (.024) .000 (.000)
variance of 0 internalized selective incentives .075+++ (.036)
variance of  direct selective incentives .117 (.068)
variance of 0 internalized behavioral confirmation .070+++ (.030)
variance of  direct behavioral confirmation .398+++ (.100)
variance of 0 internalized traitor rewards .000 (.000)
variance of  anticipated peace 1.747 (.294)
variance of anticipated defeat .594+++ (.148)
variance of anticipated clash .239+++ (.090)
variance of anticipated victory (not  in % ) .195+++ (.071)
variance of peace in % .000 (.000)
variance of defeat in % .003 (.055)
variance of clash in % .000 (.000)
variance of positive reinforcement .102+ (.064)
variance of negative reinforcement .029++ (.044)
variance of local reciprocity  towards opposite neighbors .000 (.000)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .006++ (.019)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .000 (.000)
-2 Log Likelihood model 10326.7 10226.4
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 100.3*** (17)
vs. previous model 45.3*** (15) 42.8*** (15)
+:N=14244 decisions for 203 subjects in 21 experimental sessions. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant
at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: + significant at the 5% level,
++significant at the 1% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance
compared to model without random slopes).
Among the control variables, we also included the long-term effect of 	
. In
case the outcome of the game shows stability in a series of games (except when it is
clash) subjects might recognize that their decision is not critical, therefore they will be
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less likely to contribute afterwards. The first model in Table 5.6.2.2 finds this effect
significant, which shows 
	
. This effect is in
addition to the short term effect of the criticalness principle. However, in the model that
allows a random variation in the slopes of the main explanatory variables, this effect is
no longer significant. The most likely cause of the difference in the results of the two
models is the significant variation in the effect of short-term criticalness between
subjects. Some subjects are highly guided by this forward-looking principle, while
others are influenced only to a limited extent. This variance rules out the net effect of
long term criticalness.
In this section, we extended our multilevel analysis by control variables about
personal characteristics and time effects. We did not find any indication that such
personal characteristics as gender, study direction, risk preferences, and social
orientations had significant effects on individual decisions. Among the controls for
time effects, we found a significant independent downward trend in the absence of
new monetary incentives and a long-term effect of criticalness. The inclusion of





In this section, we extend our analysis by incorporating certain cross-level
interaction effects into the model explaining contribution propensities. These effects
contain partly interactions of structural embeddedness and personal characteristics that
were also included in the analysis of single-shot games. Besides, in the analysis of
repeated IPG games we include interactions of temporal embeddedness, especially of
reciprocity and personal characteristics.
Table 5.6.3.1 displays results of the extended analyses. As improvement statistics
show, these variables enriched the explanatory power of the model. With regard to
testing our main micro hypotheses, we cannot report much change as compared with the
previous analyses that also included personal characteristics and control variables of
temporal embeddedness among the predictors (cf. Table 5.6.2.2).
The one and only substantive change in the significance of main explanatory
variables is of 		
. The significant effect of this
variable disappeared after controlling for its interaction with personal characteristics
and for its interaction with the gender of the neighbor. The significance of some of these
effects demonstrates that 	   
  
	 even towards
fellow neighbors. Gender did not make a difference for the application of local
reciprocal rules towards fellows, but social orientations did. Everything else is being as











previous decision of fellow neighbors, not like proselfs, who were more likely to
disregard such information.
The application of local reciprocal strategies was not only conditional on personal
characteristics of the subject, but also on the 	. Unfortunately we do
not have information about subjective perceptions of neighbors, but such perceptions
were certainly major determinants of conditioning behavior on the action of neighbors.
Subject might have used these perceptions to detect trustworthiness of neighbors and
anticipate their behavior in the forthcoming rounds. These perceptions and sympathy
might be based on some simple telltale signs (Frank, 1988; Macy and Skvoretz, 1998).
What could be these telltale signs between strangers, however, is not clear. One sign
that is easily distinguishable for everyone and can be partly a determinant of trust is
gender. Since previous experiments found contradictory results about the likelihood of
contribution depending on the gender of opponent (cf., Ortmann and Tichy, 1999;
Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999), we also did not formulate hypotheses about subjects’
perceptions about neighbors of different gender (see Section 3.4.2). On the other hand,
we recognize that our analysis should be controlled for the target of local reciprocity at
least in this respect. Results of the random slope model in Table 5.6.3.1 justified the
inclusion of these interaction effects. B

	
    
  
 (estimates are 0.331 and 0.332).
Consequently, there are no gender differences with regard to those who choose to
reciprocate or imitate, but there are gender differences of whom to reciprocate or
imitate.
We also have interesting results for interactions with other forms of 	
. We were interested whether the effect of fellow local reciprocity was
strengthened after the introduction of monetary behavioral confirmation. We did not
find confirmation of this effect in the previous models or here. However, interactions
show that 	  	 














  	 	
 
 
 (-0.266). This result contradicts to the related findings in the two-
person PD of Rapoport and Chammah (1965) that men are more inclined to play TFT,
especially when there are more economic incentives to do so. Our result is puzzling also
in the light that neither the main effect of gender nor the main effect of strengthened
local reciprocity was significant.
With regard to the interaction effects of social orientations and the application of
local reciprocal strategies after the introduction of monetary confirmation rewards,
results show that proselfs were more influenced by these additional incentives
(estimates are -0.676 and -0.549). This supports an explanation that these new rewards
are clearly framed as pure monetary incentives and not as guidelines of behavioral
confirmation. When application of local reciprocity was not rewarded by monetary
payoffs, prosocials reciprocated decisions of fellow neighbors more likely (estimates
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are 0.263 and 0.208). The presence of these two counterpolar interaction effects partly
explains why there are no significant main effects of social orientations.
Besides, the strengthening of local reciprocity towards fellow neighbors was also
conditional on the target of reciprocity. Similar to baseline fellow reciprocity, the
gender of fellow neighbors made a significant difference. However, unlike that case, the
application of local reciprocal strategies was strengthened in case fellow neighbors were
women. It means that in the absence of additional monetary incentives subjects imitated
actions of male neighbors more likely, but when there were monetary reasons for
imitation, this discrimination has changed its direction.
There were no significant differences between men and women with regard to
reciprocating or imitating decisions of neighbors from the opposite group. A personal
characteristic that made a significant difference for the application of local reciprocal
strategies towards opposite neighbors was social orientations. We found that prosocials
follow local reciprocal rules more likely than proselfs (estimates are 0.182 and 0.156).
This result indicates that prosocials reciprocated actions of their neighbors from both
sides, unlike proselfs, who were not influenced by the previous decisions of their
neighbors. All this means that prosocials are not likely to be initiators of neither conflict
nor peace, but they are the ones, who most likely mobilized by their environment to join
and support ongoing tendencies. As a consequence, a sufficient number of prosocial
subjects can establish inflating scenarios of clashes or peace.
The target of reciprocity also matters for the application of local reciprocal strategies.
But unlike in the case of fellow neighbors, there are no net differences, in relation to the
number of female neighbors. For reciprocating or imitating neighbors from the opposite
group, it is more important, whether the neighbor has the same sex or not. We found
that reciprocation was less likely in case there were more neighbors from the other sex
(estimates are -0.093 and -0.113). Subjects reciprocated actions of members of the
opposite group when they were similar to them, at least with regard to their gender.
Although there are many interesting interaction effects of gender and local











. Gender was also unimportant in relation to how quickly subjects learned the
structure of the game, for which we used an independent within part trend as an
indicator.
Besides interactions of the application of reciprocal strategies and subject-level
characteristics as gender and social orientations, we included cross-level interactions of
social control and personal characteristics. These effects were included also in the
analysis of single-shot games. In the single-shot games, we found that prosocial
individuals were more influenced by internalized traitor rewards than proselfs.
Sacrifices of prosocials made them responsible for higher likelihood of conflicts






repeated IPG games. Other insignificant effects among the interactions were not
significant in the single-shot games, either.
We found a significant interaction between the influence of internalized traitor
rewards and the number of neighbors from the other group with another sex in the
single-shot games. In Section 3.6.6, we provided the following arguments for this result.
Only neighbors of the opposite gender provide a significant social control in the form of
traitor rewards. For most subjects the color of the flag attached to the computers is not
sufficient to activate these internalized incentives, but an additional difference in an
apparent characteristic, such as gender, might help to make the substantive distinction to
consider traitor pressure at the decisions. Results in Table 5.6.3.1 show that this
interaction variable had a significant effect also in the repeated games (estimates are
-0.183 and -0.157).
Table 5.6.3.1. Results of multilevel logistic regression on contribution propensities with














α0 baseline contribution propensity ? 1.217** (.413) 1.133** (.434)
STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS
0 internalized selective incentives + .198*** (.055) .187** (.064)
 direct selective incentives + .559*** (.085) .525*** (.106)
0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .294*** (.071) .280** (.093)
 direct behavioral confirmation + .604*** (.064) .635*** (.085)




 anticipated peace - -2.733*** (.099) -2.599*** (.144)
 anticipated defeat - -2.101*** (.093) -2.088*** (.113)
 anticipated clash + -.763*** (.081) -.781*** (.091)
 anticipated victory (not  in % ) + .252** (.093) .263** (.102)


 peace in % - -.012 (.111) -.018 (.115)
 defeat in % + .224* (.107) .216 (.112)






predicted increase of contribution propensity + -.062 (.072) -.094 (.078)
predicted decrease of contribution propensity - -.168** (.061) -.137* (.064)
9	
 towards opposite neighbors + -.105 (.062) -.082 (.064)
 towards fellow neighbors + .125 (.102) .199 (.105)






gender (1=male) -.071 (.160) -.047 (.163)
student at the university (1=yes) .128 (.341) .253 (.355)
studies at the law faculty -.395 (.337) -.486 (.355)
studies natural sciences -.070 (.317) -.264 (.332)
studies economic, business, or spatial sciences -.300 (.309) -.454 (.323)
studies social sciences -.179 (.285) -.251 (.298)
student of literary studies or arts -.168 (.293) -.370 (.306)
did a similar experiment before -.131 (.125) -.134 (.131)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.066 (.124) -.035 (.129)
strong loss aversion -.017 (.122) -.054 (.127)
consistency on social orientation questions -.037 (.166) -.013 (.173)
prosocial orientation .265 (.178) .292 (.183)
egalitarian orientation .237 (.174) .194 (.178)
number of acquainted subjects in the experiment -.011 (.081) .007 (.084)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.001 (.003) .000 (.004)
CONTROL VARIABLES RELATED TO TEMPORAL EFFECTS
delay (minutes) at the start of the experiment .005 (.007) .004 (.007)
length of play (number of rounds) .007 (.009) .009 (.010)
within part trend, if no new incentives -.030** (.011) -.033** (.012)
within Part III trend, , medium clustering -.014 (.016) -.020 (.017)
within Part III trend, , high clustering -.025 (.020) -.024 (.021)
within Part III trend, , medium clustering -.033* (.015) -.045** (.016)
within Part III trend, , high clustering -.029 (.016) -.030 (.017)
within Part IV trend, medium clustering -.005 (.015) -.019 (.016)
within Part IV trend, high clustering .017 (.017) .013 (.018)
endgame effect in round 5 -.067 (.101) -.048 (.101)
endgame effect in round 10 .010 (.095) .008 (.095)
endgame effect in round 15 .096 (.106) .095 (.106)
between part trend -.248 (.151) -.278 (.171)
reputation effect .024 (.082) .036 (.082)






gender * within part trend .013 (.008) .015 (.009)
gender * previous peace (intergroup reciprocity) -.092 (.129) -.070 (.141)
gender * previous defeat  (intergroup reciprocity) .003 (.125) -.043 (.137)
gender * previous clash  (intergroup reciprocity) .214 (.145) .204 (.156)
gender * local reciprocity towards opposite neighbors .099 (.075) .108 (.076)
gender * local reciprocity towards fellow neighbors .116 (.096) .038 (.099)





0* number of opposite neighbors of the other sex -.183** (.057) -.157* (.061)
0* number of male opposite neighbors .105 (.061) .049 (.065)
0* number of fellow neighbors of the same sex .090 (.049) .036 (.068)
0* number of female fellow neighbors -.099* (.049) -.069 (.070)
0* prosocial orientation .122 (.088) .098 (.093)
0* prosocial orientation -.047 (.076) -.027 (.106)
0* egalitarian orientation .029 (.098) .122 (.105)











loc. rec. tow. opposite nbs * number of opp. nbs of the other sex -.093 (.053) -.113* (.054)
loc. rec. tow. opposite nbs * number of male opposite neighbors .105 (.058) .111 (.059)
loc. rec. tow. fellow nbs * number of fellow nbs of the same sex .016 (.070) -.014 (.072)
loc. rec. tow. fellow nbs * number of female fellow neighbors -.111 (.071) -.145* (.074)
loc. rec. tow. fel. nbs, with  * n of fellow nbs of the same sex .037 (.104) .088 (.110)
loc. rec. tow. fellow nbs, with  * number of female fellow nbs .331** (.108) .332** (.113)
local rec. towards opposite neighbors * prosocial orientation .182** (.067) .156* (.068)
local rec. towards fellow neighbors * prosocial orientation .263* (.117) .208 (.121)
local rec. towards fellow nbs, if  is introduced * prosocial or. -.676*** (.158) -.549** (.167)
local rec. towards opposite neighbors * egalitarian orientation .005 (.074) -.034 (.075)
local rec. towards fellow neighbors * egalitarian orientation -.088 (.126) -.023 (.131)
local rec. towards fellow nbs, if  is introduced * egalitarian or. .312 (.172) .261 (.181)
)C+BD<A//A "
interindividual variance .596+++ (.069) .547+++ (.076)
intersession variance .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
variance of 0 internalized selective incentives .069+++ (.035)
variance of  direct selective incentives .131 (.070)
variance of 0 internalized behavioral confirmation .067+++ (.029)
variance of  direct behavioral confirmation .309 (.088)
variance of 0 internalized traitor rewards .000 (.000)
variance of  anticipated peace 1.763 (.296)
variance of anticipated defeat .621+++ (.152)
variance of anticipated clash .241+++ (.091)
variance of anticipated victory (not  in % ) .213+++ (.074)
variance of peace in % .000 (.000)
variance of defeat in % .000 (.000)
variance of clash in % .000 (.000)
variance of positive reinforcement .107+ (.064)
variance of negative reinforcement .029 (.045)
variance of local reciprocity  towards opposite neighbors .000 (.000)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .001++ (.018)
variance of local reciprocity  towards fellow neighbors .000 (.000)
-2 Log Likelihood model 10085.2 10011.8
Improvement χ2 (df) for model in right column 73.4*** (17)
vs. previous model 241.5*** (27) 203.6*** (27)
+:N=14244 decisions for 203 subjects in 21 experimental sessions. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant
at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
For testing random effects it is more appropriate to use deviance tests: + significant at the 5% level,
++significant at the 1% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance
compared to model without random slopes).
In this section, we extended our multilevel analysis by certain cross-level interaction
effects, including interactions of structural embeddedness and personal characteristics
and interactions of temporal embeddedness, especially of reciprocity and personal
characteristics. These variables enriched the explanatory power of the model and also
revealed some peculiarities about the predicted main behavioral mechanisms.
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Particularly, results showed that local reciprocity works conditional on personal
characteristics, especially on social orientations, and also conditional on the gender of
the target of reciprocity.
	*5!0#"% ! 0$+
In this section, we will have a closer look at how subjects form their expectations
about the subsequent outcome in the repeated IPG game. In this way, we aim to find
deeper roots of forward-looking behavior, of which presence was well supported by our
analysis. On the basis of our results, we concluded that 	
with a correction of
forward-looking 	
	
 tendencies is an important predictor of individual behavior
in the experiments. This conclusion was drawn because dummies indicating
expectations of subjects had significant effects on contributions.
A natural step towards a deeper investigation is to try to determine the basis of these
expectations and the connections how do they depend on the past. Besides, it might help
to find their origins, if we consider whether or not these expectations match with some
sense of objective reality. If they do not, then we should come up with possible reasons
for the systematic distortions.
Another major reason for a closer look at expectations is a concern about the validity
of our explanation. We used expectations as predictors of decisions, assuming that
subjects evaluate what is likely to happen in the subsequent round and they base their
decisions on this evaluation. However, as subjects had to provide their forecasts parallel
to their decisions, they could adjust their decisions in order to fulfill their predictions
about the subsequent outcome. There was one subject, who explicitly reported that he
adjusted his decisions in order to fulfill his expectations (see Section 5.5). A closer look
at expectations might help to verify that this is not a serious concern for most subjects
and most decisions.
To achieve these goals, in this section, we will report certain statistics about the
expectations of subjects. To find their roots we report how these expectations were
conditional on the past and on social orientations. We will check how often were
expectations about the subsequent outcome correct and what could be the causes for
systematic distortions. Finally, we will provide an indirect test for the concern about the
relationship between expectations and decisions.
/, we try to ascertain determinants of the expectations of subjects. In Table
5.4.1.3 we reported average contribution rates conditional on the previous outcome, on
previous decision, and on the expectation of the subject. Contribution rates were the
focus of this table, but in parentheses the number of cell-relevant cases were also
included. These numbers are important for the purpose of this section, which is to check
for a possible effect of the previous round on the expectations of subjects. For the sake






emphasis is on conditional probabilities of forming different expectations when the
previous outcome and decision are given.
Table 5.7.1. Expectations of subjects in the 
 experiment by previous decisions and
previous outcomes
subject’s expectation


















































































































+#Numbers of cases are in parentheses.
As Table 5.7.1 shows, subjects were very optimistic about the outcome of the game.
Victory was expected (50.96%) far more often than other outcomes and far more often
than it has happened. In the absolute majority of decisions, victory was expected after a
previous victory and clash. More astonishingly, in the relative majority of the cases,
subjects expected the victory of their team even after defeat. Victory was expected quite
often also after peace. However, in most cases, if they defected in the previous round,
subjects expected a recurrence of peace. Recurrence of other outcomes was expected
also relatively often (defeat was expected most likely after defeat, victory was expected
most likely after victory, and clash was expected most likely after a clash). It is no
surprise that clash is expected least likely after peace and defeat is expected least likely
after peace and victory.
Subjects were very optimistic regardless they contributed or defected in the previous
round. They were more likely to expect victory if they contributed before, but they were
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also quite optimistic after defection. There were no large differences with respect to the
expectation of defeat and clash conditional on previous action. Subjects were more
likely to expect peace to occur if they had defected in the previous round.
To sum up, Table 5.7.1 demonstrates that the previous outcome and decision had an







. This optimism could be a result of hope in victory or wishful
thinking that is excited partly by the competitive structure of the experimental situation
and possibly also by general personality traits. This might also indicate an in-group
bias, due to which subjects have a more positive view of their group fellows than of
members of the out-group (cf. Turner, 1982; Bettencourt et al., 1992; Brewer, 1996b).
A personal characteristic that might influence expectations is social orientation.
We found no significant main effects of social orientations on individual decision in
the repeated games, although these effects were significant in the single-shot games.
This difference could possibly be the result of the intervening effect of expectations
that were not encountered in the single-shot games. If prosocial subjects are
predominantly optimistic and strongly influenced by forward-looking 	
	

tendencies, then the net effect of social orientations might disappear after controlling
for expectations. This way of reasoning is parallel to the arguments we provided for
the main effects of social orientations in the single-shot games. We observed that
prosocials made more sacrifices for their teams and caused more trouble in intergroup
relations, probably because they evaluated social identity that can be attained from the
intergroup competition more than did the proselfs. This could ground also their
stronger belief in victory and higher optimism.
However, as Table 5.7.2 shows, there are no large differences between prosocials
and proselfs, neither in their optimism about victory nor in their expectations about
other outcomes. The hypothesis that expectation of victory is independent of prosocial
values cannot be rejected (χ2(1)=0.392, two-tailed =0.531). This has the consequence
that the argument above about the intervening effect of expectations is not supported by
the data.
Table 5.7.2 Expectations of subjects by social orientations




































+#Numbers of cases are in parentheses. All single-shot and repeated games are included.
"
 we discuss how accurate the expectations of subjects were and try to find






meant farfetched optimism about the outcome of the game. This optimism lead
several subjects to make sacrifices for their groups, as they intended to join the
bandwagon of victory that actually never came. Here we aim to explore reasons for
these misbeliefs.
One possibility is that subjects could not foresee a shift in the outcome, because it
was the result of changes in the decision of others. For instance, a previous victory
suddenly disappeared because teammates became comfortable with the result and
tried to free ride on the effort of others, meanwhile defeat mobilized contributions in
the other team. On the other hand, as we have seen in Table 5.3.2.1, victory occurred
most likely after a previous victory. Therefore, expectations of victory are most likely
to be accurate after a previous victory.
Table 5.7.3. Results of multilevel logistic regression on *	
 7












(constant) baseline inaccuracy rate ? .621*** (.067) .749** (.233)
 victory in the previous round (%) - -.531*** (.055) -.535*** (.055)
no feedback (E4) + -.072 (.055) -.074 (.055)




gender (1=male) -.023 (.092)
studies at the law faculty -.007 (.195)
studies natural sciences -.105 (.171)
studies economic, business, or spatial science -.134 (.163)
studies social sciences .096 (.142)
student of literary studies or arts -.004 (.147)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.076 (.088)
strong loss aversion -.073 (.087)
prosocial orientation .052 (.104)
egalitarian orientation -.003 (.111)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.001 (.002)
)C+BD<A//A 
interindividual variance .231+++ (.036) .224+++ (.035)
-2 Log Likelihood model 9677.83 9667.81
Improvement χ2 (df in parentheses) for model in right column 10.02* (11)
vs. baseline model 122.06*** (3) 132.08*** (14)
+# N=7199 expectations of victory for 203 subjects in 21 experimental sessions. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. * significant at the 5%
level, ** significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed).
                                                          
7
 The baseline model provides a parameter estimate of 0.514*** (0.047) for the baseline inaccuracy
rate and for 0.312+++ (0.044) for interindividual variance. The -2 Log Likelihood of the baseline model
is 9799.89.
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Another possible reason for farfetched optimism is inexperience. Subjects did not
know what to expect about the outcome in the single-shot games and in the first
repeated game, because no feedback has been provided yet about previous results. We
predict that subjects have become experienced gradually, hence the proportion of
inaccurate forecasts should decrease over time.
Furthermore, certain personal characteristics could also play a role, including
gender, study direction, risk preferences, social orientations, and the level of
understanding of the experimental game. We do not have strong arguments to pledge
ourselves for certain hypotheses about these variables. Another possible predictor is
the understanding of the experimental situation that we measured by the proportion of
quiz questions answered correctly.
Table 5.7.3 summarizes our predictions and reports the results of a multilevel
logistic regression model that takes into account these variables. All cases (N=7199)
are included in the analysis, in which a subject expected victory, including single-shot
and repeated games. 61.37% (N=4418) of these expectations were inaccurate, that is
the actual outcome was not victory. The dichotomous variable of accuracy
(inaccurate=1) is the dependent variable of the model. We constructed a two-level
design, in which single expectations are at the first level and subjects are at the second
level. This was necessary, since personal characteristics affect all expectations of the
subject in the same way and consequently the expectations cannot be handled as
independent observations. On the other hand, there was no reason to include a third
level of analysis.
As results in Table 5.7.3 show, the personal characteristics we included as
predictors did not play an important role in which subjects had farfetched optimism
about the outcome of the game. None of these variables had significant effects and
their inclusion did not improve the explanatory power of the model. As expected,
expectations of victory were more accurate in case the previous round also ended with
victory. On the other hand, predictions about the lack of information and inexperience
are not supported by the data. Subjects did not guess better when they knew the
previous outcome. Moreover, their forecasts became less accurate over time.
After all, this analysis did not reveal the real reasons for farfetched optimism. We
could conclude that the lack of information, inexperience, and the above mentioned
personal characteristics are not responsible for misbeliefs.
, we will briefly deal with the concern about the relationship between
expectations and decisions. Subjects had to provide their forecasts at the same time
when they decided to keep their bonus or to contribute it to their team. Therefore, they
could in principle adjust their decisions to fulfill their expectations. The idea that
subjects try to maximize the probability that their expectations are right has
correspondence with the reduction of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962). In our
experiments, fulfilling expectations would be especially strange, if subjects expected a











 on individual decisions, we
assumed that this concern could be neglected. Here we provide an indirect test of this
assumption.
















peace () any - -
defeat () any - -
victory () any + +
peace () or defeat () + +
victory () - +
clash and contribution (C) + +
clash ()
clash and defection (D) - +
In case subjects try to match their decisions with their expectations, it has the
following consequences. In case they expected peace or defeat, independent of the
previous outcome and of their previous decision, they should have kept their bonuses.
In the situation where they anticipated victory they should have contributed in any case.
In case their forecast was a clash there was no clear directive what they should do.
When their team had lost in the previous round or when there was peace contribution
would have been the appropriate reaction. Assuming that others will not often change
their decisions after victory, defection could be a more efficient way to fulfill the
expectation of a clash. After a clash, subjects have a solid rationale to believe in the
status quo when they do not change their decisions. These implications are summarized
in Table 5.7.4. The table also includes predictions that are based on the criticalness
principle with adjustments of a forward-looking bandwagon effect. This helps to clarify
what are the differences between the two explanations and at which points could the
motive of fulfilling expectations be a serious concern for drawing conclusions about
forward-looking behavior.
As Table 5.7.4 shows, there is almost a perfect overlap between the alternative
hypothesis of 
 *	







. Therefore, on the basis
of conditional contribution rates it is difficult to carry out a test that decides between
these two hypotheses. There are only differences in case the subject expects a clash to
occur in the subsequent round. To demonstrate which predictions are closer to reality in
this case, in Table 5.7.5 we recall conditional contribution rates, if the subject expected
a clash in the coming round. These statistics have been already reported in Table
5.4.1.3. Here we also include the rival predictions of fulfilling expectations and the
adjusted criticalness principle.
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Table 5.7.5 The effect of fulfilling expectations and adjusted criticalness on












previous decision C D C D C D
	23 + + + + 56.84% (95) 43.28% (238)
	23 + + + + 78.68% (258) 59.49% (316)
23 - - + + 69.46% (442) 45.83% (120)







+:N=1880. Numbers of cases are in parentheses. The average contribution rate, if clash expected is
63.88%.
There are three cells in Table 5.7.5, for which the predictions of fulfilling
expectations and adjusted criticalness are different. In the C cell, the contribution rate
(69.46%) is lower than after contribution in general, but the difference is not significant
(,1.652, two-tailed ,0.099). On the other hand, this contribution rate is significantly
higher than the average contribution rate when clash is anticipated (,2.543, two-tailed
,0.011). This supports the 	&	
 hypothesis rather than the tendency of
fulfilling expectations. In the D cell, the contribution rate (45.83%) is significantly
lower than the average contribution rate when clash is expected (,3.951, E0.001), but
the difference in comparison with the contribution rate after defection (50.26%) is not
significant (,0.969, two-tailed ,0.334). In the D cell, the contribution rate is even
lower (41.67%). The difference is significant compared to the overall mean in case
clash is expected (,4.105, E0.001), but it is not significant in comparison with the
average contribution rate after defection (,1.588, two-tailed ,0.116). On the basis of
these data, the alternative hypothesis of 
 *	
 seems more plausible.
Consequently, although it is unlikely,  	






In this section we took a closer look at the forward-looking behavior of subjects in
the experiment. /, we analyzed what could be the determinants of subjects’ view
about the future. We found that the previous outcome and decision had an effect on the
forecasts of subjects, but the major determinant of expectations was an unfaltering
optimism. Besides, we showed that expectations were independent of social
orientations. "
, we looked at some possible origins of farfetched optimism we
experienced. We found a significant effect of the previous outcome, but we had to
conclude that the lack of information, inexperience, and personal characteristics are
not significant determinants of farfetched optimism. , we discussed the
possibility that subjects adjusted their decisions in order to fulfill their expectations.







In this chapter, we presented the results of the analysis of repeated IPG game
experiments. First we explored the aggregated outcomes of the games and tried to
trace the predicted scenarios in the experiments. Then we turned to the analysis of
individual behavior and tested our main micro hypotheses. We also drew attention to
the effects of intervening and control variables and to interactions. In this concluding
section, we provide a summary of our main results in the order as we structured our
main research questions in Table 4.2.1. The discussion of societal implications and
limitations of this analysis are left for Chapter 6.
We classified our interests as  and 	 questions, depending on whether
they related to individual behavior or to aggregated outcomes in the experiment. We
emphasized that the emergence of intergroup conflict and peace cannot be explained
as a direct consequence of group-level factors, such as segregation. In the spirit of
methodological individualism, the explanation has to reveal the causes that determine
individual actions leading to harmful consequences in intergroup relations. Therefore,
we preserved the bottom-up character of the explanation. After testing the presence of
macro phenomena in the experiments we concentrated on the roots of individual
behavior.
We classified the main causes into three categories: effects of 	

, effects of 	
, and their 
	
. For the sake
of testing our hypotheses about structural embeddedness we manipulated structural
configurations in the experiment. We developed an experimental design, in which
seating patterns of subjects were varied between experimental sessions. Structural
manipulations were used for both the single-shot and the repeated games. Chapter 3
discussed the analysis of the single-shot games, in which effects of temporal
embeddedness could be excluded. Effects of temporal embeddedness and the
interactions of structure and time could only be analyzed in the repeated games. By a
within session manipulation we made sure that we have also data about situations, in
which effects of structural embeddedness can be excluded. In the control condition of
every session (Part I), subjects were separated, hence they could not have been
influenced by their neighbors. Further parts of the experiment ensured that we could
analyze also the simultaneous effect and interactions of structural and temporal
embeddedness.
Now let us summarize the answers we could give to the research questions we
addressed in this chapter. Table 5.8.1 displays the main hypotheses we formulated in
Chapter 4 for these questions and the conclusions we drew from the results in Chapter
5. Table 5.8.1 follows the structure of Table 4.2.1, in which we summarized our main
research questions and the structure of Table 4.3.3.1, in which we formulated our
hypotheses.
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likely in the low
clustering condition.







F: Spiral of peace.
): Largely supported.
F: Spiral of conflict.
): Not supported.
F: Stable peace and

















































F: There is no direct




With regard to effects of 	 
, we were interested in the
effects of manipulating structural configurations in the experiment on the outcome of
the repeated IPG game and on individual decisions. Precisely, we were looking for an
answer to whether segregation has an effect on the likelihood of intergroup conflict.
We constructed three conditions (low, medium, and high clustering) in order to test
the hypothesis that conflict is more likely in segregated structures. As we compared
frequencies of intergroup conflict between structural conditions, we gained a partial
confirmation of this hypothesis. Conflict was least frequent in the low clustering
condition, but it did not occur more likely in the high clustering condition than in
medium clustering (cf. Table 5.3.1.1). Further analysis has revealed that this
discrepancy was partly a consequence of a ceiling effect and partly of a selection
distortion. Subjects, who by chance were assigned to the medium clustering condition,
had high baseline contribution rates. The initial difference is accumulated as subjects
reciprocated contribution decisions (cf. Table 5.3.1.2). Furthermore, we also tested






selective incentives are introduced in comparison to when monetary confirmation
rewards are present. Results confirm the hypothesis that the segregation effect is
stronger under normative pressure than under confirmation pressure.
The mechanism behind the main effect of segregation we believe is the social
control of neighbors. We predicted that different forms of social control influence
decisions in a direct and in an internalized form. Social control in an internalized form
gets activated in the presence of interdependent others, even when they are complete
strangers, they have no channels of communication, and they have no ways to enforce
each others’ decisions in any way. We also tested the effects of direct forms of social
control that we introduced as additional monetary rewards in Parts III and IV in the
experiment. This allowed us to provide a comparison between the size of effects of
monetary rewards and internalized forms of social control. We assumed that group
membership of neighbors would activate different forms of social control, causing the
segregation effect at the aggregated level.
Between fellow neighbors, we predicted the influence of internalized selective
incentives and behavioral confirmation. Internalized selective incentives exert
pressure towards contribution if there are fellow neighbors around. Behavioral
confirmation is realized in an internalized form if subjects adjusted their decisions in
order to match the expected decisions of their fellow neighbors. Selective incentives
and behavioral confirmation were introduced also as monetary rewards that were
distributed conditional on neighbor decisions in Parts III and IV of the experiment.
Our analysis confirmed all hypotheses about the influence of these incentives.
Internalized forms of fellow social control did not have as strong effects as monetary
side-payments, but they were still highly significant predictors of individual decisions.
Between neighbors from opposite groups, we predicted the existence of an
internalized pressure that drives towards defection. The analysis did not confirm the
hypothesis about the universal presence of these incentives that we called traitor
rewards. Subjects felt pressure to defect and betray the interests of their group only if
they were surrounded by members of the other group who belonged to the opposite
sex. It seems that gender worked as a telltale sign that helped to make the substantive
distinction to consider traitor pressure at the decisions. Neighbors of the same sex did
not activate this pressure. From another perspective, subjects were more competitive
towards the out-group when their neighbors from the opposite group had the same
gender.
With regard to effects of 	
, we were interested in how the
outcomes of intergroup competition change over time and we tried to trace typical
scenarios in the experiment. Particularly, we focused on the dynamics of intergroup
conflict and contribution rates. We predicted that once peace is established, when no
changes are introduced, it would be stable over time. We got a solid confirmation of
this hypothesis, as peace followed peace relatively often not only once, but in a
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sequence of peaceful outcomes. Similarly, we predicted that once it occurs, conflict
would be durable. The analysis of results revealed that conflict was indeed repeated
quite often, but this did not mean that one particular outcome was stabilized (see
Section 5.3.2).
As a further consequence of this, the 	  
 hypothesis that we
formulated about the process of self-reinforcing dynamics of harmful clashes was not
supported by the data. Contribution rates very often stabilized at a certain high level,
especially in Part IV in the high clustering condition, but there were always some
defectors, who prevented the emergence of all-in clashes. On the other hand, we
found some evidence for the 		 hypothesis. Contribution rates decreased
gradually in experimental sessions if no new incentives were introduced. However,
there was a difference between the sessions, in which stages of the experiment this
decrease has occurred. Furthermore, this spiral has also not reached its extremity, as
some hardliners kept trying to contribute (see Section 5.3.3).
The dynamics of intergroup conflict and of contribution rates are the results of
changes in individual behavior over time. The primary focus of this chapter was to
test predictions about these changes. We aimed therefore to determine the strategies
individuals follow in the repeated IPG game. We believed that these strategies are
rather simple and softwired, as they are combinations of different heuristics and are
not based on elaborate calculations. Furthermore, we debated both the rational
forward-looking and the purely backward-looking views on human action. We
discussed that individual decisions make use of both forward-looking calculations and
past experience. Hence, we formulated hypotheses about the influence of simple
mechanisms on individual choices that are partly oriented towards the future and
partly towards the past.
With respect to the shadow of the future, we predicted that subjects count on the
principle of 	
. Criticalness prescribes contribution in case subjects perceive
their decision in the forthcoming round as a decisive one that makes a difference for
the aggregated outcome. We asked subjects directly at each round about their
expectations about the outcome. The influence of these expectations on actual
decisions was the basis of our test of the criticalness hypothesis. Results confirmed
that expectations are strong predictors of individual choices in the repeated IPG game.
As predicted, the expectation of peace and defeat decreased the willingness to
contribute. However, the anticipation of clash was also associated with a decrease in
contribution propensities, which contradicts the criticalness hypothesis. This negative
result was related to the unconditional high contribution rates when victory was
expected (see Table 5.4.1.1). It seems that subjects liked to make active contributions
to the victory of their team, although they could have free ridden on the effort of
others. Hence we concluded that the criticalness hypothesis should be adjusted for a
forward-looking bandwagon tendency.
With respect to the shadow of the past, we formulated hypotheses about the










 hypothesis predicted that subjects would be
more likely to stick to their actions if they gained money in the previous round and
that they would be more likely to change their decisions if they lost. When
formulating this hypothesis, we did not make any additional assumptions on the speed
and accuracy of learning and we assumed that subjects consider the zero payment as
their aspiration level throughout the entire experiment. Results provided only
conditional support for the reinforcement learning hypothesis. We found that
reinforcement works if it drives towards defection and that it is more likely to be
activated after a previous defection (for a similar result, see Flache, 1996).
The 
  hypothesis predicted that subjects reciprocate the
observed collective behavior of the other group. They decrease their contribution
propensity if the other group behaved peacefully in the previous round, and they are
more likely to contribute if they observed a competitive behavior. On the basis of our
analysis, this hypothesis did not receive confirmation. Although means of conditional
contribution rates provided some evidence for intergroup reciprocity (see Section 5.4),
the multilevel regression analysis proved that this effect was caused by other variables
and only a previous defeat elicited significant retaliations.
A comparison of the relative size of effects provide more support for forward-
looking considerations than for backward-looking strategies, which is due to the
strong influence of subjective expectations. On the other hand, a partial confirmation
of the hypotheses about backward-looking mechanisms justifies our efforts to
integrate different behavioral mechanisms in a unified model of human action.
With regard to 
	
	
, at the macro level we were
interested whether we can trace different scenarios in different structural conditions of
the experiment. We predicted that stable peace and the 		 would be most
likely in the low clustering condition. Results supported this hypothesis, although the
		 occurred in different stages of the experiment (see Section 5.3.3). On
the other hand, we predicted that durable conflict and the 	
 would be
more likely in segregated structures. In accordance with the previous finding, these
scenarios did not occur at all in the low clustering condition. There was also support
for the stabilization of conflict in the high clustering condition. However, contribution
rates did not increase gradually within experimental parts, but between the parts.
Consequently, we did not find any support for the 	 
 hypothesis, not
even in the most segregated structures. Besides, there was no indication of any
recognizable scenarios in the medium clustering condition (see Section 5.3.3).
We were interested in finding the micro causes of different scenarios. We aimed to
answer whether or not subjects apply different strategies in different structural
conditions and if they are influenced by other interaction effects of structure and time,
particularly by previous decisions of their neighbors. We showed that for the
explanation of interactions at the aggregated level a direct effect of the structural
condition on which behavioral rules are applied does not necessarily have to exist.
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Instead, differences in the scenarios can be the consequence of main effects of
structural and temporal embeddedness on individual decisions. Subjects cannot apply
certain conditional strategies if they do not have the opportunity to do so. For
instance, they cannot retaliate conflict if there was no conflict. We predicted that
further reasons behind the macro scenarios are the influence of previous decisions of
neighbors and independent learning of the structure of the game.
We formulated a hypothesis about 	 that prescribes contribution as
a reaction to contribution of neighbors and drives towards defection, if neighbors kept
their bonus in the previous round. Results provided conditional support for this
hypothesis depending on personal characteristics of the subject and on the target of
reciprocity. We found a significant main effect of local fellow reciprocity only (see
Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2). Looking deeper at the interaction effects, results showed a
complex picture about the conditions under which local reciprocity influences
individual decisions. We found significant interaction effects between social
orientations and all forms of local reciprocity. Prosocials reciprocated actions of both
fellow and opposite neighbors more likely than proselfs. On the other hand, the
introduction of monetary behavioral confirmation elicited less additional reciprocity
from prosocials than from proselfs. These monetary incentives also had an interaction
with gender: men were less likely influenced by them to reciprocate their fellow
neighbors than women. Furthermore, responses to decisions of neighbors were not
only conditional on the source, but also on the target of local reciprocity. Subjects
reciprocated (or imitated) their fellow neighbors more likely if they were males. On
the other hand, reciprocating actions of neighbors from the other group was
conditional on identicalness of gender. Local reciprocity was applied less likely if
there were more neighbors from the other sex. To sum up, local reciprocity did not
work universally, but only under certain circumstances.
The hypothesis that subjects do not use different strategies under different
structural conditions is partly supported by the data. Criticalness and forward-looking
bandwagon tendencies affected decisions under every structural condition and in each
experimental part. On the other hand, reinforcement learning had an effect only in
later stages of the experiment, but irrespective of the structural condition. It seems that
subjects have “learned the principle of learning” during the game (see Section 5.4.3).
We also discussed that the interaction effect of structure and time at the aggregated
level can be partly the consequence of independent learning trends. Subjects might
learn the structure of the game during the experiment and they might adjust their
decisions towards a rational choice over time, irrespective of previous outcomes and
future expectations. For testing this preposition, we included trend variables as
controls in the analysis (see Sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3). We found a significant
downward trend that is independent from intergroup reciprocity and the other main
behavioral mechanisms if no monetary incentives were introduced in the experiment.
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Harmful conflict between groups is among the most costly enigma of mankind. The
high complexity of intergroup conflict in our everyday life, however, makes the
solution of this enigma a challenging task. Instead of dealing with all the complexities,
by making simplifying assumptions and by relying on a sound theoretical basis, this
study contributed to the investigation of certain factors that influence the likelihood of
intergroup conflict. First of all, we emphasized that 		!
!	!. In pursuit of the
underlying processes that drive competitions toward lethal consequences, we focused
on effects of  	  	. Particularly, we intended to
determine some conditions under which 	 is associated with conflict and the
causal mechanisms that are responsible for this effect. As most intergroup relations
cannot be torn from their historical context, we also investigated how conflict changes
over time and what are the endogenous determinants of positive and negative changes.
Such an investigation should not remain at the intergroup level, as groups are not
unitary entities. They consist of consciously acting individuals, who make their
decisions based on their own free will. For instance, citizens volunteer for military
service in a war situation, soldiers volunteer to be sent to the front lines, front liners
volunteer to be asked for special assignments (Coleman, 1990). Terrorists who commit
suicide bombings not only risk their life, but they sacrifice it in the belief that it helps
their groups to obtain a certain goal, such as independence. Individual participation in
intergroup conflict is rarely so demanding, but it always involves a cost that members
have to bear to help their group. Contributions of this sort are seemingly rather more




 #     		. Forces and motives that facilitate
individual participation are necessary to discover for the explanation of intergroup
conflict.
In this study, we focused on factors that can be classified according to their origin in
		, in the 	
!, or in the $	
! 	 	 		 	. Intergroup competition and comparison
motivates participation by   rewards, such as territory, pride, or social
identity that are distributed among the members of the winning side. Social
relationships with relevant others constrain individual decisions by transmitting
different forms of  	 that can either enforce or reduce participation. The
historical context is important as people behave according to certain 	.
These heuristics are partly built on their %	, for instance, they learn from the
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past or revenge previous outrages. Similarly, %	 about future encounters also
influence individual actions strongly.
&				!
The major theoretical goal of this study was to 	   ! 	
	 that can help to understand the emergence of harmful conflicts that are the
consequence of structural and temporal embeddedness. As a basis of model building,
we departed from the '	 ( ) *'()+  model of competitive
intergroup relations (Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987). The major potential of the IPG
game model is that it coherently represents the dual interdependence structure of
intergroup competitions; the negative interdependency between the groups on one hand
and the free riding problem within the groups on the other hand. However, the IPG
model in its original form could not cope with !! !  	.
Structural embeddedness affects individual decisions through different  	
	. Social #		#, such as respect, are distributed as rewards for
fellows who made sacrifices for the group and as punishments for those fellows who
failed to take part in group efforts. ,# 	!	 is received for an action
that is identical to the behavior of fellow group members. -
 are sent to
relevant members of the opposite group who refused to help their own group. As a
substantial contribution of this study, we incorporated these forms of social control
mechanisms into the IPG model of competitive intergroup relations.
As social control is transmitted through network relations, the 	
!
	#   	  	   ! 	 	. One of our
main research questions targeted to determine the 			

 ! 	 	!   and the conditions under which peaceful
coexistence might be expected.
In the structurally embedded IPG game, under certain structural conditions strong
social control might lead to an unusual social dilemma situation. In this social dilemma,
everyone is better off by 		 for the group, but overall contribution would
result in an outcome that for everyone is worse than peaceful coexistence. In this
interdependence structure, unintended conflict is the aggregated consequence of
intentional individual actions. The model predicts that such a social dilemma would
occur where dense contacts within the groups are distribution channels for social
selective incentives, rather than spreading routes of behavioral confirmation. An
additional requirement for the emergence of suboptimal conflict situations is that
interpersonal ties between members of the competing groups should be scarce or traitor
rewards should be of little importance.
Our interest was not purely in determining the conditions under which overall
conflict evolves as a social dilemma, but in general in showing the structural conditions
that increase the likelihood of intergroup conflict. In particular, a main research
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question concerned why and under what conditions 	 promotes intergroup
conflict. For the investigation of this question we used simulations and experiments.
	 were applied in order to explore the general theoretical relationship
between segregation and intergroup conflict and to derive hypotheses about the effect of
structural embeddedness for the experimental investigation. In the simulations, the
structurally embedded IPG game was played by agents arranged in simplified network
structures. As a general result, we found that the effect segregation on the likelihood of
intergroup conflict can be typically characterized by an S-shape function. This means
that 			!. However, depending on other
parameter values, 			!	"				
				!	!. These cases were labeled as ! and 	




	  # 	!	 !
	.
Simulation results were reformulated as hypotheses for the %	. Besides the
theoretical developments, testing these hypotheses in experiments was another major
scientific contribution of this study. For the implementation of structural conditions in
laboratory, a 	
 %	 	 needed to be invented. In the experiments,
subjects played the structurally embedded IPG game without communication in two
teams consisting of five members. In order to test the presence of a segregation effect
and the underlying social control mechanisms, seating patterns were varied and
visibility conditions were manipulated. Four structural conditions were applied, one in
which subjects were separated, one in which the two groups were arranged in a highly
segregated pattern, one with medium, and one with low levels of segregation. The
segregation effect on the likelihood of intergroup conflict was tested by comparing
outcomes of the game under different seating patterns.
We predicted that social control would affect individual decisions also in an
		$ form. For detecting internalized forms of social control, in one part of the
experiment subjects established eye contact with their direct neighbors. In later parts
of the experiment, also  ! !  	were introduced as monetary
rewards in order to test the relative impact of internalized and direct forms of social
control on individual decisions.
Experimental results  	!  	 . As predicted,
intergroup conflict was least likely when members of the two teams were seated in a
mixed pattern. However, conflict was not less likely in the medium segregation
condition than in high segregation. This could partly be explained as a ceiling effect
and partly as a consequence of high baseline contribution rates in the medium
segregation setting.
In general, monetary social control strongly influenced individual decisions. We
found strong evidence of internalized behavioral confirmation as subjects adjusted
their decision towards the expected decision of their fellow neighbors even though
there was only eye contact between them. There was also some support for the effect
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of internalized selective incentives. These effects were not as strong as the influence
of monetary social control, but internalized social control from fellow neighbors was
still a major predictor of individual contribution propensities. Internalized traitor
incentives were found only under certain conditions. Subjects felt a pressure to betray
the interests of their group only when they were surrounded by members of the other
group, who belonged to the opposite sex.
To summarize, the new experimental design provided important insights for
understanding structural effects and the influence of social control in intergroup
situations. Particularly, results demonstrated how important 	 between the
subjects in the laboratory is in activating internalized mechanisms of social control.
What follows is a brief summary of our main 	 ()), our derived










 The network structure affects the likelihood of conflict because it is the channel of
social control mechanisms. In a segregated structure, the likelihood of intergroup
conflict is usually higher because dense connections between group fellows allow
for the spread of selective incentives that support mobilization. Moreover, scarce
relations between members of the competing groups mitigate the distribution of
suppressing motives. Because social control is often internalized, segregation
increases the likelihood of intergroup conflict also where individuals only have eye
contact with each other.
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Answering these questions required an explanation of individual behavior that is
causing these macro consequences.
) . 	 	
 		  	#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 	 #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 Individuals might be mobilized to participate if direct and internalized forms of
social control compensate for the cost of contribution. Social control implies a
distribution of positive and negative incentives that constrain individual decisions,
conditional on expectations and behavior of the individual and relevant others.
Depending on the nature of social control and on the composition of the ego-network
of the individual, social control can facilitate or suppress participation. As the web of
interpersonal relations defines the social network, macro structural effects can be
derived as a consequence of social control mechanisms.
Social selective incentives reward group fellows for participation. Traitor rewards
are conveyed in interpersonal relations between members of the competing groups
and inhibit participation. Consequently, these forms of social control are responsible
for the segregation effect. Behavioral confirmation, however, has a double edge; it
can contribute to the establishment of widespread activism as well as to the
dissemination of peaceful behavior. The larger the size of normative pressure
(selective incentives) compared to confirmation pressure, the stronger the effect of
segregation on intergroup conflict.
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Besides these main research questions, in the simulations we also investigated
whether the effects and macro consequences of social control mechanisms are
dependent on assumptions about 	#	 and access to information or not.
We examined the effect of social control mechanisms and structural configurations on
intergroup conflict under four behavioral models. These models differed in the
assumptions regarding the level of calculating rationality of individual actors and
regarding the amount of information individuals have access to. We were particularly
interested in the effect of segregation on the likelihood of conflict under the different
model specifications. Simulation results showed that under certain structural conditions,
rational individuals with higher amount of information were more likely to be trapped
in harmful conflict than less rational actors. Furthermore, rigid assumptions about
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individual rationality slightly strengthened the effect of segregation on intergroup
conflict.
We demonstrated that not only segregation, but also !  
	
 are associated with the likelihood of intergroup conflict. For instance, minority
hostages can suppress mobilization, bridging ties can play a brokerage in the spread of
contribution, and loosely connected subgroups may either elicit or inhibit intergroup
conflict depending on the behavioral assumptions.
2-				!
Besides the structural embeddedness of behavior, 	 plays also
a crucial role in intergroup relations. The historical record of previous encounters and
prospects of future relations have firm effects on present attitudes and actions in the
intergroup context. Empirical examples of inflating clashes and durable conflicts
between groups challenged us to explain the emergence of such scenarios. Fortunately,
intergroup relations are more frequently peaceful than violent, which drove us towards
the exploration of the conditions under which peaceful coexistence prevails.
Our explanation of the dynamics of intergroup relations concentrated on
mechanisms at the individual level that aggregate to macro scenarios. Individual
decisions are strongly affected by both experiences from the past and expectations
about the future. With regard to the temporal embeddedness of action, in this study,
we adopted a view of 		. We claimed that individuals do not recall
all past events when making decisions and neither do they make extensive
calculations about long-term consequences. Instead, they are guided by 
#. With regard to the question, what are these guiding rules, based
on recommendations of previous literature we formulated hypotheses about the
existence of three mechanisms, namely criticalness, reinforcement learning, and
reciprocity. 	 dictates contribution when the individual expects a single
decision to change the outcome of the competition.  	!			 prescribes
sticking with a decision that gave rise to a satisfactory outcome. It calls for a change
when the outcome was unsatisfactory.   	 evoke peaceful
responses to observed peaceful behavior of others and evoke retaliations to previous
contributions to conflict. Individuals might reciprocate the collective action of the
other group, but also actions of relevant individuals. In this study, we have taken into
consideration all these behavioral mechanisms. The main argument to present this
approach was that behavioral strategies might differ between and also within actors.
An original aspect of this research was that it tested the influence of different
behavioral heuristics on individual decisions simultaneously in the experimental
laboratory. We could test the effect of temporal embeddedness as in parts of the
experiment subjects played  IPG games. Unlike in the 	 
where subjects did not receive any feedback on previous outcomes, in the repeated
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games they received information about the outcome of the previous game and
eventually about the decision of their neighbors. As structural conditions were
introduced also in the repeated games, 		!!!	 could
be also tested.
Let us now provide a brief summary about the main 	 ()) about
the effect of temporal embeddedness and about the interactions of structure and time.
We also summarize the hypotheses () that were formulated for these questions and
the conclusions that were drawn from the experimental results ().
) 0
			#/3	"
	 	 	 ! 	!    ! /1  	 !!
			/
 We predicted that some typical scenarios would occur, such as stable peace, durable
conflict, a spiral of peace, and a spiral of conflict. Our forecast was that stable peace
and a spiral of peace would be more likely in a mixed seating configuration and
durable conflict and spiral of conflict would be more likely when segregation is
high.
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		/
 Our hypothesis was that individual choice in the experiments would be guided by
simple behavioral rules that are partly based on experience from previous
encounters and partly based on expectations about future interactions. We predicted
that the combination of criticalness, reinforcement learning, intergroup reciprocity,
and local reciprocity mechanisms would influence actual individual decisions.
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In this section, we discuss some implications of this study for societal applications.
Our model was built on the presumption that the origin of intergroup conflict is the
	 between the groups for certain limited resources. If there is no competition,
intergroup relations have a completely different nature. In most cases, the lack of
negative interdependency is a guarantee for peaceful coexistence, even if there are dark
memories of the past or there is a high level of segregation. In these situations, there
could be other difficulties, such as coordination problems. For instance, using the same
standards would be beneficial for interacting groups, but naturally enough, none of the
groups are keen on changing its own established system. This research has not directly
dealt with such situations, but it might have some valid implications also for these
cases. The underlying mechanisms of social control and decision heuristics work in a
similar way in these contexts, causing effects of structural and temporal embeddedness.
For example, people experience strong confirmation pressure from relevant others to
use identical standards, such as speaking the same language as they speak.
Consequently, members of a minority, who are exposed to members of the majority
group, are easily forced to adopt the standards of the other group. Furthermore,
segregation of the social network directly leads to the same standards within the
segments, such as to the evolution of dialects in remote parts of a language area.
A closer correspondence can be made between the results of this study and situations
in which groups actually compete for a certain goal. However, 		
 , as mutual collective action does not always have suboptimal
consequences. Intergroup rivalry might result in a draw that is not harmful for either
side or the groups may reach a  and divide the public good. Furthermore,
competitions might have a positive value for the larger community such as in the case
of team sports or competition between R&D teams. In these cases, there is still a free
riding problem within the groups, but mobilization has positive externalities for the
other group. The community has an interest in enforcing participation. Therefore policy
suggestions that follow from our analysis are the opposite to the case of harmful
competition. In order to facilitate contribution, dense relations within the group and
strong selective incentives are needed. Besides, ties between members of the rival
groups should be minimized or should be kept at a neutral level.
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These implications also hold for in-group # 	 . The key
mechanism to the solution of these social dilemmas is the distribution of strong
selective incentives and their internalization. Our model predicts, similarly to Coleman
(1990), that this works best in a dense network with transitive ties. On the other hand,
strong confirmation pressure in a dense network might lead to widespread contribution
as well as to overall defection. In this way, behavioral confirmation is double edged for
cooperation, just as in the case of approval exchange (Flache, 1996).
There are possibly many more situations, to which the results of this study can be
implied. However, the major goal of this research was to understand and explain the
emergence of !		! situations and to show under which
conditions these can be avoided. In this respect, our major contribution was to reveal
mechanisms that explain how and why conflicts emerge as a result of structural and
temporal embeddedness of individual actions.
In relation to 	, our major conclusion was that 	 is
likely to promote intergroup conflict. Starting from a certain structural configuration, an
increase in the number of relations within the group or a decrease in the number of
relations toward members of the other group will definitely not facilitate conflict
resolution. For instance, this result supports policy arguments to encourage interethnic
relations and decrease residential segregation in order to help the resolution of ethnic
conflicts. However, as both theoretical and experimental results suggest, such a policy
will not always be effective. Conflict can just as likely occur in middle ranges of
clustering as it can in the completely segregated setup, due to weak traitor incentives
and the strong influence of (internalized) fellow pressure. Furthermore, already a few
zealots might be sufficient to initiate conflict even in a relatively mixed configuration.
In these cases, especially if the costs of desegregation are high, it is better to seek
institutional or external solutions for the management of damaging intergroup relations.
Desegregation policies also have to be aware of 	!		
.
As the examples of minority hostages and bridging ties show, it is often more efficient
to place certain persons to the right position than to implement a costly wide-range
desegregation policy. A presence of a small minority in an otherwise homogenous
environment might be sufficient to excite sympathy for the rival group and to suppress
activism. Bridging ties between isolated subgroups might play a crucial role in the
dissemination of radical, but also of peaceful attitudes. We illustrated that one
gatekeeper is usually not enough to play such a brokerage. Multiple bridging ties do this
better, when supported by strong bridgeheads, that is by influential group members,
who are in contact with the intermediary persons. To keep hawkish tendencies at a low
level, the most efficient way is to close down the radical groups’ bridging contacts to
the outside world, and thus to isolate radicalism. With regard to the question of how can
such structural strategies be implemented in practice, one can benefit from
recommendations of applied social network analysis (e.g., Kratzer, 2001; Leenders,
Kratzer, and van Engelen, 2002).
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There will always be heroes who are prepared to die to advance the position of
their group. In the experiments of this study, a significant portion of subjects
sacrificed the received bonus, even when their decision remained anonymous and the
effort was completely fruitless. We did not find any personality trait that would
strongly correlate with such behavior, except prosocial orientation, to a certain extent.
The interesting result that zealots often have prosocial attitudes implies that it is the
individualistic “invisible hand” that would save intergroup relations from lethal
rivalry.
'	#$	 is a remedy for conflict also in another sense. Apart from
fanatics, most individuals are sensitive to social control effects. Experimental results
show that social control from fellow group members even in an internalized form
impacts upon individual action. As fellows are more likely to demand contribution,
downgrading fellow contacts would further conflict resolution. In 	,
individuals build primarily on their egoistic incentives and do not make costly
sacrifices for the group.
4	  are also isolated from their fellows. Besides free riding
incentives, an additional motivation for them to defect is traitor pressure from their
neighbors. Minority groups do not have many choices, apart from assimilating into
their environment. If they are too few, they cannot even hope to evoke tolerant
attitudes from their neighbors.
As experimental results show, traitor incentives are only internalized and affect
decisions when group affiliation is combined with visible characteristics, such as
gender. In practice, social relations are much stronger than in the laboratory. We
could therefore expect the transmission of immaterial traitor rewards between
members of the different groups. This prescribes another route out of troubled
intergroup relations, which is $	. As relations across groups are propagated
and network paths between individuals are shortened, exposure to other cultures
increases and individuals are influenced by stronger traitor incentives that work
against the emergence of intergroup conflict of a traditional kind.
In relation to 	, we concluded that intergroup competition that
is repeated in a similar fashion often has similar outcomes because individual decisions
are also relatively stable over time. On one hand, peaceful relations are likely to be
preserved. On the other hand, conflict is also frequently a follow-up of previous
conflict, although the winners of the competition might change. The pessimistic
prediction that vengeance drives conflict toward ultimate escalation is not supported by
our experimental data. Individuals were tempted again and again by the free rider
benefits of peaceful behavior.
In general, our results suggest that effects of temporal embeddedness are not as
strong as effects of the payoff structure and social control. Among temporal effects, the

 !  ! proved to be more influential than the shadow of the past as
individuals were rather forward than backward-looking. We demonstrated that the
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proper model of action should also consider influences of previous encounters.
Experiments showed that subjects were reinforced to adopt peaceful behavior, but they
were not likely to learn activism in the Pavlovian sense. In general, being aware of the
implications of lessons learned in the past for one’s future were developed over time
and reinforcement was detected more often in later stages of the experiment. The
!		!!	!#!! gives hope for endogenous
solutions of intergroup conflict. In principle, a deadlock of a clash can be broken by a
critical mass of defecting initiatives: others will follow as they learn over time the
benefits of peaceful coexistence. This process requires a lot of patience if people indeed
need time to adopt reinforcement principles. In practice, this could be facilitated by
making the negative consequences of the past transparent and by helping coordination
between initiators of peace.
Another positive result of the experiments for conflict resolution is that subjects 
	 the collective action of the rival group except where they were provoked
by other incentives. This suggests that vengeance can be avoided in the intergroup
context. On the other hand, we found conditional support for the existence of local
reciprocity. Under certain conditions subjects retaliated the previous contribution
decisions of other subjects seated adjacent to them. This result implies that unlike in the
intergroup context, revenge can be an important mechanism in interpersonal relations.
Furthermore, a contagion of interpersonal retaliations might gradually lead to an
outburst of intergroup conflict.
Still, such macro dynamics were not detected in the experiments. There was no
indication that conflict would have been solved as individuals adopted reinforcement
over time. Furthermore there was also no sign that local retaliations were leading to a
spiral of conflict. These scenarios did not occur in the repeated games because of the
presence of intervening effects, of which the most influential was the role of
%	!.
Subjects did evaluate possible outcomes of subsequent games, which is very much in
line with the rational choice perspective on individual action. On the other hand, these
evaluations were far from being sophisticated and perfect, which shows that individual
rationality also in this aspect has strong limitations. Subjects helped their group only if
they felt that a single contribution could change the outcome. This happened frequently
as they largely overestimated the criticalness of their choice (for a similar result, see
Kerr, 1989). Furthermore, if subjects expected a victory of their team, they did their best
to take their shares not only from the rewards but also from the group efforts. However,
they largely overestimated the chances of their group to win and the efforts made by
their fellows (for a similar result, see Brewer, 1996a; 1999). All this resulted in a 	
 about the future and their individual role. After all, this optimism explains
hawkish tendencies in the experiment and much of why intergroup conflicts were
observed so frequently.
This implies that a 	#  of conflict resolution might have an
enormous power. Methods that can lower individual expectations and beliefs about
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criticalness would contribute substantially to peace. In practice, this means that the
media and for that matter anyone, who has control over the flow of information, carries
a large responsibility with regard to the management of intergroup relations. Major
channels of information could be used effectively to educate individuals about realistic
thinking and the irrationality of radicalism. Manipulating individual concepts about the
future in this positive sense would help the establishment of peace in the world.
However, this is extremely difficult as the groups have a collective interest that is in
contradiction with this end. They have an incentive to advertise criticalness principles,
such as stating that “we need  to win”. Besides, bandwagon effects explain why it is
always in the interest of the most popular political party to publish survey results before
the elections.
	%%$$%& 
In this section we critically discuss the limitations of this study and the problems
we face in generalizing the results. Our conclusions have remained at a highly abstract
level, as it was not our intention to provide precise policy instructions. We would
need to be much more cautious with regard to relating the results to concrete cases of
intergroup competitions. Empirical situations have special characteristics that should
be taken into account in their analysis. Most limitations of this study concern such
% that actually shape intergroup relations in practice. We intended to stay
at a relatively abstract level in order to focus on fundamental processes of structural
and temporal embeddedness. In this section, we summarize some points to which we
need to add complexity to understand concrete cases of intergroup conflict better.
Some of the restrictions and assumptions we needed to make can quite easily be
relaxed. Both in the simulations and in the experiments, we considered a specific
 $. As we discussed, in small groups individual decisions are more likely
decisive, therefore it is easier to establish collective action, even in the absence of
social selective incentives (cf. Olson, 1965). In large groups, relative differences in
group sizes are more important because of the disproportional effect of segregation.
We also discussed the importance of minimal contributing sets (MCS). The higher the
 to establish collective action, the higher the chances for intergroup peace
are. The !! of the IPG game can easily be adjusted to model different
empirical situations. For instance, the assumption of zero reward for peace can be
relaxed.
Furthermore, similar assumptions on structural and temporal embeddedness can be
applied to completely different interdependence structures, such as to  
. For instance, there might be objections to the too 	
	! in
the IPG game. In case of civil war, urban gang fights, and other violent competitions,
when the number of participants is not exactly equal in the groups, conflict outcomes
are still lethal for both sides. A game that takes this into consideration is illustrated in
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Figure 6.3.1. A significant change compared to the original IPG game is that overall
clash is no longer a Nash-equilibrium. However, by comparing the structurally
embedded version of this game to the structurally embedded IPG game, we would not
detect significant differences. Both the conditions for contribution being a dominant
strategy and the conditions for overall contribution being a suboptimal equilibrium are
exactly the same as those presented in this study. Hence, our major conclusions might
be also generalized for these situations.
5  	
6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Figure 6.3.1 Graphical representation of a game with an extended concept of clash
6: Nash equilibria are indicated by bullets.
It was necessary to decrease abstraction and consider some intervening variables
already in the experiments in comparison to the simulation analysis. In the
simulations, we assumed a linear !		 that was independent from the utility
of others. Furthermore, we assumed that the set of players is 	 with
regard to the applied behavioral rules. In the experiments, we found that utility
functions are sensitive to attitudes towards risk and to rewards of others. Besides,
experiments showed that subjects also differ in their strategic behavior. Subsequent
simulations that are follow-up of this study could incorporate this and could introduce
parameters about the distribution of social orientations, risk attitudes, and decision
heuristics in the analysis. Advanced models might also incorporate further individual
differences. An example is a distinction between forward-looking leaders and
backward-looking followers or aggressive and peaceful types. Such differences might
be caused by intrinsic values of fighting or differences in individual incentive
structures. For instance, some people may have a stronger preference for the public
good of victory, and in this privileged situation they would therefore be more inclined
to make sacrifices for their group (cf. Olson, 1965).
 Another major discrepancy between the simulations and the experiments is that we
did not consider 		 in the simulations. The theoretical analysis of
iterated intergroup competitions would be a natural development of subsequent
research that might build on the experiences of our experiments.



















There are also major limitations to the generalization of experimental results to
empirical situations. Although intergroup competitions often have the same target over
and over again, such as regaining control over a certain territory, 			
%	. Additionally, history cannot repeat itself
because structural contacts between individuals change. Neighbors move to another
house, old friendships dissolve and new friendships develop, or member countries of
rival alliance blocks change their dyadic relations. These changes might be partly the
consequence of previous intergroup conflicts (for empirical evidence see Doherty,
1990; Liska and Bellair, 1995; Liska, Logan, and Bellair, 1998). Extreme examples of
feedback effects of intergroup conflict on the community structure are the incidences of
massive refugee flows. In most cases, feedback effects promote a segregation process in
the community structure. A segregated network can remain a stable configuration, in
which intergroup conflict is repeated. As segregation and conflict stabilize it is difficult
to intervene and help the community shifting to peaceful equilibrium. Major research
implications proceeding from these empirical processes would see the formation of a
dynamic model that incorporates feedback effects of conflict on the residential
structure.
Furthermore, in the long run, 		. Assimilation, for
instance, can be considered as an optimal long-term strategy to avoid the emergence of
harmful conflicts between groups.
A major concern for the validity of this study is the difficulty of the 	
of payoff parameters in empirical situations. Even the utility of material rewards of
intergroup competition, such as territory, is difficult to determine. There are even
more problems with conceptualizing the value of immaterial rewards, such as social
identity, and also with providing meaningful parameter values for rewards of social
control.
A possible objection to the behavioral assumptions of this study is that 
	!!	! in interpersonal relations than that which we
have explicated. There are several regularities at the micro level that can be related to
undesired macro consequences (cf. Coleman, 1990). For instance, not every
acquaintance is a good one. There can be interpersonal feuds not only between
fellows, but also between members of the competing groups. Intergroup conflict very
often originates or results in negative interdependencies between individuals.
Furthermore, some ties are stronger and transmit more efficient social control than
others. There are also qualitative differences between different social contacts. Certain
individual characteristics, such as gender, might imply that ties are very different in
terms of content (e.g., Burt, 1998). As we hear about contemporary Romeos and
Juliets, we know well how the meaningless fight between the modern counterparts of
Capulets and Montagues lead to personal tragedies (cf. movies “Before the Rain” or
“Torn Apart”). Moreover, social control can also be completely independent from the
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intergroup context. Policies that aim to strengthen these forms of social control are
ineffective for the improvement of intergroup relations.
Another possible objection to the behavioral assumptions of this study is that 
	  	 
   . The establishment of effective
sanctioning systems, such as norms, can also be characterized as a social dilemma,
which includes a second order free rider problem (Heckathorn, 1989; 1993).
Furthermore, sanctioning those who do not take part in the enforcement of sanctions
includes higher order free rider problems (Kuran, 1995; Wintrobe, 1995: 59). An
example of how such dilemmas can be solved by  is provided in Stalinist
regimes, where top leaders executed the highest level officials who failed to punish
those party members who did not enforce enough “contributive” behavior in the
population.
The role of in-group hierarchies is another factor that was disregarded in this study.
Formal hierarchical control is an effective way of solving social dilemmas, but it does
not improve intergroup relations. On the other hand, internal hierarchies clarify
responsibilities within the groups for certain actions. If the set of powerful actors is
clearly defined, 		 between the two sides are also easier. Agreements
between leaders can bring settlements over highly segmented division lines.
Furthermore, a   that controls, at least to a certain extent, actions of the
groups, such as the teacher in the classroom or the United Nations in international
conflicts, can impose on rival parties that they be committed to peaceful coexistence.
This higher body can induce positive changes also indirectly by manipulating the
structural conditions of the intergroup competition. For instance, national
governments can implement and even enforce desegregation policies or can change
the competitive character of intergroup relations, for example, by dividing the public
good.
In general, 		 can play a crucial role in conflict resolution, even if they are
not external supervising powers but established internally by opposite sides. Intense
competition can sometimes be defused by institutional interventions of seemingly
little importance (for instance, by a fixed negotiation schedule, a referee or a
mediator). Similar help might come from the introduction of 	
#		, from
the intervention of  or from the . These interventions might change
the incentive structure, might manipulate the available information or create cognitive
interdependencies. However, as Rubin (1980: 385) claims, this help is only
conditional: “It appears that certain tried and true techniques of third-party
intervention, such as the introduction of communication between the parties, the
recommendation that the disputants consider multiple issues as a package, and the use
of such issue identification procedures as role reversal, facilitate concession making
and agreement only when conflict is relatively low in amount and intensity. When
conflict is intense, these very techniques may prove ineffectual and may even
exacerbate the conflict.”
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There are probably several more limitations and objections to this study that concern
the complexity of empirical situations. Despite these reservations, our analysis was
nevertheless able to demonstrate the effect of intergroup competition, structural and
temporal embeddedness on the likelihood of group conflict. This may help conflict
resolution in empirical situations that are along these lines.
	7%!$%& $ !"
We hope that future studies of intergroup conflict and peace can benefit from the
results of this research. In this section we provide some suggestions for subsequent
investigation. 3	#	 might concern different types of equilibria in
repeated games or the derivation of aggregated consequences of bounded rationality
of players. =%	 in close relation with our experimental findings might
be designed to model macro consequences of certain combinations of behavioral
mechanisms given certain distributions of personal characteristics in a predetermined
population. Further simulation developments might include computer tournaments,
genetic algorithms, cellular automata, neural networks, and other 	
	 techniques for the analysis of repeated interactions and structural
dynamics. >%	 might be concentrated on the role of communication,
on the process of identification with the group, on structural changes, or on the
emergence of social control. > %	"  " and # 
might provide ways to test theoretical hypotheses empirically and might reveal further
underlying mechanisms for the explanation of intergroup conflict.
This constitutes a wide range of possibilities. Section 6.4 is devoted to provide
more concrete suggestions for some of the specific directions that were originally
planned to be part of this study.
?3	#	
As this research has demonstrated, social control can provide a structural solution to
the collective action problem within groups. On the other hand, this solution might
create a social dilemma in the intergroup context, especially in a segregated setting.
Individual contribution can be the dominant choice for everyone. This choice would
result in an aggregated outcome that is suboptimal compared to peace. Is there a way
out of this social trap? How can the harmful outcome of overall conflict be avoided?
Similar to Axelrod (1984), we can argue that 	!		 provide a resolution to
conflict. However, the strategy that triggers collective action of the other group is 	in
equilibrium against itself in the structurally embedded IPG game. Hence, intergroup
reciprocity has no theoretical support in this specific context.
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A reciprocal strategy that offers a way out of the social dilemma is TIT FOR ONE
TAT (TF1T). It defects in the first round and contributes only, if there was at least one
contributor in the other group in the previous round. A homogenous population of the
TF1T strategy is an equilibrium, if the shadow of the future is bright enough (the
probability of continuation is high). The proof is similar to the derivation of the





Subsequent research that assumes intentional individual action should examine 

  ! 	#  	 	 	 	. For the
purpose of this theoretical inquiry, hardwired strategies should be targeted that have the
same conditional rules throughout the repetitions.
To impose a restriction on the number of possible strategies and to make the
analysis more realistic, research interest could be limited to the analysis of strategies
with short time memory. An example would be to consider strategies with only one
round of memory. These behavioral rules are called 
 4 	
(Linster, 1992; Bicchieri, 1997; Klos, 1997). A Moore machine is a deterministic
automaton that provides conditional responses for all possible combinations of
previous outcomes and decisions. Different Moore machines can represent permanent
                                                          
1
 For the sake of simplicity, let us introduce the notations L for !L, -L for L, and ,L for !L. It is
sufficient to show that the homogenous TF1T population cannot be invaded by ALL C nor by an
alternation of D and C. For the first statement,


















A continuation probability δ >0 exists, if ;#≤-L;L is met for everyone.
For the second statement (the homogenous TF1T population cannot be invaded by an alternation of
D and C),

















A continuation probability δ >0 exists, if ;≤-L;&L is met for everyone.
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trouble-makers, firm free riders, revenging individuals, and many other types.
Examples of Moore machines are shown in Table 6.4.2.1. Cells show individual
decisions in round  as functions of the outcome and decision in round . These
strategies use only restricted information from the previous round. They are
conditional on the previous collective outcome and not on the exact number of
contributors. There are two possible past decisions and if we assume information
about the establishment of collective action, six possible outcome states (see Table
6.4.2.1). Every strategy is defined by its binary responses to these twelve different
states. Therefore, strategies can be expressed as 12-bit strings or can be uniquely
represented by the decimal number translations of these strings (these are shown as
strategy codes in Table 6.4.2.1). Additionally, for each strategy, the very first choice
also has to be defined. This could be a quite crucial determinant of fitness, as it is the
case with a property of being 	 in the two-person PD (Axelrod, 1984).
Table 6.4.2.1 Examples of two-state Moore machines
		 #   !




C D C D C D C D C D C D
ALL D 0 D D D D D D D D D D D D
Change 1365 D C D C D C D C D C D C
Likely Critical 2096 C D D D D D C C D D D D
Win-Stay Loose-Change 2709 C D C D C D D C D C D C
Intergroup TFT 3135 C C D D D D C C C C C C
Intergroup GRIM 3775 C C C D C D C C C C C C
TFT + Bandwagon 3903 C C C C D D C C C C C C
ALL C 4095 C C C C C C C C C C C C
6: Cells contain decisions in round . C=contribution (binary value 1), D=defection (value 0).
Among the strategies that are displayed in Table 6.4.2.1, “Likely Critical”
resembles the criticalness behavioral principle of the present study. However, the
“Likely Critical” Moore machine is strictly backward-looking, unlike subjects, who
base their decisions on expectations about the next outcome. “Intergroup TFT”
resembles intergroup reciprocity and the strategy “Win-Stay Loose-Change” is the
counterpart of reinforcement learning. The main difference is that in the experiments
we did not consider deterministic strategies, and we formulated our hypotheses in
probabilistic terms, since other factors also influence decisions.
Strategies that were shown in Table 6.4.2.1, do not use information about previous
decisions of relevant others. However, one of the major conclusions of this study is
that human action is strongly determined by social control from related group
members. For instance, previous decisions of neighbors might influence the behavior
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of individuals in the form of local reciprocity. In order to analyze what are the
successful individual strategies 	 !!	 	 in long-term intergroup
competitions, we need to consider much more complex strategies that are also
conditional on the behavior of relevant others.
The conceptualization of what is successful, however, is quite problematic.
Strategies can have overwhelming success in certain neighborhoods and ignominious
failure in others. Even in strategically equivalent network positions or at a fixed
location different strategies may do best, depending on the distribution of strategies
among others. Therefore, a study that aims to search for successful strategies has to
make simplifying assumptions, for instance by considering simple network structures,
such as a cellular world (cf. von Neumann, 1966; Nowak and May, 1992; Nowak and
Vallacher, 1998; Hegselmann and Flache, 1998; Flache and Hegselmann, 1999a).
?2			#		!!
The study that examines Moore-machines and searches for successful individual
strategies would need to specify the 	 of strategies that is analyzed, the
	, and also the  that is used to determine success.
To avoid the criticism that strategies are chosen in an ad hoc fashion for the
analysis, strategies should be systematically selected or sampled (Binmore, 1998). For
instance, similar to the two-person PD computer tournaments of Linster (1992), a
careful design can encounter  Moore machines with one round of memory.
On the other hand, for the illustration of certain tendencies, a #	 also
suffices, as in the computer tournament of Axelrod (1984) or in the case of strategy
selection by Kollock (1993).
One possibility to determine the success of strategies is based on an evolutionary
perspective (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Dawkins, 1976; Maynard Smith, 1982).
=  covers all phases of a strategy-life from birth to overwhelming
dominance and it consists of three criteria: initial viability, robustness, and stability
(Axelrod, 1984). '	 # means that a strategy is successful as a mutant in a
uniform population. The fabled TFT, for instance, individually is not viable in an ALL
D population in the two-person iterated PD.  	 means that a strategy does well
in mixed environments. In the iterated PD computer tournaments of Axelrod (1984)
TFT and slight modifications of TFT were the most robust strategies. If all possible
two-state Moore machines participate, GRIM2 is the most robust strategy (Linster,
1992). Finally, a strategy is #	 , if no other strategy can invade its
uniform environment. In the iterated two-person PD, ALL D is always stable and TFT
is evolutionary stable, if the discount parameter is sufficiently high (Friedman, 1971;
Axelrod, 1984).
                                                          
2
 GRIM is also known as FRIEDMAN (Axelrod, 1984). It contributes in the first round and never
contributes again, once the other player has defected.
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 		 can be used to investigate the robustness of different
strategies (cf. Axelrod, 1984). Evolutionary algorithms can test also other criteria of
ecological success employing the principle of “survival of the fittest”. @		 and
spread of successful heuristics can either happen  in the entire population as the
best performing strategies reproduce (Axelrod, 1984; 1997a) or can take place  as
individuals adopt better codes of behavior from neighbors (Ellison, 1993; Chwe, 2000).
If strategies are also contingent on previous actions of neighbors, the amount of possible
codes is extremely large, even if only two-state Moore machines are considered.
)	 are able to cope with such a variety as they introduce mutation and
crossover to the reproduction process (Holland 1975; Holland and Miller, 1991; Macy,
1996; Klos, 1997). Hence there is no need to encounter all possibilities; simulations
take care of the selection of successful behavioral traits.
??>			

In this study, we assumed that all interpersonal relations are equally important.
However, the impact of good friends and acquaintances on individual behavior might
be radically different. An advanced model design might take into account that the size
of social control effects is dependent on the strength of the tie between given
individuals. A further complication is that individual relations might be asymmetrical.
The subjective strength of a tie could be different for the connected persons.
Subjective values, ranging from zero (no contact, indifference) to maximum influence
(dictatorship), determine the weights of social control effects.
The consideration of relational strength adds substantial complexity to the model
and calls for efficient computational methods. 3	 	 techniques
could be used for this purpose. Agent-based simulations assume that individuals have
intentions and make choices that affect other agents (Macy, 2002). With their help,
emergent macro phenomena can be “grown” from simple rules of micro behavior
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996). For the study of structural embeddedness of intergroup
dynamics, neural network models might provide a powerful example of agent-based
techniques (Bainbridge, 1995; Macy, 1996; Nowak and Vallacher, 1998). 3
		
 that create a compelling analogy of mechanisms in the brain and in
society would particularly fit the purpose of the study of social network dynamics
(Minsky, 1985; Kitts, Macy, and Flache, 1999). In attractor neural networks, nodes are
agents and ties between nodes have weights corresponding to the strength of the
relationship. Agents adjust these weights over time due to their network strategy.
Meanwhile, they receive from and impose social control on others proportional to the
strength of the tie. These relational strategies combined with the decisions of whether to
participate in intergroup conflict could be the basic decision elements in an agent-based
simulation model of a subsequent research program.
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In repeated interactions, intergroup conflict or peace has a feedback effect on the
network structure. People might reconsider, who are their real friends, depending on
their previous actions. As a consequence of intergroup conflict and of dyadic social
control, some ties might become stronger and other ties might dissolve almost entirely.
In order to increase future satisfaction, individuals have an interest in strengthening
their ties with those who rewarded them in previous rounds with either selective
incentives or with behavioral confirmation. All this is at the expense of less profitable
relations. This kind of  		 (cf. Kitts, Macy, and Flache 1999) is an
optimal network strategy in the short run. However, it does not provide a way out of
ongoing intergroup conflict. After clashes, structural learning provides a directive to
decrease the strength of ties with members of the other group and to increase the
strength of ties within the group. This leads to higher segregation and durable
intergroup conflict, which Newcomb (1947) called  . It could happen
that the suboptimality of overall participation disappears and group members enjoy
continuous conflict, since they are compensated by selective incentives and behavioral
confirmation. But this is definitely not a desirable resolution for the social dilemma.
Individual structural strategies that show the way out of harmful clashes should be of a
different kind.
	84(0%&-$ !%($+ 
It is certainly challenging to find ways out of the spiral of ongoing conflict and
segregation without an inclusion of third parties or institutions. In this section, we
discuss some intuitively appealing 		 	 of , 	,
	 	
 , 	, %, and # 		 of members of the
opposite group. Subsequent research in the directions we considered in Section 6.4
might provide theoretical support for these solutions. Moreover, we would like to
demonstrate that suggested solutions can be explicitly linked to empirical situations and
provide ways out of the social trap of harmful intergroup relations.
A-		!#	#
In this section, we consider an endogenous solution of intergroup conflict by
. At the same time, we also illustrate how this research and its proceedings
might help to explain intergroup conflicts better than previous studies.
In his highly influential work, Axelrod (1984) argues that the relevance and
success of TFT in the repeated PD can help to explain the emergence of the live-and-
let-live system in the trench warfare of World War I. There is no doubt that mutual
226 
restraint became possible in the antagonistic fight because of the static nature and
infiniteness of the opposition. However, the two-person PD model of trench warfare is
too simple to represent the interdependencies on the battlefield. First of all, opponents
cannot be considered as unitary players. Soldiers as individual actors start socializing
with soldiers from the other side and they are the ones, who apply the live-and-let-die
principle otherwise. It is completely their decision to shoot accurately or not, although
there is extremely high pressure from their commanders to comply with group efforts.
On the other hand, besides the effort of pulling the trigger, they face a much higher
cost of breaking the strong moral rule of “not to kill”. Because of these concerns,
trench warfare is better described as a team game, in which individual actions
aggregate to the collective performance of the armies. As the competition at the
national level can indeed be described as a two-person PD, for the two levels of
interdependencies the IPG game provides an accurate representation.
Figure 6.5.1.1 Application of the structurally embedded IPG game to trench warfare
in World War I
Social control effects entering the model as soldiers have an influence on the
actions of comrades and on warriors on the opposite side. These include behavioral
confirmation as well as social selective incentives between fellows and traitor rewards
towards people on the other side. Furthermore, in the form of orders, rewards, and
punishments, officers distribute strong selective incentives between their troops.
Social control effects are transmitted along the spatial arrangement of soldiers on the
front line that is more or less stable over time (see Figure 6.5.1.1 for a rough
illustration).
To get a closer impression of the social dilemma of trench warfare, consider a
numerical example. Let us fix the private shares of the public rewards from the
intergroup competition to 9:; #9&; 9A; and 9?. Let us assume a benefit for not
shooting that contains the value of a bullet, a spared effort, and moral satisfaction of
being 9. Additionally, side payments of social control are in effect. The supervising
officer enforces compliance strongly by 9?. Behavioral confirmation from each








concern sympathy to humans on the other side are negligible (9::). In the
structurally embedded IPG game of this payoff structure, shooting is a dominant
strategy of all soldiers. Independently of what others do, individuals are always better
off by fighting. Rationality dictates the application of the live-and-let-die principle for
everyone. The aggregated consequence of overall participation in the bloodshed is
dominant strategy equilibrium. However, in this outcome everyone is rewarded less
() than in overall peace (&:), which shows the social dilemma character of trench
warfare.
Due to the static nature of opposition, the interdependency is repeated in the same
structure. As Section 6.4.1 shows, if the likelihood of continuation is large enough
(δ≥:AB), the strategy TF1T ensures a possibility of an endogenous solution for the
conflict. The emergence of the live-and-let-live system can be explained by the
overall adoption of this rule. On the other hand, the easy collapse of this system is the
consequence of the extreme vulnerability of this equilibrium to a single trembling
hand (cf. Selten, 1975).
A&)!	
Another internal solution has its roots in the 	 of Allport (1954).
Facilitating contact formation and interaction between members of the rival groups
might contribute to the dissemination of traitor incentives and consequently to the
resolution of intergroup conflict. However, it is more difficult to find a rationale for
actors to behave tolerantly and form such contacts voluntarily, especially during
ongoing conflict. Unlike structural learning (cf. Section 6.4.5), 	 is a farsighted
network strategy that is based on short-term sacrifices in order to gain long-term
benefits of intergroup peace. Subsequent research might examine under which
conditions, if at all, strategic formation of intergroup ties would bring individual
benefits in the long run. Another question concerns whether or not tolerant network
strategies can invade a segregated population that is full of prejudice, and whether or
not tolerant societies can be in evolutionary stable equilibrium.
This investigation might take place by using attractor neural networks (cf. Section
6.4.4). In this perspective, the strategy “tolerance” gives new weights to the strength of
ties in favor of intergroup contacts. The success of the strategy might depend on the
likelihood of continuation and on how quickly individuals can change their ego-
networks. A key to success might be in the moderateness of the strategy. An
exaggerated application of tolerance would simply lead to treachery and not to conflict
resolution. Important fellow ties should not be sacrificed, as they are the sources of
propagating peaceful behavior. Furthermore, the network location of tolerant actors
might also be of crucial importance. For instance, individuals with high centrality in
their group can provide sufficient confirmation pressure towards several fellows, but




The idea that crosscutting social circles promote good intergroup relations dates
back to Simmel (1955[1908]). This theorem was elaborated further in several respects
(LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Deschamps and Doise, 1978; Blau and Schwartz, 1984;
Brewer and Miller, 1984; Flap, 1988). In empirical research, the hypothesis was
tested, for instance, by using data on intermarriage (Blau and Schwartz, 1984). In
political science, crosscutting dimensions have been recognized to overcome deeply
rooted cleavages in Western democracies (cf. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). However,
there is also contradicting evidence, which shows that crosscutting social circles do
not necessarily influence behavior, for instance, voting (Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000).
A subsequent study could analyze the effects of introducing a new issue that causes
a similar negative interdependency as the old issue of intergroup competition, but
along another division line. In the case of crosscutting cleavages, the dimensions
would be clearly distinct. A further specification could concern the salience of actors
for old and new issues, as is the case in collective decision making models (e.g.,
Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994). Conflict on the old issue might end, if the
new issue is salient enough for actors in key structural positions to build intergroup
ties. On the other hand, conflict might evolve on the new issue, if the old division
becomes unimportant for most individuals and the population becomes segregated
along the new division line. Even worse, raising a new issue might lead to conflict on
both dimensions, even when cleavages are crosscutting. For instance, hooligans at one
time may fight as football supporters and other times they may be side by side as left
or right wing extremists.
Peaceful resolutions might emerge on both issues, for instance, if key actors in the
rival groups develop a high salience for the new issue, on which they agree. In this
case, the majority of the population does not necessarily have to be interested in the
new issue nor should they decrease their negative sentiments towards members of the
other group. It is sufficient if they remain interested in and influenced by the key
actors in their group. The popularity of influential actors ensures that conflict is
suppressed on the old dimension. This is probably why peaceful coexistence can be
maintained in consociational democracies (cf. Lijphart, 1969; 1977). For instance, in
Belgium, as long as the Flemish and the Walloon intellectual, political and economic
elite remains united on major policy issues, there is a chance that ethnic relations can
be rendered harmonious.
A?3		%
As Simmel (1955[1908]) claimed, a natural end to conflict is the disappearance of
its object. This refers to the case where a limited resource for which groups compete,
cannot be attained anymore. Another quick way of conflict resolution is when one of
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the contestants disappears. This occurs where one group   completely, it
 to the other group, or  the interdependence. Unfortunately, there are
several empirical examples, in which participants of conflict aim at the complete
			 of the other side. Ethnic cleansing and genocide are the most horrible
ways of getting rid of the rivalry. 3	 means giving up the original group
membership. It might be a beneficial strategy, especially if traitor pressure puts a
heavy burden on the individual who is surrounded by members of the other group.
The possibility of changing sides under such conditions might be incorporated into an
agent-based simulation design. Sometimes it is possible to avoid taking part in the
competition or to % the intergroup contest (cf. Hirschman, 1970). The exit option
has already been incorporated into agent-based simulations for the two-person PD.
Results show that enlarging the set of alternatives by the possibility of not playing
might help the evolution of cooperation and morality (Schüssler, 1989; Vanberg and
Congleton, 1992; Macy and Skvoretz, 1998). Individual exit does not obviously have
such desirable consequences in the structurally embedded IPG game, as gatekeepers
with extensive contacts to members of both groups would be especially keen on
refusing to play.
AA1	#			
Another strategy that advocates conflict resolution and might be of central interest in
subsequent research is # 		. As we discussed in Section 6.3, the
production of social control often involves costs. Consequently, individuals have
limitations on how much social control they impose on each other (cf. Kuran, 1995).
Costs require them to decide whom to sanction negatively or positively (cf. Flache
1996; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). This means relaxing the assumption that social control
towards in-group and out-group members is distributed automatically and infinitely. In
this perspective, a multitude of possible strategies can be constructed that are based on
different distribution policies of sanctioning resources. Positive discrimination, as one
of these, implies more likely imposing positive sanctions on out-group members and
negative sanctions on group fellows. Similar to tolerance (cf. Section 6.5.2), it is
difficult to find an individual rationale for the application of such a strategy. A
significant proportion of individuals may follow it if a backup group specializes in
higher order sanctioning and provides selective incentives for positive discriminators or
punishments for negative discriminators. A further support could come from the
inclusion of both forward-looking and backward-looking agents in the population. Far
sighted individuals might teach reinforcement learners to adopt peaceful behavior by
using discriminative sanctioning. Exact conditions for the emergence of equilibria, in
which individuals in sufficient number apply positive discrimination to protect
intergroup peace, can be highlighted by agent-based simulation.
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In this chapter, we summarized and concluded our study on competitive intergroup
relations. An overview of the main results was provided and some strengths and
weaknesses of the analysis were discussed. We also supported further investigations
with some suggestions. We concentrated mainly on recommendations for simulation
research, but we strongly believe that analytical model developments, laboratory
experiments, survey research, field and case studies might also reveal further underlying
mechanisms and enrich the explanation of intergroup conflict substantially.
After all, this study should be considered as a modest contribution to the search for
a solution for the costly enigma of intergroup conflict. Hopefully, this search will
provide the opportunity to challenge the heavy pessimism delivered from the time of
the Bosnian war, in yet another graffiti message in the heart of Budapest stating
“Szarajövõ” (the future is crap).
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Intergroepsconflict, vooral als er geweld bij speelt, behoort tot de ernstigste
problemen waar de mensheid momenteel mee geconfronteerd wordt. Tal van factoren
beïnvloeden het ontstaan van dergelijke conflicten. Intergroepsconflict in het dagelijks
leven is erg ingewikkeld, daarom kan niet worden ingegaan op alle facetten ervan. Het
zijn zowel de ernst als deze complexiteit die conflict oplossing tot een uitdagende taak
maken. Deze studie levert een bijdrage aan het onderzoek naar een aantal factoren die
van invloed zijn op het ontstaan van ongunstige groepsconflicten. 	
	




Teneinde te onderzoeken waardoor competitie tot slechte uitkomsten leidt, richt deze




. In het bijzonder is
het doel de condities vast te stellen waaronder 	
 samengaat met conflict en
welke de onderliggende mechanismen hierbij zijn. Omdat de meeste
intergroepsrelaties niet gescheiden kunnen worden van hun historische context wordt
ook onderzocht hoe conflict in de loop van de tijd verandert en wat de endogene
determinanten zijn die leiden tot positieve en negatieve veranderingen.
Groepen vormen geen homogene eenheid, omdat ze bestaan uit bewust handelende
individuen die op basis van hun eigen vrije wil beslissingen nemen. Hierdoor kan een
analyse van intergroepsconflict niet beperkt blijven tot het groepsniveau. Handelen op
basis van vrijwilligheid komt bijvoorbeeld voor in tijden van oorlog als burgers zich
aanmelden om in dienst te gaan, soldaten zich vrijwillig aanmelden om aan het front
te vechten en frontsoldaten zich aanbieden om speciale opdrachten uit te voeren
(Coleman, 1990). Een ander voorbeeld wordt gevormd door zelfmoordcommando's;
zij riskeren niet alleen hun leven maar offeren het in het geloof dat het bij zal dragen
aan het bereiken van een groepsdoel, zoals onafhankelijkheid. Over het algemeen
geldt dat individuele participatie in intergroepsconflict zelden een grote investering
vereist, wel is het zo dat aan het helpen van de groep altijd een bepaalde hoeveelheid





  . Om intergroepsconflict te kunnen verklaren is het nodig te
achterhalen waarop individuele participatie gebaseerd is.







intergroep- en interpersoonlijke relaties spelen. Intergroepscompetitie en -vergelijking
stimuleren deelname in conflict via 
 die verdeeld worden onder de
leden van de winnende partij, zoals territorium, trots of sociale identiteit. Sociale
relaties met relevante anderen leggen beperkingen op aan individuele beslissingen via
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verschillende vormen van 
 	, waardoor participatie zowel kan worden
bevorderd als verminderd. De historische context is van belang omdat mensen zich




. Deze heuristieken zijn
gedeeltelijk gebaseerd op de 
 die individuen in de loop van de tijd opdoen. Zo
kan men van het verleden hebben geleerd of eerdere beledigingen vergolden worden
of niet. Op vergelijkbare wijze worden individuele handelingen sterk beïnvloed door
	











 dat inzicht geeft in het ontstaan van nadelige conflicten als
gevolg van structurele en temporele inbedding. Het 	
  
 model voor competitieve intergroepsrelaties vormt de basis van dit model
(Rapoport en Bornstein, 1987). Het belangrijkste voordeel van het IPG model is de
coherente presentatie van enerzijds de duale onderlinge afhankelijkheid bij competitie
tussen groepen en anderzijds van de negatieve interdependentie tussen groepen en het
!
 probleem binnen groepen. In zijn originele vorm kan het IPG model echter
niet omgaan met 			

. Structurele inbedding beïnvloedt






, zoals respect, wanneer zij offers brengen voor
de groep. Groepsleden die geen inspanningen hebben geleverd worden gestraft met
dergelijke prikkels. Daarnaast worden mensen beloond met 	

 als zij
zich net zo gedragen als andere groepsleden. Zij die de eigen groep afvallen krijgen

 		
. Een belangrijk onderdeel van deze studie is dat deze
vormen van sociale controle zijn toegevoegd aan het IPG model voor competitieve
intergroep relaties en dat het model daarmee in een structuur van individuele relaties
is ingebed.
Omdat sociale controle via interpersoonlijke relaties wordt uitgeoefend, heeft de
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In het ingebedde IPG model kan sterke sociale controle, onder bepaalde structurele
condities, tot een ongewoon sociaal dilemma leiden. In dit sociale dilemma is
iedereen beter af door aan zijn groep 
 	 , maar pakt algehele bijdrage
slechter uit voor een ieder dan vreedzame coëxistentie. In deze structuur van
onderlinge afhankelijkheid is conflict het onbedoelde gevolg van bedoelde individuele
acties. Het model voorspelt dat een dergelijk sociaal dilemma optreedt als hechte
contacten binnen groepen meer gebruikt worden voor verspreiding van sociaal





van gedragsbevestiging (beloning voor ’hetzelfde doen als relevante anderen’). Een
extra voorwaarde voor het ontstaan van een sub-optimale conflictsituatie is dat er
weinig interpersoonlijke relaties tussen strijdende groepen zijn of dat de beloningen
van de tegenpartij van gering belang zijn.
Doel is niet enkel het aantonen van de condities waaronder algeheel conflict zich
ontwikkelt als een sociaal dilemma, maar om te laten zien welke structurele condities
de kans op intergroepsconflict vergroten. Meer in het bijzonder is het doel van deze
studie te kijken waarom en onder welke omstandigheden 	
 tot
intergroepsconflict aanzet. Simulaties en experimenten worden gebruikt voor het
beantwoorden van deze vraag.

	
 worden gebruikt om de algemene theoretische relatie tussen segregatie
en intergroepsconflict te exploreren. In de simulaties worden de structureel ingebedde
IPG games gespeeld door agenten binnen gesimplificeerde netwerkstructuren. Het
effect van de segregatie op de kans op intergroepsconflict kan worden uitgedrukt in
een S-vormige functie. Dit betekent dat in het algemeen 	
   

		.Echter, dit effect is gering bij zeer lage en bij hoge waarden
van segregatie, afhankelijk van waarden op andere parameters. Dit zijn ! en
 	. Verder is het 	








De hypothesen zijn gebaseerd op de resultaten van de simulaties. Ze zijn
vervolgens middels experimenten getoetst. Teneinde de structurele condities in de
toetsing mee te kunnen nemen is het volgende "
	  ontwikkeld:
verdeeld over twee groepen van vijf hebben proefpersonen de opdracht gekregen IPG
games te spelen zonder daarbij met elkaar te communiceren. Teneinde te toetsen op
de aanwezigheid van segregatie effecten en onderliggende controle mechanismen zijn
de zitplaatsen gevarieerd en zijn de zichtbaarheidcondities gemanipuleerd. Vier
structurele condities zijn toegepast, één waarin proefpersonen uit de twee groepen
volledig van elkaar gescheiden zijn (volledige separatie), één waarin de twee groepen
in een sterk gescheiden opstelling zitten (hoge segregatie), één waarin zij gemiddeld
gescheiden zitten (gemiddelde segregatie), en één waarin de twee groepen in een
gemengde opstelling zitten (lage segregatie).  Het effect van de segregatie op de kans
op intergroepsconflict is getoetst door de spelresultaten van de verschillende
opstellingen met elkaar te vergelijken.
We verwachten dat ook #	
 sociale controle individuele beslissingen
kan beïnvloeden. Teneinde geïnternaliseerde vormen van sociale controle waar te
kunnen nemen, hebben de proefpersonen in een onderdeel van het experiment de
mogelijkheid oogcontact met hun buren tot stand brengen.  In latere delen van het
experiment worden ook 
	   
 	 geïntroduceerd als
financiële beloningen. Dit gebeurt om de relatieve invloed van geïnternaliseerde en
directe vormen van sociale controle op de individuele beslissingen te kunnen toetsen.




Zoals voorspeld, is intergroepsconflict het minst waarschijnlijk wanneer er sprake is
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van een laag segregatieniveau van de leden van beide groepen. Echter, bij gemiddelde
segregatie is conflict niet minder waarschijnlijk dan bij sterke segregatie. Deels kan
dit verklaard worden door een plafond effect, deels door de hoge
contributiebereidheid in de gemiddelde gesegregeerde setting.
Over het algemeen laten proefpersonen zich sterk door financiële sociale controle
beïnvloeden. Interessanter is echter de bevinding dat proefpersonen hun beslissingen
aanpassen aan de verwachting van wat hun buren zullen doen, als die tot de eigen
groep behoren, zelfs al is er enkel oogcontact. Dit onderschrijft het bestaan van
geïnternaliseerde gedragsbevestiging. Er is ook enige ondersteuning voor het effect
van geïnternaliseerde selectieve prikkels. Hoewel het effect kleiner is dan dat van de
financiële sociale controle, blijkt de geïnternaliseerde sociale controle van buren van
de eigen groep een belangrijke voorspeller van de individuele geneigdheid om bij te
dragen. Geïnternaliseerde beloningen van de tegenpartij worden enkel onder bepaalde
condities aangetroffen. Proefpersonen ondersteunen hun groepsgenoten niet als zij
omringd worden door leden van de andere groep die behoren tot de andere sekse.
Samenvattend kan gesteld worden dat dit nieuwe experimentele model in
belangrijke mate bijdraagt aan het inzicht in het effect van structuur en sociale
controle op intergoepssituaties. De resultaten tonen met name hoe belangrijk
oogcontact tussen proefpersonen in een laboratorium is voor het activeren van
geïnternaliseerde sociale controle mechanismen.
De belangrijkste  (V), hypotheses (H), en 

 (R) over de effecten van segregatie op intergroepsconflict worden
hieronder kort samengevat.
 %    
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 Netwerkstructuren zijn van invloed op het ontstaan van conflicten omdat zij de
sociale controle mechanismen kanaliseren. In een gesegregeerde structuur is de
kans op intergroepsconflict groter omdat hechte connecties groepsleden in staat
stellen selectieve prikkels te verspreiden ten behoeve van mobilisatie.
Afwezigheid van relaties tussen groepen vermindert de effect van beloningen van
de tegenpartij. Omdat sociale controle vaak geïnternaliseerd is, vergroot
segregatie de kans op intergroepsconflict ook als individuen enkel oogcontact met
elkaar hebben.
  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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Voor het beantwoorden van de volgende vragen is uitleg over individueel gedrag





















































 Individuen kunnen tot participatie aangezet worden als directe en
geïnternaliseerde vormen van sociale controle de kosten van participatie
compenseren. Sociale controle resulteert in een verdeling van positieve en
negatieve prikkels die de individuele beslissingen beperken. De verdeling van die
prikkels is afhankelijk van de verwachtingen en het gedrag van het individu en
van relevante anderen. Afhankelijk van het type sociale controle en de
samenstelling van het ego netwerk van het individu kan sociale controle
participatie vergemakkelijken of bemoeilijken. Sociale controle mechanismen op
het niveau van interpersoonlijke relaties bewerkstelligen de macro structurele
effecten op conflict.
Sociale selectieve prikkels motiveren groepsleden tot participatie. Beloningen van
de tegenpartij verhinderen participatie. Deze vormen van sociale controle zijn dus
verantwoordelijk voor het effect dat segregatie heeft op intergroepsconflict.
Gedragsbevestiging, echter, heeft twee kanten; het kan bijdragen aan
totstandkoming van wijd verbreid activisme of juist bijdragen aan de verspreiding
van vreedzaam gedrag. Hoe sterker de normatieve druk (selectieve prikkels) in
verhouding tot de confirmerende druk (gedragsbevestiging), hoe sterker het effect
van segregatie op intergroepsconflict.
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

  "! 	
 	" 		 		    	
 	"  #"  	 
	!





Naast deze centrale onderzoeksvragen is in de simulaties onderzocht of de effecten







	 en 	 		 
	
. Het effect van
sociale controle mechanismen en structurele configuraties op intergroepsconflict is
voor vier gedragsmodellen onderzocht. Deze modellen verschillen wat betreft het
niveau van calculerende rationaliteit van de individuen en de hoeveelheid informatie
waarover individuen beschikken. We zijn met name geïnteresseerd in het effect van
segregatie op de kans van conflict onder de verschillende modelspecificaties. De
simulaties laten zien dat, onder bepaalde structurele condities, rationele individuen
met meer informatie meer in een schadelijk conflict terecht komen dan minder
rationele actoren. Verder versterken zwaardere aannames over de individuele
rationaliteit het effect van segregatie op intergroepsconflict enigszins.
Daarnaast tonen de simulaties dat niet alleen segregatie, maar ook 
	
	 van invloed zijn op de kans op intergroepsconflict.
Zo kunnen minderheden omringd door de meerderheid mobilisatie onderdrukken,
kunnen mensen die twee subgroepen verbinden mobilisatie bevorderen en kunnen
zwak gerelateerde subgroepen, afhankelijk van de gedragsassumpties,








Naast de structurele inbedding van gedrag speelt ook 	 

 een
cruciale rol in intergroepsrelaties. Ervaringen opgedaan bij vorige ontmoetingen en
verwachtingen ten aanzien van toekomstige relaties hebben een grote invloed op
huidige houdingen en gedrag in de intergroepscontext. De dagelijkse praktijk toont
ons vele voorbeelden van uit de hand lopende confrontaties en duurzame conflicten
tussen groepen. Hoe kan het ontstaan van zulke conflicten verklaard worden?
Intergroepsrelaties zijn (gelukkig) vaker vreedzaam dan gewelddadig. Vandaar dat de
nadruk ligt op de vraag onder welke omstandigheden vreedzaam samenleven mogelijk
is.
In de gebruikte verklaring over de dynamiek van intergroepsrelaties ligt de nadruk
op mechanismen op het individuele niveau. Individuele beslissingen worden sterk
beïnvloed door enerzijds ervaringen uit het verleden en anderzijds verwachtingen ten
aanzien van de toekomst. Met betrekking tot de temporele inbedding van gedrag is in
dit onderzoek gebruik gemaakt van het idee van 	 	

	
	. Er is vanuit
gegaan dat beslissingen van individuen niet gebaseerd zijn op een volledig overzicht
van gebeurtenissen uit het verleden gecombineerd met ingewikkelde berekeningen
over de lange-termijn gevolgen van die beslissingen. In plaats daarvan maken




Met betrekking tot de vraag welke beslissingsregels gebruikt worden zijn op basis





weten vermeende invloed, leren door beloningen en wederkerigheid. Het eerste
mechanisme zorgt ervoor dat een individu investeert in het collectieve goed als hij
verwacht dat zijn beslissing 
 heeft op de uitkomst van de competitie. Het 
 
 
 zorgt ervoor dat individuen vasthouden aan een
beslissing die eerder heeft geleid tot een bevredigend resultaat, en van strategie




 lokken vreedzame reacties uit op geobserveerd
vreedzaam gedrag van anderen en vergeldingsgedrag als reactie op investeringen in
conflict. Individuen kunnen zowel reageren op het collectieve gedrag van de andere
groep als op het gedrag van relevante individuen. In dit onderzoek zijn alle
voornoemde mechanismen in beschouwing genomen. Het belangrijkste argument
voor deze benadering is dat gedragsmechanismen kunnen verschillen tussen personen,
maar ook binnen personen.
Een nieuw gezichtspunt in dit onderzoek is dat gelijktijdig getoetst is op de invloed
van verschillende gedragsheuristieken op beslissingen van individuen. Toetsing van
de invloed van temporele inbedding is mogelijk doordat een gedeelte van het
experiment bestaat uit het spelen van  IPG spelen. In tegenstelling tot de

 spelen, waarin proefpersonen geen feedback krijgen over eerdere
uitkomsten, krijgen ze in de herhaalde spelen informatie over de uitkomst van het
vorige spel en over de beslissingen van hun buren. Met het introduceren van




Hieronder volgt een korte samenvatting van de belangrijkste 
$% over de invloed van temporele inbedding en over de interacties van structuur en
tijd. Tevens worden de hypotheses $% gemeld die zijn geformuleerd voor deze
onderzoeksvragen en de conclusies die zijn getrokken op basis van de 

 $%.
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 Voorspeld is dat er enkele typische ontwikkelingen voorkomen, zoals stabiele
vrede, duurzaam conflict, spiraal van vrede en spiraal van conflict. Stabiele vrede
en spiraal van vrede zijn waarschijnlijker in een opstelling waarbij de zitplaatsen
gemengd zijn. Duurzaam conflict en spiraal van conflict zijn waarschijnlijker in
een opstelling met hoge segregatie.
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 De verwachting is dat beslissingen van proefpersonen geleid worden door
eenvoudige gedragsregels die voor een deel gebaseerd zijn op ervaringen van
ontmoetingen in het verleden en voor een deel gebaseerd zijn op verwachtingen
over toekomstige interacties. De combinatie van vermeende invloed, leren door
beloningen, intergroepswederkerigheid en lokale wederkerigheid is van invloed
op de huidige beslissingen van proefpersonen.
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The ICS-series presents dissertations of the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory
and Methodology. Each of these studies aims at integrating explicit theory formation with
state-of-the-art empirical research or at the development of advanced methods for empirical
research. The ICS was founded in 1986 as a cooperative effort of the universities of
Groningen and Utrecht. Since 1992, the ICS expanded to the University of Nijmegen. Most
of the projects are financed by the participating universities or by the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The international composition of the ICS
graduate students is mirrored in the increasing international orientation of the projects and
thus of the ICS-series itself.
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 victory payoff (temptation) 
 payoff for free-riding (bonus) 
 peace payoff 
 clash payoff (punishment, draw) 
 payoff for defeat (the sucker’s payoff) 
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{} the set of groups ∩Ø
$, % group sizes $≥, %≥
α, β proportional group sizes α$$%, βα
L number of fellow neighbors of individual 




 minimal contributing sets for group collective action ≤$≤$, ≤%≤%
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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 grid size 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 ≥!
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" total number of dyadic connections in the grid
δ the proportion of network relations (nonempty dyads)
φ the proportion of fellow ties (clustering, segregation)
γ the proportion of opposite ties (exposure) γφ
ρ$ the proportion of ties between members of group  ρ$#ρ%φ
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











%UL[(ωL) probability of contribution in decision round $of
actor in experimental session &
%UL[ contribution propensity in decision round $of actor 


















α baseline contribution propensity
ϕ[ session level error term ϕ[~ N(0, ρ2)
εL[ subject level error term εL[ ~ N(0, σ2)
ξUL[ intra-individual variation
